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AN EXAMINATION OF DECISION-MAKING DURING ORGANIZATIONAL CRISES: A  




Organizations experiencing crises are subject to harm that can involve injuries, fatalities, 
financial losses, reputational damage, losses of assets, and others. This study examined a 
phenomenon central to minimizing crisis-related harm: decision-making. More specifically, this 
study examined the ways in which decision elements interact to influence decision processes and 
behaviors during crises. The significance of this study stems from a steady increase in the 
frequency and intensity of organizational crises, and the claim that novel research and insights 
into the phenomenon can promote harm reduction. Research in this domain has been 
predominantly grounded in post-positivist perspectives, suggesting that new insights and 
understandings can be found through alternate perspectives. This inquiry adopted a constructivist 
and holistic view of crisis decision-making, recognizing that the construction of meaning, or 
“sensemaking”, is an important aspect of decision-making. As such, this study sought to 
investigate how people make decisions during organizational crises, how and why some factors 
influence sensemaking and decision-making in the ways they do, how and why some decision 
factors are ascribed more significance than others, and the ways in which decision consequences 
influence ongoing decision-making. The conceptual framework guiding this study involved 
organizational crises, contextual decision factors, sensemaking frameworks, decision-making 
strategies, and decision consequences. The results of this study are intended to enlighten an area 
iii 
that some researchers and practitioners believe is growing in importance, and to provide insights 
that will foster improved practitioner capabilities. 
 The study’s findings suggest that in some contexts, organizational crisis decision-making 
can be appropriately described as a complex adaptive system. The findings also yielded insights 
related to several decision factors: past experiences, time influences, situational control, group 
member trust, and decision-maker self-perceptions. Among the various decision factors studied, 
decision-maker self-perceptions were found to be the most influential. Finally, implications for 
research, theory, and practice are presented. 
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The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer—often indeed, to 
the decider himself. There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision-
making process—mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.        
— John Fitzgerald Kennedy, quoted in Allison, 1971, preface. 
Introduction 
For a variety of reasons, the occurrence and intensity of crises have increased steadily, 
impacting people, the environment, and organizations in unprecedented ways. Among other 
types of losses, the World Bank has reported that costs associated with natural disasters alone 
have reached an extraordinary $555 billion annually (Hallegatte, Rentschler, & Walsh, 2018). 
Despite this trend, Coombs (2010) has suggested “we have only just begun to scratch the 
surface” in our understanding of crisis phenomena (p. 479). Within the broad domain of crisis-
related research, this study recognized the criticality of decision-making in responding to and 
managing crises, and investigated behaviors and processes that constitute the crisis decision-
making phenomenon. This study focused on the nature of crisis decision-making associated with 
a major wildfire in Northern California, taking into consideration the various personal and 
organizational contexts that influenced decision-making during that event. This chapter describes 
the nature of the problem, the purpose of the study, the research questions, the significance of the 
study, the theoretical and conceptual framework, and key definitions.  
Problem Statement 
 The problem addressed in this study is that an incomplete understanding of crisis 
decision-making processes and behaviors among practitioners could lead to flawed decision-
making. Flawed decision-making, in turn, exposes organizations to excessive harm involving 
people, finances, reputation, assets, and other interests. Furthermore, steady increases in the 
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frequency, intensity, and types of organizational crises have been accompanied by heightened 
organizational expectations that practitioners will be capable of effectively managing these 
situations. Some within the research community have suggested that a limited understanding of 
organizational crisis decision-making (OCDM) has impeded the potential for practitioners to 
reduce harm, and they have called for novel research as a means of yielding new insights 
(Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada & Saint-Macary, 1995; Roux-Dufort, 2007; Scott, 1994; 
Sommer & Pearson, 2007).   
The problematic conditions described in this chapter suggest there is both a need for 
novel research into organizational crisis decision-making as well as an opportunity to illuminate 
the “dark and tangled stretches” evoked by John F. Kennedy. This study aimed primarily to 
explore how people make decisions during times of organizational crises, and why some factors 
influence those decisions more than others. As Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman (2009) observed, 
“The optimal moment to address the question of how to improve human decision making has 
arrived” (p.1). This study aimed to advance that observation through an examination of how 
people make decisions, and how various factors influence the OCDM phenomenon more than 
others. This study’s focus centered on the 2017 Northern California Firestorm, as that event 
created conditions during which numerous individuals were faced with extreme OCDM 
challenges. Because these individuals represented diverse organizations, multiple perspectives 
and behaviors emerged, yielding outcomes that may be useful in improving crisis decision-
making in other contexts. 
A Description of the Problem 
The primary problem addressed in this study is threefold: (a) crises are increasing in 
significance, (b) expectations of people who manage those crises are increasing, and (c) the 
3 
absence of research into organizational crisis decision-making has not produced novel insights. 
The combination of these factors suggests there is a widening gap between the understanding of 
OCDM and the need for novel insights. Each of these aspects of the problem is further discussed 
in this section.  
Crises are Increasing in Significance 
Research has suggested that the regularity of crises is steadily increasing, in part because 
of the complex and unpredictable nature of organizational environments (Cesta, Cortellessa, & 
De Benedictis, 2014; Milkman et al., 2009; Mileti, 1999; Mitroff et al., 1988; Reger & Palmer, 
1996; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997; Weber, 2010). Evidence also suggests the number of crises 
are increasing due to natural and technological disasters (Robert & Lajtha, 2002). Furthermore, 
costs associated with crises have become immense, as reflected in a 2018 World Bank report 
reporting that natural disasters alone cause annual economic losses amounting to $555 billion 
(Hallegatte et al., 2018). The combination of these trends suggest that crises-related trends are 
multi-dimensional: crises are increasing in frequency, intensity, and cost. 
Heightened Practitioner Expectations for Managing Crises 
As the significance of crises has increased, so have expectations of organizational 
leaders, managers, and other decision-makers involved in managing them (Asgary, 2016; 
Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewé, 2004). Concurrent with these heightened expectations, specialized 
practices such as business continuity and disaster recovery management systems have become 
more common (Asgary, 2016). These types of systems are intended to diminish the effects of 
crises and other unanticipated events on organizational obligations (Zsidisin, Melnyk, & Ragatz, 
2005). While such systems are helpful in guiding an organization’s response to crises, they do 
not eliminate the exposure to crises. Rather, they are necessary because of organizational 
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exposures to crises. Consequently, the need for insights into crisis decision-making remain, even 
as contingency planning has become more of an expectation (Zsidisin et al., 2005). 
A Scarcity of Research About Crisis Decision-Making 
Despite the increasing need for effective decision-making during crises, the topic has 
received limited treatment among researchers and theorists. Although crisis management experts 
have expressed a need for novel ideas to advance decision-making (Sommer & Pearson, 2007), 
scholars have not answered the call by engaging in rigorous research and theoretical 
development (Langley et al., 1995; Scott, 1994; Sommer & Pearson). In describing the elusive 
aspects of decision-making, Allison (1971) referenced John F. Kennedy’s account of decision-
making during the Cuban missile crisis as being full of “dark and tangled stretches.” More recent 
research does not suggest the landscape has changed dramatically. Cottone (2001) suggested, for 
example, that while decision models describe decision processes, they universally fail to 
adequately describe how the culmination of the decision process occurs.   
From an epistemological standpoint, research related to OCDM has chiefly adhered to 
decision theorists’ positivist roots (Langley et al., 1995). Consequently, other perspectives have 
been employed to a lesser degree. While research has examined relationships between isolated 
decision-making behaviors and factors, research has not tended to focus on the holistic nature of 
their interactions. A holistic view might better explain how and why decisions processes and 
behaviors unfold as they do. As stated by Langley et al. (1995), “decisions get studied, behavior 
gets lost” (p. 266). This absence of this understanding was observed decades ago, when Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1981) claimed that— while decision processes are thoroughly researched— the 
question of why decision-makers engage in certain behaviors remains unanswered. The answers 
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to these questions may be further understood by using diverse epistemological perspectives to 
study the phenomenon.  
Purpose of the Study 
The fundamental purpose of this study was to further the understanding of how people 
make decisions during organizational crises.  This study sought to achieve this aim using 
qualitative research, employing a holistic single case study method. The case context involved 
individual decision-making for organizations during the 2017 Northern California firestorm. The 
results of this study were intended to inform ongoing crisis decision-making research and theory, 
and to yield meaningful insights that can assist organizational decision-makers in reducing 
exposure to harm. 
Research Questions 
The over-arching research question of interest guiding this study was: How do people 
make decisions during organizational crises?  Sub-questions of interest were: 
1. What are the primary contextual factors that influence decision-making during 
organizational crises, and do some have more significance than others? If so, why? 
2. What sensemaking frameworks do people employ during organizational crises, and 
why? 
3. What types of decision-making strategies do people engage in during organizational 
crises, and why? 
4. How and why do decision consequences influence ongoing decision-making? 
Expected Impact and Significance of the Study 
From a research perspective, the study was expected to help fill or expose knowledge 
gaps by adding new perspectives and by shedding new light on the phenomenon. Furthermore, 
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this study was intended to contribute to answering Langley et al.’s (1995) call for research to 
provide a richer description of the “dynamic linkages” and “interwoven network of issues” (p. 
260) which decision-makers encounter. At the core of these linkages and issues are the myriad of 
decision factors, behaviors, and processes that constitute decision-making. From a theoretical 
perspective, the study aimed to add interpretivist insights to a traditionally positivist paradigm. 
Kersting and Obst (2016) argued current decision-making theory does not ontologically explain 
why people engage in non-rational decision behavior. As such, this study was intended to shed 
light on research questions by exploring how and why people make decisions the way they do 
during organizational crises. 
Finally, from a practitioner standpoint, this study was intended to promote interest in 
practices and interventions designed to improve crisis decision-making. While it is premature to 
identify the precise nature of interventions that would benefit practitioners, it is expected that 
interventions might involve the development of reflective practice, development of group 
member trust and cohesion, and increased exposure to various decision-making processes. 
Furthermore, these insights may be informative in enhancing common standards of practice 
many organizations look to for crisis preparedness guidance.  
Conceptual Framework 
This study adopted a holistic view of the organizational crisis decision-making (OCDM) 
phenomenon, exploring the interactions between its principal components. The following frames 
form the structure of this inquiry: (a) contextual decision factors, (b) sensemaking frameworks as 
a precursor to decision-making; (c) decision-making strategies, and (d) decision consequences. 
These elements are viewed within an organizational crisis environment. Literature supporting 
this a priori framework reveals a multi-faceted domain subject to a wide variation of theoretical 
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foundations and researched phenomena. The exploratory nature of this study suggests this 
framework may serve as a launching point for other conceptions of OCDM. This section 
describes the elements of the framework and the relationships between them; Figure 1 provides a 
representation of the framework as a general systems “IPO” (input-process-output) model, and 
Figure 2 illustrates the key components of each framework element.  
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework represented as a general system model. 
 
 
Figure 2: Core concepts within each framework element. 
 
Organizational Crisis Context 
In this study, an “organizational crisis” represents the overall context in which 
individuals make decisions. Organizational crises are events that are unexpected and expose 
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organizations to severe consequences. Crisis consequences can be related to human health and 
safety, reputation, assets, finances, or other organizational interests. Organizational crises are 
further characterized by an absence of information, decision time constraints, and decision-
maker stress (Alkharabsheh, Ahmad, & Kharabsheh, 2014; Bazerman, 2001; Vivacqua, Garcia, 
& Canós, 2016).  This study did not focus on crises of a personal nature or other situations 
unrelated to organizational contexts. Furthermore, this study did not focus on emergency 
situations that—while potentially crisis-inducing—are predictable, and therefore subject to 
detailed planning and proactive measures (Boin & McConnell, 2007). Examples of emergency 
situations can involve incidents such as tornadoes, building fires, and chemical spills.  
Contextual Factors 
This study invoked the claim that an intertwined and changing collection of contextual 
factors interact to influence decision-making (Baumann, Dalgleish, Fluke, & Kern, 2014; 
Graham, Dettlaff, Baumann, & Fluke, 2015). In this study, the term “contextual factors” refers to 
the various forces that can influence decision-making, sensemaking, and crisis consequences. 
The ambiguous nature of contextual factor interrelationships suggests the possibility of 
simultaneous and entangled influences on both sensemaking and decision-making. Rather than 
attempting to consider all possible contextual factors, this study proposed to attend to those that 
have been described in literature as being significant: time constraints, stress response, self-
identity, past experiences, social influences, and group member trust and cohesion. These factors 
are further described in Chapter two. Other important factors that emerge will also be analyzed. 
Sensemaking Frameworks 
The act of sensemaking has generally been described as how people “make sense” of 
situations they encounter (Weick, 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). This act describes 
9 
how people establish frames of reference that allow them to comprehend, understand, and 
explain new stimuli (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). Literature suggests people must undergo 
sensemaking before they can contemplate decision-making. Hudson and Singh (2017) have 
suggested “once data is coherently structured, decision-making can proceed” (p. 167). In this 
study’s conceptual framework, sensemaking was conceived as an output from contextual factors, 
and as an input to decision-making.  
To investigate sensemaking in a diverse manner, this study’s conceptual framework 
incorporated sensemaking styles that have been associated with crisis contexts: Weick’s (1995) 
retrospective sensemaking properties, and the iterative data-frame approach to sensemaking 
described by Klein, Phillips, Rall, and Peluso (2007). Weick’s (1995) perspective is analytical, 
while the data-frame theory is processual. Together, they provided a multi-dimensional 
perspective of sensemaking’s interrelationships with other elements of decision-making. These 
frameworks are more fully described in Chapter two.  
Decision-Making Strategies 
This study incorporated three distinct decision-making models that provided a diverse 
means of examining decision processes. First to be discussed is the unstructured decision model 
proposed by Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Théorêt (1976). The model is intentionally broad and 
versatile, and accommodates specific concepts related to OCDM. In this model, Mintzberg et al. 
(1976) suggested that previously unencountered decisions—including those involving crises— 
tend to follow a three-phase process: identification, development, and selection. The 
identification phase involves the recognition and diagnosis of a situation requiring a decision. 
The development phase involves information collection and the formation of alternatives.  
Finally, the selection phase involves making a choice which reflects a commitment to action. 
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This broadly structured process accommodates elements from other decision-making models, 
and provides a means for contextualizing research data as decision influences are explored.  
Second, the model of conflicted decision-making was incorporated into the conceptual 
framework as a means of analyzing decision behavior associated with stressful conditions (Janis 
& Mann, 1976, 1977). This model suggests that in crisis situations, people tend to adopt one of 
five behavioral patterns that reflect a decision-maker’s level of vigilance. Of the five patterns 
identified in the model, only behavior is considered vigilant and high-quality. Vigilant behavior 
involves an openness to new information and a recognition of potential biases. Low-quality 
patterns tend to involve non-vigilant behaviors such as procrastination, denial, rashness, and 
resistance to new information (Janis & Mann, 1976, 1977).  
Third, this study’s framework incorporated naturalistic decision-making (NDM), a 
strategy which offers a pragmatic solution to the challenges of consequential and time-
constrained decision-making. NDM suggests that in certain conditions, individuals may not have 
the time, information, or cognitive capacity to analyze various decision options. Rather, people 
are likely to act rapidly, using a “close match” past experience to derive a course of action for a 
current situation (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). If a selected past 
experience is found to be inappropriate, the decision-maker moves on to the next most relevant 
past experience (Klein, 2008). The incorporation of an NDM perspective is suggested to 
accommodate the practical constraints of decision-making during times of crisis. 
Crisis Consequences 
The objectives and compositions of organizations cover a vast array of crisis consequence 
possibilities, as do the types of crises that organizations might experience. Therefore, the absence 
of conceptual boundaries results in a virtually unlimited universe of crisis consequences. To 
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enable the analysis of crisis decision consequences and how they influence ongoing decision-
making, this study adopted elements of the crisis management model advanced by Mitroff, 
Pauchant, and Shrivistava (1988). Within this model, the range of potential crises were 
categorized into four typologies: human, technical, economic, and social/organizational. These 
four typologies were used in this study to analyze the interrelationships between decision 
outcomes, crisis environments, sensemaking, and decision-making strategies.  
Study Design Overview 
 The act of decision-making during a crisis is complicated; it involves a number of 
influences that can “come from all directions” (Hickson, 1986, p. 59) leading to a myriad of 
decision behaviors and approaches. This study sought to explore the nature of the overall 
phenomenon, and aimed to shed more light on the topic through a thick, rich description of real-
world experiences.  
 To achieve the aims of this study, the author employed a qualitative methodology that 
emphasized the “how and why” nature of the study’s research questions and acknowledged an 
interpretivist perspective. The method used in this study was a holistic single case study, which 
provided for the in-depth inquiry into a phenomenon within a specific context (Merriam, 1998; 
Yin, 2013a; Zainal, 2007). The context of interest in this study involved the 2017 Northern 
California firestorm, and the case involved individual decision-making during organizational 
crises. 
Definitions of Terms  
1. Contextual factors: Internal and external factors that combine in various ways to influence 
decision-making (Baumann et al., 2014). 
2. Crisis: An unexpected event having severe consequences. Characteristics of crises 
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involve decision-making time constraints, uncertainty, a lack of information, and a 
dynamic environment (Mitroff, Shrivistava, & Udwalia, 1987; Roux Dufort, 2013). 
3. Decision: A selection made for the purpose of establishing a course of action (Baumann 
et al., 2014; Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
4. Decision-making strategy: The techniques, behaviors and processes used to arrive at a 
decision, as suggested by Simon (1957). 
5. Organizational crisis: A crisis for which consequences relate to an organization, its 
interests, or its objectives, as described by Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivastava (1988). 
6. Sensemaking: The process of giving meaning to events (Helms Mills et al., 2010). 
7. Sensemaking framework: The patterns, processes, and behaviors that comprise the act of 
sensemaking, as described by Boland (2008). 
Limitations 
This study was subject to several limitations that could constrain the transferability of 
results or could have affected the quality of the study’s outcomes. First, the study was conducted 
within the context of four 2017 Northern California wildfires that occurred concurrently and 
within a common geographical region. Because of the firestorm context, the study may be more 
relevant to similar wildfire events compared to other types of crises. Second, the study was 
focused on organizational crisis decision-making, so is not intended to apply to crises of a 
personal nature. Finally, this study’s outcomes might have been influenced by participants’ 
ability to recall and provide accurate and unbiased information during interviews. Information 
recall may have been particularly significant due to cognitive limitations during crises (Folkman, 
Lazarus, Gruen, & DeLongis, 1986). Measures taken to address recall and retrospection 
limitations are addressed in Chapter three. 
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Organization of the Study 
Chapter one describes the nature of the problem addressed in this study, the conceptual 
framework for the study, research questions, expected benefits of the study, definitions, and 
assumptions and delimitations.  Chapter two presents a literature review of organizational crisis 
decision-making, as well as findings that led to this study’s research questions and conceptual 
framework. Chapter three discusses this study’s proposed research method and design, as well as 
rationale for research design elements. Chapter three also discusses proposed details on the 
conduct of the study, to include case study design, sampling, data gathering, and data analysis. 
Chapter four presents this study’s findings, and Chapter five discusses the implications of the 
study’s findings and presents conclusions. 
The next chapter describes the literature review associated with this study. The literature 
review begins with a description of the study’s conceptual framework. Through this framework, 
he author has identified the core elements of the study, and how these elements are perceived. 
Chapter two also describes the literature review method used, as well as findings resulting from 
the review. The literature review findings served as significant guideposts throughout the 
remainder of the study.  
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Introduction and Purpose 
The purpose of this chapter is to review scholarly literature concerning organizational 
crisis decision-making (OCDM). The basis for this review is a widening gap between OCDM 
research and the growing need for insights that can assist organizational decision-makers in 
coping with crises. The core elements of this literature review consisted of the organizational 
crisis, crisis decision-making perceived as being embedded within risky decision-making and 
general decision-making, and the individual decision-maker within an organizational context.  
Conceptual Frame 
As described by Merriam (1998), Roberts (2010), and Miles and Huberman (1994), the 
conceptual and theoretical frame used in this review offered the perspective and boundaries that 
guided its structure and direction. According to Schultz (1988), research can be approached from 
a myriad of perspectives; the theoretical and conceptual framework gave direction to both the 
research process and the research questions.  Lacking such a framework, the study could 
unrealistically purport to study any and all aspects of the research topic.  
With respect to this study, organizational crisis decision-making (OCDM) exists as a tiny 
research niche derived from a very broad decision-making research domain, so the study’s 
framework was intentionally designed to be flexible enough to accommodate relevant aspects of 
the larger field. The frames guiding this literature involved: (a) the organizational crisis 
phenomenon, (b) decision-making during a crisis, and (c) the individual as the decision-maker 
within an organizational context. Each frame is discussed within the context of this study.  
The Organizational Crisis  
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An organizational crisis is frequently thought of as an unanticipated, improbable, and 
highly consequential event that can severely disrupt or cause harm to an organization (Crandall, 
Parnell, & Spillan, 2013; Pearson & Clair, 1998) and its objectives (Weick, 1993). Crises have 
been known to involve a variety of situations, including natural and technological disasters, 
lawsuits, product recalls, and other calamitous occurrences. In this study, several interpretations 
of the term “crisis” were excluded. First, this study was not intended to address crises which are 
primarily of a personal nature, such as an individual struggling with a critical medical condition. 
Nor were crises viewed as the immediate response to predictable emergency situations such as 
building fires or small chemical spills; these types of events can be anticipated and therefore lend 
themselves to advance preparations (Boin & McConnell, 2007).  
Decision-Making During Crisis 
The organizational crisis decision-making frame significantly bounded this study within a 
broad decision-making research domain. Consistent with this delimitation, this literature review 
framed the OCDM concept as being hierarchically embedded within the frames of general 
decision-making and risky decision-making. The frame was approached iteratively, beginning 
with broad parameters focused on general decision-making, narrowing the focus to risky 
decision-making, and then OCDM.  During this process, literature involving research, concepts, 
and theories that were encompassed within the broader domains was retained for potential 
analysis within OCDM. Each level of the embedded frame illustrated in Figure 3 is discussed. 
 
Figure 3. The embedded nature of organizational crisis decision-making. 
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General decision-making spans a wide-ranging domain that has been a topic of interest 
for centuries, with roots going back to Nicholas Bernoulli’s St. Petersburg Paradox in the early 
1700’s (Allais, 1990) and Blaise Pascal’s 1670 wager about man’s belief in God. Over time, 
decision-making research has examined a vast array of decision types: medical choices, 
consumer choice, investments, and numerous others. Neuroscientist and psychologist Ernst 
Pöppel suggested people make about 20,000 decisions each day, ranging from inconsequential to 
highly important (Tönnesmann, 2008). For these reasons, the vast domain of “decision-making” 
was deemed to be overly expansive for the purposes of this study. 
 In establishing the first constraint to bound this study within the broad context of 
decision-making, the literature review considered risky decision-making. In defining the risky 
decision-making domain, literature generally concurred “risk” implied the presence of uncertain 
outcomes and the potential for gains and losses (Edwards, 1954). Uncertain outcomes are 
associated with various levels of risk, as exemplified by gambles (Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson,1992), natural disasters (Tinsley, Dillon, & Cronin, 2012) and military conflict (Holsti, 
1989; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997).  
At the lower end of the risky decision-making spectrum, a decision tends to be described 
by the mere presence of uncertain outcomes (Conrath, 1967). An example of a low-risk decision 
might involve consumer choice between two new restaurants; the outcome is uncertain, but the 
consequences are relatively insignificant. At the higher end of the risk spectrum, risky decision-
making involves time constraints, stress, significant outcomes, and limited access to information 
(Alkharabsheh, Ahmad, & Kharabsheh, 2014; Bazerman, 2001; Vivacqua et al., 2016). An 
example of a high-risk decision might involve a choice about whether to insert rescue workers 
into a potentially hazardous situation.   
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Based on the range of situations and contexts within the topic of risky decision-making, 
this domain was still found to be overly expansive for this study. This claim is made for two 
reasons. First, although risky decision-making addresses high-risk contexts that are inclusive of 
organizational crises, it also includes simple, low-risk gambles that are not crises. Second, risky 
decision-making includes crises of a personal nature; an important domain, but one that is not 
applicable to this study’s context. Consequently, this conceptual frame required further 
bounding.  
As suggested by this review’s iterative narrowing, research indicated OCDM was a 
nested subset of risky decision-making. Several risky decision-making parameters were used to 
supplement the organizational crisis frame: time constraints, stress, significant outcomes, 
uncertainty, and dynamic conditions. For this study, OCDM excluded risky decision-making that 
occurred within a personal and non-organizational context. The OCDM frame also excluded 
emergency situations which are predictable and subject to pre-defined reactions (Boin & 
McConnell, 2007). In summary, this study asserted that organizational crisis decision-making 
occurs in the context of an organization experiencing an improbable and unexpected event with 
the potential for severe outcomes. 
The Individual Decision-Maker 
This study’s conceptual view of OCDM involved individuals who make high-stakes 
decisions for their organizations during a crisis; however, it was not constrained to any particular 
type of role. In research, crisis decision-making has often been applied to formal leaders (Bass, 
Avolio, Jung, & Berson, 2003; Garvin & Roberto, 2001; Hammond, Keeney & Raiffa, 2006; 
Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2007; Vroom, 2000; Yukl, 2001). For the purposes of this 
study, however, decision-makers could include managers, team leaders, supervisors at all levels, 
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and others in decision-making roles. Because of its focus on the individual decision-maker, this 
study was not intended to consider group-level decision-making processes. However, this 
exclusion does not suggest that crisis-related decisions are made in an individual vacuum, 
without input or the involvement of others. Rather, in organizational situations individuals are 
often tasked with decision authority (Zaccaro, Rittman, & Marks, 2002), and it is those 
individuals who are of interest in this study.  
Literature Search Method 
 To identify an expansive and encompassing set of literature pertaining to crisis decision-
making, this review involved an iterative series of database searches, followed by a snowball 
reference search technique as described by Greenhalgh & Peacock (2005). While sources used in 
this review were primarily found in peer-reviewed scholarly journals, some practitioner journals 
were considered.  
To gain an appreciation for the potential enormity of the risk decision-making topic, a 
database search for all keywords “risk,” “decision,” and “making” in the entirety of each article 
was conducted. The databases searched were Business Source Complete, PsychINFO, 
ERIC/EBSCO, and Academic Search Premier. The initial resulting dataset included over 85,000 
articles. Refining the search by adding the keyword “crisis” reduced the article set to 1,610 
articles. The terms “disaster,” “catastrophe,” and “emergency” were substituted as synonyms for 
the term “crisis;” these search results produced articles already identified, or emergency 
situations outside the bounds of this study. Academic journals associated with the original 1,610 
article set were identified and culled to those relevant to the topic of interest. Refined search 
criteria filtered out journals that were not germane to this study: these journals were related to 
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clinical studies, family studies, financial investing, environmental studies, and animal studies. 
The journals which were retained are listed below. 
• Decision Sciences 
• Group Decision and Negotiation 
• International Journal of Conflict Management 
• Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 
• Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 
• Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 
• Journal of Risk Research 
• Management Science 
• Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Process 
• Organizational Behavior & Human Performance 
• Risk Analysis: An International Journal 
The next iterative database search included the term “decision” in the title of the article 
(noting the term “decision making” did not produce relevant articles), and one or more of the 
terms “risk,” “crisis,” “emergency,” “disaster,” or “conflict” in the entire article. No filters were 
used to screen articles falling into a specific methodology or epistemology, and no date 
limitations were used. This search yielded 231 articles published in the timeframe 1954 to 2018. 
Reviews of all abstracts and scans of selected articles were conducted to verify relevance to 
organizational crisis decision-making and to identify key topics and areas of focus. A total of 32 
articles were deemed unrelated to the study and were eliminated, leaving a set of 199 articles 
resulting from the database search. A snowball search (Greenhalgh & Peacock, 2005) was 
conducted based on the set of 199 articles to more fully explore research or concepts that 
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appeared to be relevant and significant. An additional 78 articles were identified, resulting in a 
final set of 277 articles.  
Findings 
The results of this literature review suggested the following: (a) crisis decision-making 
studies have taken place within a vaguely bounded domain; (b) organizational crises are 
increasing in both intensity and frequency; (c) crises result in various types of consequential 
outcomes; (d) decision-making strategies are essential to the understanding of decisions; (e) 
crisis decision-making can be viewed holistically; (f) numerous, varied, and interrelated factors 
influence decision-making processes; (g) new epistemological perceptions of decision-making 
research can offer novel insights into current theory; and (g) sensemaking is intrinsic to OCDM. 
These findings provide guidance for advancing the understanding of OCDM. Each finding is 
described in this section. 
Organizational Crisis Research Has Been Vaguely Bounded 
Little consensus exists with respect to the boundaries of research applicable to crisis 
decision-making. This implies challenges to ongoing research, because in the absence of a 
recognized framework, potential exists for the loss of credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, 
unbounded research is subject to “misidentify the phenomena it aims to describe” (Roux-Dufort, 
2007, p. 106). To apply crisis contexts that range from a lost wallet (Sweeny, 2008) to nuclear 
holocaust (Holsti, 1989) is so vast as to be meaningless. 
The first sub-category of interest within the decision-making domain involves “risky 
decision-making,” reflecting the presence of outcome uncertainty involving gains and losses 
(Payne et al., 1992). As a simple example, uncertainty is present in a gamble involving the flip of 
a coin, in which the odds of a “heads or tails” outcome is known, as is the amount of money to 
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be gained or lost. In this case, risk exists even though all aspects of the decision are predictable 
(there can be no outcome other than a head or a tail, and gains/losses are known).  However, 
some researchers have argued such a view of risk is not consistent with real-life decisions 
(Conrath, 1967). An alternate view of risk would not be limited to pre-defined decision options 
and outcomes, but would consider external influences.  
Reflecting the diversity of risky decision research perspectives, literature revealed risky 
decision-making can range from a simple coin flip to a large-scale catastrophe, suggesting that 
the domain is both inclusive and exclusive of crises. Consequently, further bounding of the 
concept was necessary: when introducing extreme risk, events are often improbable, decision 
variables can be unknown and constantly changing, and outcomes can be severe. Such conditions 
are characteristic of crisis situations (Vivacqua et al., 2016).  
By narrowing risky decision-making within the context of crises, research was restricted 
to the higher-end of the risk spectrum. Within this context, research demonstrated a general 
agreement that beyond the mere presence of risk, crisis decision-making involves the elements of 
time constraints, stress, limited information, and severe outcomes (Hart, Rosenthal, & Kouzmin, 
1993). Even within this refined view of decision-making, researchers’ interpretations differed. 
For example, the element of time constraints has been interpreted by researchers in several ways: 
Argyris and Schön (1978) have argued that crisis decision-making entails split-second decision-
making, while other researchers have contended that a crisis allows some time for information 
gathering and analysis (Janis & Mann, 1976). This study incorporated the perspective that crisis 
decision-making is not necessarily split-second, but can allow some time for information 
gathering and analysis. Furthermore, literature has suggested that crises present decision-makers 
with dynamic and changing situations (Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewé, 2004). This assumption is 
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supported by the types of crisis situations that organizations experience:  natural disasters, 
technological disasters, and other dynamic situations. Based upon an integrated view of these 
perspectives, researchers’ synthesized views of organizational crisis decision-making include 
several characteristics: (a) event unpredictability, (b) significant potential for loss or harm to the 
organization or its interests, (c) time constraints, (d) limited information availability, (e) 
decision-maker stress, and (f) dynamic and changing situations.  
Organizational Crises are Becoming More Frequent and Intense 
It is tempting to view crisis decision-making as a highly-limited practitioner niche, 
applicable to only a small number of professionals within government emergency agencies, 
firefighting, law enforcement, and similar types of high-risk occupations. Research indicates that 
such an assumption is mistaken, as the ability to manage crises is becoming more of a standard 
expectation within organizations (Sayegh, Anthony, & Perrewé, 2004). Research also suggests 
the frequency of crises is steadily increasing due to the unpredictable and complex nature of 
business systems and environments (Cesta, Cortellessa, & De Benedictis, 2014; Milkman et al., 
2009; Mileti, 1999; Mitroff et al., 1988; Reger & Palmer, 1996; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997; 
Weber, 2010), and an increase in the number of natural and technological disasters (Robert & 
Lajtha, 2002). In terms of scale, a 2018 World Bank report found that losses caused by natural 
disasters alone amount to $555 billion in economic losses each year (Hallegatte et al., 2018), 
demonstrating the negative consequences of some crises can be enormous. 
In response to an increasing need for crisis decision-making understanding and expertise, 
research-derived insights have been limited (Langley et al., 1995; Scott, 1994; Sommer & 
Pearson, 2007). An analysis of crisis decision-making literature suggested a compelling 
argument that our understanding of the domain has not kept pace with the complexity and 
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frequency of crisis decision-making faced by today’s leaders and managers (Sommer & Pearson, 
2007). Roux-Dufort (2007) and Scott (1994) contended that the lack of scholarly interest in 
crisis-related domains has stemmed from the phenomenon’s disconnection from organizational 
theory. They argued this schism reflects a perception among scholars that crises are an exception 
to common organizational practice, breaking from the norms of organizational research and 
theory. Research revealing an increase in the frequency of organizational crises (Robert & 
Lajtha, 2002) might serve as a catalyst to change this sentiment. Despite these trends, this study 
did not uncover evidence that OCDM has been the subject of considerable research or theoretical 
development. To this point, Sommer and Pearson (2007) observed “For three decades crisis 
management experts have called for creativity to improve crisis decision making, but theoretical 
development and empirical testing are scarce” (p. 1234). This literature suggests this under-
representation has continued into its fourth decade. 
Crises Result in Various Types of Consequential Outcomes 
Crises are difficult to manage because, by their very nature, they are unpredictable, 
unexpected, time constrained, and dynamic. Furthermore, each crisis presents unique 
circumstances, contexts, and potential impacts. Because this study adopted a holistic view of 
OCDM, it attended to how decision consequences interrelate with ongoing decision-making 
processes and behaviors. As a frame for classifying outcomes, this study invoked the model of 
crisis management proposed by Mitroff et al. (1987). The model is appropriate for this study in 
that it provided a general approach to crisis management, applicable to wide-ranging 
organizations, threats, and consequences. The model classifies both threats and consequences 
into categories that are human, social, technical, or economic, summarized as follows (Mitroff et 
al., 1987): 
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1. Technical considerations involving harm to physical and technological systems such as 
buildings, products, and equipment.  
2. Economic considerations involving harm such as financial losses, bankruptcy, and debt. 
3. Human considerations involving issues such as injuries, fatalities, and personal well-
being. 
4. Social/Organizational matters involve considerations such as organizational breakdowns, 
morale degradation, and reputational damage. 
Decision-Making Strategies are Essential to the Understanding of Decisions 
Researchers have largely agreed that the quality of decision outcomes are directly related 
to the quality of peoples’ approaches to decision-making (Conrath, 1967; Herek, Janis, & Huth, 
1987; Mann, Burnett, Janis & Mann, 1977; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Radford, & Ford, 1997; 
Raiffa, 1968; Smart, & Vertinsky, 1977; Sweeny, 2008). As such, to examine a decision, the 
corresponding decision-making strategy must be evaluated (Hammond et al., 2006; Janis & 
Mann, 1977; Keinan, Friedland, & Ben-Porath, 1987; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986). While researchers have used differing terms to represent the ways people go 
about decision-making, this study has adopted the term “decision strategy” as used by Janis and 
Mann (1977, p. 415), connoting the behaviors and processes that constitute the decision-making 
phenomenon. The review of literature has yielded three strategies associated with organizational 
crisis decision making: (a) conflicted decision-making, (b) naturalistic decision-making, and (c) 
unstructured decision-making.  These strategies are further described in this section.  
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Conflicted decision-making.   
Research conducted by Janis and Mann (1976, 1977) examined “conflicted” decisions 
involving consequential outcomes and inclusive of crisis contexts. In these instances, decision-
makers experience conflict over negative potential losses associated with various decision 
outcomes, whether utilitarian (such as financial losses), or non-utilitarian (such as losses to self-
esteem or social standing). Janis and Mann (1977) argued that decisional conflict influences 
decision strategies through the introduction of such factors as decision-maker emotion, stress, 
fear, and loss of self-esteem.  
Janis and Mann (1976, 1977) further posited that conflicted decision-making strategies 
are influenced by varying degrees of vigilance. In this context, vigilance represents the extent to 
which decision-makers gather and analyze information, their openness to consider multiple 
viable alternatives, their willingness to deliberate within the time available, and a recognition of 
their own biases (Herek et al., 1978; Janis & Mann, 1976). Janis and Mann (1976, 1977) further 
asserted the degree of decision-making vigilance results in one of five coping behaviors. Four of 
these behaviors are considered to be non-vigilant and low-quality, and can be summarized as 
stalling, over-analyzing, jumping to conclusions, and selecting the path of least resistance. 
Behavior involving vigilance, or thorough search and evaluation, is suggested as the only high-
quality pattern.  
Janis and Mann (1977) suggested that decision strategies occur within a five-step 
decision-making process: (a) appraising the challenge, (b) surveying alternatives, (c) weighing 
alternatives, (d) deliberating about commitment, and (e) the degree of adherence to a course of 
action despite negative feedback. This model assumes that, even during a single decision-making 
episode, individuals’ strategies can vary constantly based on continuous assessments of potential 
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for gain and loss. As such, people are neither constrained to a single strategy in general, nor 
during specific decisions. 
Naturalistic decision-making. 
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) has been described as a decision-making strategy 
used in real world settings (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz et al., 2001), during which situations are 
dynamic, stressful, uncertain, and high-risk (Klein, 2008; Schraagen & van de Ven, 2008). Klein 
(2008) has suggested that classical, normative decision strategies become invalid in situations 
subject to time constraints because “they simply take too long” (p. 16). Naturalistic decision-
making allows decision-makers to quickly recognize a course of action that was effective during 
a past event, and therefore could be applied to a similar current situation. NDM represents a 
significant departure from more traditional normative decision-making strategic models 
involving the generation and evaluation of multiple decision options. By adopting a naturalistic 
decision-making strategy, people rapidly react to a situation based on expertise and prior 
experiences, foregoing extensive deliberation and analysis (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz et al., 2001).  
The NDM strategy involves a three-step process: (a) recognizing a simple match that is 
based upon previous experiences, (b) rapidly developing a course of action that is “primed” by 
the simple match, and (c) conducting mental simulations to determine if the identified course of 
action is expected to succeed (Klein, 1993, 2008). If an enacted decision is ineffective, the 
decision-maker then recognizes and enacts the next best match to the current situation (Klein, 
2008). Because recognition is contingent on one’s past experiences, Klein asserted that this 
behavior is influenced by an individual’s depth of experience. Because of its urgent nature, NDM 
has been explicitly described as being relevant to crisis situations involving time pressure, 
uncertainty, risk, and uncertainty (Schraagen & van de Ven, 2008). 
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Unstructured decision-making. 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) proposed that when facing complex and unfamiliar situations, 
decision-makers deconstruct problems into sub-problems which are more familiar to them. By 
using this strategy, people limit their decisions to the most immediate problems, thereby filtering 
out decisions which are more long-term and perhaps less urgent (Mintzberg et al, 1976). This 
strategy is built upon a three-phased process. The first phase involves recognizing a decision 
stimulus and collecting information to aid in understanding it. In the second phase, decision-
makers search for and design solutions that fit the existing circumstances. In the third phase, 
decision-makers filter for viable options, select a solution, and arrive at a final decision. The final 
stage of this decision strategy involves a deliberate and iterative consideration of alternatives 
based on an evaluation-choice routine. Evaluation-choice routines involve analysis, judgment, or 
bargaining. Mintzberg et al. (1976) found the vast majority of complex decisions involved 
judgment; choices based upon factors that decision-makers perhaps could not describe.  
Crisis Decision-Making Can be Viewed Holistically 
Complex decision-making in real-world situations can prompt people to adopt a 
cognitively holistic view of a situation, engaging in a number of simultaneous and interrelated 
cognitive activities that produce an understanding not found in each distinct element. Examples 
of dynamic and interacting elements comprising holistic cognition include focus and attention, 
developing mental models, managing uncertainty, and generating courses of action (Endsley, 
Hoffman, Kaber, & Roth, 2007). Klein further suggested that a holistic view of decision-making 
involves sensemaking, problem detection, planning, situation assessment, and naturalistic 
decision-making. In practical terms, literature has suggested that the holistic nature of the 
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OCDM phenomenon is fluid, and comprised of several aggregated decision-making actions and 
cognitions.  
Numerous Contextual Factors Influence Decision-Making 
Research suggests that numerous interrelated factors unique to individuals play a part in 
influencing decision-making. Researchers have described the interactive nature of numerous 
decision elements as a decision-making ecology (Baumann et al, 2014; Graham et al., 2015). The 
essence of the decision-making ecology is that a complex decision is understood and acted upon 
within its overall context; the ecology provides a framework for understanding decision-making 
(Baumann et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2015).  This perspective is supported by other research 
which emerged from the field of psychology, suggesting that decision-making is highly complex 
and contextual, involving numerous inputs mapped to decision options (Glimcher & Fehr, 2013).  
According to Baumann, et al. (2014), decision influences involve both internal and 
external factors. Internal factors include characteristics innate to the decision-maker, such as self-
concept, stress response, and experience. In contrast, external factors are those imposed upon the 
decision-maker, and are related to environmental, organizational, and social forces. Examples of 
external factors include time constraints, work rules, and limited information. Both internal and 
external factors are further described in this chapter. 
This literature review uncovered little evidence of research describing and explaining the 
cumulative effects of these influences, and researchers have observed that trying to understand 
even a narrow sliver of decision-making can be problematic. Confounding the presence of 
intertwined decision factors, Hammond (2007) claimed “there will be some indicators leading to 
one inference that will appear simultaneously with others leading to a different inference” (p. 
39). Therefore, contextual factors are not viewed necessarily as being causal, but more as 
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entangled sources of decision stimuli. While the universe of internal and external factors is 
extensive, this review found several influences that emerged as being prevalent in literature. 
Examples of factors influencing decision-making are shown in Table 1 and discussed further in 
this section.  
Table 1 
Examples and Types of Contextual Factors Influencing Decision-Making 




Cognitive biases and heuristics 
Internal 
Group cohesiveness and psychological safety 
Social factors 
Time pressures 
Limited information  
External and Organizational 
 
Stress Response 
Empirical evidence indicates that crises can induce stress, which in turn results in 
physiological, cognitive, and behavioral influences on decision-making (Kowalski-Trakofler, 
Vaught, & Scharf, 2003). LeBlanc (2009) suggested that in cases such as crises, the demand for 
physiological and cognitive resources can be overwhelmed, thereby causing stress. The size of 
the physiological-cognitive resource availability gap correlates with an individual’s level of 
stress. Depending on the level of stress, responses can include tunnel vision, hyper-vigilance, 
impaired cognitive processes, erratic emotional swings, and an increase in blood pressure and 
heart-rate (Lupien & Seguin, 2013; Weisaeth, Knudsen & Tønnessen, 2002). Ariely and Zakay 
(2001) have found that stress causes a variety of cognitive changes: the inability to retain 
important information, inaccurate judgment, limited information processing capabilities, and 
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increased defensiveness. Furthermore, Lehner, Seyed-Solorforough, O'Connor, Sak, and Mullin 
(1997) found stress contributes to an increased exposure to cognitive biases. From a behavioral 
standpoint, Lehner et al. (1997) suggested that stress results in a reduction of decision 
alternatives considered, the tendency to reinforce and not question a previously selected course 
of action, and the tendency to use ineffective decision strategies. In contrast, Entin and Serfaty 
(1990) found a degree of stress can stimulate vigilance and effort. However, Entin and Serfaty’s 
findings tended to relate to conditions in which cognitive demands were low; conditions that 
would not generally relate to crises.  
Self-Identity 
The concept of identity represents how people conceive of themselves, and what that 
conception means (Heshmat, 2014). Research has suggested that peoples’ self-identities 
influence their actions (Stets & Burke, 2000; Terry, Hogg & White, 1999), indicating that it is 
germane to the topic of decision-making. This proposition is supported by research conducted by 
Terry et al. (1999) and others who have found relationships between self-identity and decision 
behavior.  
From a theoretical standpoint, self-identity suggests people do not think of themselves as 
discrete entities; rather, they think of themselves in terms of their social connections and the 
group-related roles that they play (Stryker & Serpe, 1982). Stets and Serpe (2013) suggested that 
social connections, or group memberships, can involve businesses, sports teams, families, 
churches, or others. Furthermore, role types can include worker, teacher, leader, spouse, parent, 
or others. Because people can fulfill many roles and be members in many groups, people tend to 
have several different identities (Burke & Stets, 2009). Given the presence of multiple identities, 
Stets and Burke (2000) suggested that people adopt an identity that is the most salient in any 
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particular situation. From a behavioral standpoint, research has suggested that people behave in 
ways they believe embody the roles they are fulfilling (Burke & Cast, 1997).  
Another way of perceiving identity is through the lens of social identity. Social identity 
theory suggests that people tend to identify themselves based on their membership in groups 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Through an identification with groups, people often classify themselves 
and others into social categories, such as the organizations for which they work, their work 
teams, their religious or political affiliations, or others (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979). Hogg and Turner (1985) have suggested people identify with social groupings largely for 
the purpose of enhancing self-esteem (Hogg & Turner, 1985). By identifying with a social group, 
individuals vicariously enjoy the group’s status and successes (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Tajfel 
and Turner (1979) posited that group-membership categorizations lead to a “we-they” mentality, 
based on peoples’ in-group or out-group status.  
While both self-identity and social identity are similar in a number of ways, they differ 
largely as a matter of emphasis (Stets & Burke, 2000). Both concepts of identity relate to how 
people perceive themselves; however, while social identity emphasizes “who one is,” self-
identity emphasizes “what one does” (Thoits & Vishup, 1997). Because this study centered 
around “what one does” within the context of organizational crisis decision-making, this study 
emphasized the concept of self-identity as a contextual factor of interest. 
Past Experiences 
Theorists and researchers have generally regarded past experiences as a meaningful 
influencer of decision-making behaviors and processes. Baumann et al. (2014) argued that past 
experiences, whether of an actual or vicarious nature, are factors contributing to decision-
making. Klein (1883, 2008) suggested past experiences play a central role in naturalistic 
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decision-making, enabling people to use previous occurrences as a way of informing current 
decision requirements. Sitkin and Weingart (1995) identified past experiences as a contributor to 
what a person has learned about risk-taking, and the propensity to engage in risky decision-
making behavior. In discussing how people go about understanding situations they encounter, 
past experiences play a central role in the interpretation of cues during retrospective sensemaking 
(Helms Mills et al., 2010; Weick, 1995). From the perspective of decision-making within a 
leadership role, the influence of past experiences has been described as having both positive and 
negative consequences, as past experiences can provide deep insights about appropriate actions. 
But, past experiences can also promote entrained thinking which inhibits new ideas (Snowden & 
Boone, 2007). 
Cognitive Biases and Heuristics 
Cognitive biases are forces that influence the way we think and perceive the world 
around us, and literature reflects an agreement among researchers that cognitive biases 
significantly influence decision-making (Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011), often detrimental 
to the decision-making process (Korte, 2003). Research has yielded numerous biases related to 
cognition (Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011), social interactions (Hattis & Anderson, 1999), 
past experiences (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993; Wilson, Winter, Maguire & Ascher, 2011), 
information integration (Vlaev, Chater, & Stewart, 2008), self-interest (Vetschera, 2005), and 
others.  
Further confounding the understanding of crisis decision-making is the tendency for 
people to rely on heuristics or mental shortcuts that guide decision-making (Kleinmuntz, 1985; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1975). In the absence of deeper analytical thought, decision-making 
heuristics can cause serious judgmental mistakes concerning information inputs, consequently 
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leading to significant errors (Hammond, Keeney & Raiffa, 2006; Kleinmuntz, 1985; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1975). Research concerning decision-making biases and heuristics has become a 
topic of keen researcher and practitioner interest (Kahneman, 2011), and evidence of these 
research topics within crisis contexts has been found in several firefighting decision-making 
studies (Gonzalez, 2001; Wibbenmeyer, Hand, Calkin, Venn, & Thompson, 2013; Wilson et al., 
2011). The omnipresent nature of biases and heuristics suggests the quality of crisis decision-
making is mediated by these influences. 
Group Cohesiveness and Trust 
Because decision-making during crises is uncertain and information-deficient, people 
often “do the best they can,” not knowing for sure whether their decisions will yield positive 
outcomes. As a result, they are exposing themselves to personal risk involving social standing 
within their organizations, potentially experiencing the loss of face, or negative consequences 
associated with the inability to “make a good showing” of one’s self (Goffman, 1955, p. 222). In 
this study, the implications of decision-maker risk associated with social standing emerged as a 
significant theme and is discussed through the lens of group cohesiveness and psychological 
safety, further described in this section. 
Group cohesiveness. 
Craig and Kelly’s (1999) review of group cohesiveness literature suggests the condition 
is most commonly viewed as the extent of members’ attraction to the group. Others have 
elaborated on group cohesiveness as the tendency for a group to remain unified in the interest of 
attaining a common goal (Carron, 1982), and the degree to which members like and get along 
with one another (Mullen & Copper, 1995). Craig and Kelly (1999) noted that common views of 
cohesiveness can relate to either both goal achievement or interpersonal attraction, but not 
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necessarily both. As a matter of clarity, the concept of cohesiveness is not intended to connote an 
antecedent condition leading to groupthink, a condition in which people’s intense attachment to 
an in-group status outweighs their ability to evaluate problems and solutions in a realistic manner 
because of in-group pressures (Janis, 1972). T’Hart (1991) asserted groupthink applies to “tightly 
knit policy-making groups” (p. 247), a condition not applicable to decision-makers and 
organizations involved in this study.   
Group member trust and confidence: psychological safety. 
Within contexts of organizational learning and change, Schein (1992) and Edmondson 
(1999, 2002) described the presence of trust, respect, and interpersonal confidence among group 
members as psychological safety. In a psychologically safe organization, open communications 
and a shared openness allow members to more effectively solve problems and take chances, as 
members feel like they are not subject to punishment if they make a mistake (Schein, 1992). 
Edmondson (1999) proposed that the presence of a safe environment is a function of the level of 
mutual trust and respect among members. By creating such an environment, people feel 
confident they are empowered to engage in risk-taking, and are “comfortable being themselves” 
(Edmondson, 1999, p. 354). In the remainder of this chapter, these aspects of group member trust 
and confidence are referred to as psychological safety. 
Social Factors 
In making decisions, research has suggested that people are subject to the influences of 
various social factors: intergroup relations and social identity (Brown, 2000), institutional inertia 
impeding change (Staw & Ross, 1989), the embodiment of a decision as the decision-maker 
(Dietz-Uhler, 1996), social rationality as a means of maintaining social structures (Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2002), and others. Among senior leaders, research has suggested that social influences on 
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self-concept are important considerations in decision-making, involving aspects of self-esteem, 
self-efficacy, control, and emotional stability (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). As a reflection of the 
varying number, type, and context of these influences, Gigerenzer and Selten (2002) noted the 
difficulty in assessing the combined effects of social forces that can cloud decision-making. 
Based on these observations, it is suggested that further exploration of social forces on individual 
crisis decision-makers will provide an enhanced understanding of OCDM. 
Time Pressures 
The availability of time within which to make a decision affects behaviors and processes 
in a number of ways. First, time pressure can increase a decision-maker’s stress level (Ariely & 
Zakay, 2001), and as discussed previously, heightened stress levels introduce a number of 
physiological and cognitive implications for decision-making. Klein, Calderwood, and Clinton-
Cirocco (1986) found that time constraints overwhelmingly lead people to prefer personal 
experiences over the consideration of decision alternatives. Kerstholt (1994) also found that as 
time pressures increase, people put more emphasis on negative consequences, effecting their 
willingness to take risks. Ordóñez and Benson (1997) found people tend to use simpler decision-
making strategies under time constraints. Viewed in the aggregate, these implications suggest 
that under time pressure, people are subject to change their decision-making processes in ways 
that lessen risk and reduce quality (Maule, Hockey & Bdzola, 2000). However, Ordóñez and 
Benson (1997) suggested under time pressure, people do not switch to simpler strategies if too 
much effort is required to do so.  
Limited Information 
During a crisis, decision-makers tend to lack information, causing them to search for 
additional information, make decisions based on incomplete information, or both. Boin and 
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McConnell (2007) suggested that crisis events can lack reliable information and can be fueled by 
a cycle of communications breakdowns and rumors. Research conducted by Robert and Lajtha 
(2002) further suggested the absence of information during crises contributes to stress. The lack 
of information, combined with a poor information search, has been suggested as a key 
contributor to low-quality decision-making (Welch, 1989). Because of a lack of information, 
crisis situations are highly ambiguous, with unknown causes and implications (Dutton, 1986; 
Quarantelli, 1988). This perspective deviates from the origins of decision theory, in which 
decisions are optimized based on the analysis of complete information. Contemporary theory, 
however, has largely dispensed with rational choice assumptions as being relevant in real-world 
decision-making (Simon, 1978). 
Other Decision-Making Influences   
Because the domain of decision-making is vast, it is expected that a wide-range of 
additional influences could emerge as part of exploratory research, and therefore should not be 
neglected. Decision influences such as individual cognition (Brown & Ng, 2012; Janis & Mann, 
1976; Simon, 2013) and emotion (Hu, Wang, Pang, Xu, & Guo, 2015; Kuvaas & Kaufmann, 
2004; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006) could play a significant role in the understanding of the crisis 
decision-making phenomenon. The same might be true for the personal traits of gender and age, 
both of which have been the subject of very limited research, raising the possibility of 
meaningful research discoveries. The influence of leadership styles is relevant in that decision-
making is an inherent responsibility within managerial and leadership roles (Barnard, 1968; 
Vroom, 2000; Vroom & Yetton, 1973) and is especially crucial during times of crisis (Wooten & 
James, 2008).  Furthermore, Baumann et al. (2014) argued that work policies and procedures are 
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a contextual factor within the decision ecology. As other contextual factors emerge, they were 
identified and explored through the conduct of this inquiry.  
Novel Decision Research May Offer Insights into Contemporary Theory 
Since the Age of Reason, decision-making has been a topic of interest among 
philosophers and scholars. Weick (1993) discussed the ubiquity of decision-making research in 
observing that “most organizational analyses begin and end with decision-making” (p. 634). 
While the topic has been researched extensively for centuries, the ontological perspectives of 
contemporary decision theory have become incongruent with research epistemology. This 
situation is not suggested to reflect flawed research, rather, it suggests that theoretical capacity 
exists to enlighten contemporary research.   
During the origins of decision-making research, theoretical perspectives were driven 
primarily by considerations of rationality, reason, logic, and the “economic man” (Edwards, 
1954; Simon, 1978; Skorepa, 2010). Fundamental to early decision theory was the positivist 
perspective that humans were rational and made decisions that maximized expected value; which 
was typically viewed in economic terms (Edwards, 1954). The ability to objectively maximize 
expected value indicated that one could optimize decisions by having access to all necessary 
information about decision choices, and could therefore quantify the possible outcomes. The 
economic man perspective of uncertain decision-making would prevail until the mid-20th 
century, when researchers were recognizing and seeking to explain why decision-makers so 
often deviated from expected value theory (Edwards, 1954). At that time, researchers began to 
acknowledge that personal preferences influenced decision-making, thus challenging the long-
held notion that rational decision-making was mutually exclusive of individual beliefs and values 
(Payne et al., 1992; Shafer, 1986).  
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Over time, decision theory has given way to a loosening of positivist assumptions, 
accommodating more constructivist and interpretivist perspectives. More recent theories and 
models have abandoned strict assumptions of rationality. Evolved, post-rational theoretical 
perspectives are seen in behavioral economics, naturalistic decision-making, and conflicted 
decision-making. Behavioral economics suggests that decision-making is influenced by 
heuristics, framing effects, and biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975, 1986). Naturalistic decision-
making suggests that in certain conditions, people can entirely skip the “rational” act of 
alternative analysis, instead giving preference to past experiences (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz et al., 
2001). Conflicted decision-making suggests decision processes are subject to varying degrees of 
vigilance, defensiveness, stalling, biases, and other behaviors (Janis & Mann, 1976, 1977). None 
of these theories support a hypothesis that a “single truth” exists. In each of them, decision 
processes involve outcomes that are co-constructed and subject to social and other forces.  
Despite changes in decision theory to accommodate constructivist views, this literature 
review found crisis decision-making research has overwhelmingly incorporated post-positivist 
methods. Of 180 research-oriented articles examined in this review; 175 concerned quantitative, 
post-positivist studies. Only 3% of the total research articles reviewed used an interpretivist or 
constructivist methodology. Accordingly, researchers have suggested that very little subjective, 
qualitative crisis decision-making research has been undertaken (Alkharabsheh, Ahmad, & 
Kharabsheh, 2014), yielding a limited understanding of the phenomenon.   
There has been a perspective among some researchers that deeply-rooted institutional 
norms have produced an overreliance on positivism as a means of knowing and understanding 
(Lincoln, 2009), and a dogged adherence to outmoded theoretical assumptions (Langley et al. 
1995). The argument for engaging diverse research methodologies is supported by noted 
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decision scholar Herbert Simon (2013), who offered the perspective that real-world decision 
behavior often differs significantly from the predictions of normative models. However, this 
review found that researchers have commonly adopted the perspectives of expected utility and 
rationalism long after both have been demonstrated as limited in many real-world contexts. A 
wide-ranging field of holistic and constructivist research remains unexplored, and therefore few 
novel insights have been introduced into the domain. 
Sensemaking is Intrinsic to Crisis Decision-Making 
In simple terms, to engage in sensemaking is to achieve a degree of understanding during 
an unpredictable and ongoing experience (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). The process of 
sensemaking has been described in various ways and for various purposes. The U.S. Army’s 
FOCUS model has sought to assist its leaders in quickly and effectively understanding dynamic 
situations (Sieck, Klein, Peluso, Smith, & Harris-Thompson, 2007). In the context of employee 
selection, Bolander and Sandberg (2013, p. 285) described the process as “practical 
deliberation,” in which interrelated individual or social processes involve information assembly 
and interpretation, confirmation, selection decisions, and selection tools. Furthermore, Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005) proposed an analytical process applicable to chaotic, disruptive, 
and ambiguous conditions. Furthermore, Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006b) and Klein, Phillips, 
Rall, and Peluso (2007) presented a data/frame sensemaking model, which suggests an iterative 
cycle of changing mental frames and ways of interpreting data. 
This review found that sensemaking is an important contributor to organizational crisis 
decision-making. Brown, Colville, and Pye (2015, p. 7) described the sensemaking-decision 
making relationship as a “complicated intertwining” of processes, often examined in contexts 
involving crises. Bolander and Sandberg (2013) characterized decision-making as a product of 
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sensemaking. Similarly, Weber and Glynn (2006) argued that institutional processes stimulate 
sensemaking that accompanies decisional processes. Research conducted by Lycett and Marshan 
(2016) aimed to operationalize sensemaking to improve decision-making processes. As such, 
research suggests it is improbable that a people make decisions based on current conditions if 
those conditions cannot be comprehended. Boland (2008) suggested the two activities are 
distinct: individuals look back in time to attribute meaning to the present moment while they 
look to the future for decision-making considerations. This moment of concurrent sensemaking 
and decision-making is significant; decision models frequently begin at this moment, when 
people evaluate and gain and understanding of a situation. 
Beyond its relationship to decision-making, sensemaking research has often been related 
to matters involving crises and disasters, suggesting a high degree of relevance to the OCDM 
domain. Weick’s (1993) account of the Mann Gulch wildfire catastrophe examined the absence 
of sensemaking and the disintegration of structure, and in his account of the Union Carbide 
disaster in Bhopal, India, he invoked sensemaking for the purposes of better managing and 
preventing crises (1988). Gephart (1993) demonstrated the role of sensemaking in his 
examination of a fatal gas pipeline explosion. Winch and Maytorena (2009) adopted a 
sensemaking lens to examine risky decision-making in a number of contexts. Maitlis and 
Sonenschein (2010) explicitly supported the application of sensemaking in crisis situations; they 
argued that the ambiguity, confusion, and disorientation experienced during crises are 
characteristics of sensemaking.  
Three claims posited by Harris (1994) and Weick (1988) support the use of sensemaking 
as a means of understanding crisis decision-making: (a) sensemaking is relevant to decisions 
subject to multiple perspectives, (b) sensemaking provides the novel perspective that many crises 
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are manifestations of several actions and decisions, and (c) sensemaking considers stress levels, 
cognition, and speed of action. These considerations align with this study’s bounding of crisis 
decision-making, as they allow for the inclusion of numerous decision influences, and they 
support the observation that subjective research may provide novel insights into the crisis 
decision-making phenomenon. Weick’s (1988) claim offered support for the relevance of 
sensemaking in crisis research: “actions devoted to sensemaking play a central role in the genesis 
of crises and therefore need to be understood if we are to manage and prevent crises” (p. 308).   
Weick’s approach to sensemaking within an organizational setting consists of seven 
properties, presenting a framework for analyzing and describing the components of sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995). While they comprise the “process” of sensemaking, these properties are non-
sequential (Helms Mills et al., 2010), and people various aspects to differing degrees. The 
properties suggested by Weick are summarized as follows (Helms Mills et al., 2010; Weick, 
1995): 
1. Social context: in constructing meaning, people are influenced by social interactions and 
cultural contexts. 
2. Plausibility: people rely less on the accuracy of their perceptions than the degree to which 
information supports their perceptions, making them plausible.  
3. Retrospection: people tend to make sense of current conditions by comparing them to 
ones in their past experiences.  
4. Salient cues: people construct understanding through the interpretation of various 
indicators; some of which are ascribed more importance in order to confirm existing 
beliefs. 
5. Enactive of the environment: peoples’ ability to make sense of a situation is constrained 
42 
by the environment that they create, or it is created by the constraints that they impose on 
the environment.  
6. Ongoing events. The sensemaking process is continuous. 
7. Personal identity. Influences such as past experiences, social interactions, and personal 
characteristics affect how people view circumstances and ascribe meaning to them. 
In contrast to Weick’s seven properties, Klein, Moon and Hoffman’s (2006) data/frame 
sensemaking model proposed a cyclical iteration of framing data, elaborating the frame as new 
data emerge, questioning the frame, and reframing. The model is relevant to this study for 
several reasons. First, the model elicits information about how and why various factors 
interrelate with sensemaking. Second, the model addresses the ongoing introduction of decision 
factors into sensemaking. Third, the model elicits data and framing information that interrelates 
with decision processes and behaviors. Finally, the model’s cyclical nature accommodates the 
dynamic and changing aspect of organizational crises, suggesting that individuals constantly take 
in, frame, and re-frame data. The model integrates with decision-making, providing a basis for 
understanding a situation before engaging in decision-making processes and behaviors (Beach & 
Connolly, 2005).   
Discussion 
 The purpose of this review was to examine literature related to crisis decision-making 
research and to identify research opportunities that address observed needs and gaps. The 
outcome of the literature review yielded insights related to the following themes: (a) the concept 
of a crisis, (b) factors that influence crisis decision-making, (c) making sense of crisis conditions, 
(d) decision-making strategies, (e), decision consequences, and (f) ontological approaches to 
research in this domain. Each insight is further discussed in this section. 
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The Concept of a Crisis 
 The ways in which crises are perceived by researchers are paradoxical to a degree. On 
one hand, researchers describe the features of crises in a consistent way: they are unexpected, 
time constrained, dynamic, uncertain, and can result in severe outcomes (Mitroff, Shrivistava, & 
Udwalia, 1987; Roux Dufort, 2013). On the other hand, the contexts in which this description 
has been applied have varied greatly. First, research addresses crisis within a myriad of domains: 
political crises, crisis communications, personal crises, and others. Second, the degrees of crises 
cover a broad continuum. To illustrate the range of perceptions as to “what a crisis is,” Sweeney 
(2008) discussed crises as being merely a negative event that requires attention, whereas Holsti 
(1989) addressed crises in the context of nuclear holocaust. Numerous other research contexts 
have fallen between those extremes.  
The vast range of contexts to which the concept has been applied raises questions as to 
the usefulness of a singular definition. This review found that in order to study the phenomenon, 
either clear boundaries around the concept of a crisis are needed, or it is necessary to recognize 
that a singular definition of the concept is untenable. Ideally, the outcomes of this study will help 
refine current perceptions of crises or shed more light into how crises can be perceived.  
Contextual Factors 
 As Hickson (1986) suggested, decisions involve influences that can come from all 
directions. And because of the nature of a crisis, these influences tend to change and interact with 
each other, evoking John F. Kennedy’s “dark and tangled stretches” that impede the 
understanding of such decisions. Baumann et al. (2014) characterized these factors as a “decision 
ecology” comprised of forces both internal and external to the decision-maker, further suggesting 
these factors result in a decision once they reach a personal threshold for action. What research 
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has yet to explicate is “how and why” various factors enact or interact to drive a decision-maker 
to take action. Consequently, further research can shed light on the salience of contextual factors 
in the setting of organizational crises. 
Sensemaking During Crises 
 Brown et al. (2015) suggested that people must seek to understand ambiguous or 
confusing situations before they can engage in decision-making. Yet, the ways in which people 
go about sensemaking has been a matter of differing interpretations and definitions (Brown et al., 
2015). This literature review found two sensemaking frameworks associated with crisis 
conditions. Weick suggested the phenomenon is largely analytical and retrospective (Helms 
Mills et al., 2010; Weick, 1993, 1995; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2005). In contrast, Klein (2006) and 
others have perceived sensemaking as an iterative process by which people interpret data based 
on evolving cognitive frames.  
Because sensemaking has been argued to precede decision-making, literature suggests it 
plays an intermediary role between contextual decision factors and decision-making. However, 
the differing views of the nature of sensemaking suggest that its dominant forces can differ, and 
that sensemaking frameworks can differ. The two sensemaking frameworks that emerged in this 
literature review suggest that when an organization is in crisis, its decision-makers are subject to 
engage in different ways of understanding current conditions, thus leading to different decision-
making approaches. Through a qualitative lens and an interpretivist paradigm, this study may 
shed more light on “how and why” people make sense of organizational crises the ways in which 




 This study’s review of literature has yielded three decision-making strategies that relate 
directly to the crisis phenomenon: conflicted decision-making, naturalistic decision-making, and 
unstructured decision-making. Each of these strategies emphasizes different underlying 
conditions. Conflicted decision-making is centered on decision-maker stress, naturalistic 
decision-making assumes significant time constraints, and unstructured decision-making 
assumes complexity and changing conditions. Therefore, to view organizational crisis decision-
making through one particular perspective would offer limited insights. In this study, the 
researcher aimed to consider each of these strategies as a way to illuminate how and why people 
engage in various decision-making approaches. Furthermore, the researcher recognized that the 
outcomes of the study may suggest different or alternate strategies that must be attended to. 
Decision-Making Consequences 
 The intent of this study was not to judge the quality of decision outcomes; rather, it was 
to examine how those decisions came about. And because decisions occur within an 
environment, their consequences can influence ongoing decision-making. Given the ongoing 
nature of some crises, the implications of decision consequences play an important role in the 
overall phenomenon. While Mitroff et al.’s (1988) crisis typology was used to examine decision 
consequences, it was also clear that decision consequences could relate to other issues such as 
decision-maker learning and organizational learning.     
Research Epistemology 
From an epistemological standpoint, organizational crisis decision-making (OCDM) is a 
phenomenon that has been predominantly studied in a post-positivist and objective manner. As 
such, research has tended to deconstruct the phenomenon to examine its individual components 
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and the relationships between them: decision processes, decision influences, decision behaviors, 
sensemaking, and others. Despite research norms, evidence strongly suggests that the complex 
interaction between those elements plays a vital role in the OCDM phenomenon. The presence of 
these interrelationships is seen in decision ecologies (Baumann et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2015), 
sensemaking (Boland, 2008; Lycett & Marshan, 2016; Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick, Sutcliffe, 
& Obstfeld, 2005), and the diverse nature of decision strategies (Janis & Mann, 1976, 1977; 
Klein, 2008; Mitroff et al., 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1975, 1986). These dynamic and 
varying interrelationships strongly suggest the OCDM phenomenon is subject to internally and 
socially constructed interpretations. As such, OCDM can be researched holistically within 
interpretivist and constructivist perspectives.  
 A holistic perspective of the OCDM phenomenon raises a number of potentially 
enlightening questions including: 
1. How do contextual factors interact with sensemaking and decision-making?  
2. How and why do sensemaking and decision-making influence decision strategies?    
3. Why do people assign more importance to various contextual factors than others?  
4. Are some types of decision factors assigned more importance than others, and if so, why? 
 Research suggests the questions posed in the above section are both relevant and 
unexplored. Therefore, a research agenda involving the following elements is proposed: (a) a 
holistic view of the OCDM phenomenon; (b) a methodology that is congruent with and 
complimentary to contemporary decision theory; (c) methods that provide a rich, thick 
description of the phenomenon’s complexities, and (d) methods that are sensitive to contextual 




 As described in this chapter, an examination of organizational crisis decision making 
involves a number of elements: the organizational crisis environment, contextual factors, 
sensemaking frameworks, decision-making strategies, and decision consequences. Furthermore, 
literature suggests there is a sequential relationship between the elements: the crisis environment 
yields various contextual factors, those factors influence sensemaking, sensemaking informs 
decision-making, and the decision consequences further influence the environment. This 
sequence suggests a progression that is described by a traditional “input-process-output” (IPO) 
system. This system has been illustrated previously in Figure 1.  
In adopting the IPO framework, the study not only allowed for the examination of each 
element, but also facilitated an understanding of the relationships between the system elements. 
However, due to the interpretivist paradigm employed in the design and conduct of this study, 
the researcher was cognizant that alternate conceptual elements and relationships might be 
constructed. Such alternate understandings did come to light. This study found that in some crisis 
circumstances, the sequence of system elements breaks down. In these instances, the dynamic 
and unpredictable nature of the crisis led to system element interactions that were unpredictable 
and non-linear. The alternate model reflects a complex adaptive system and is further discussed 
in Chapters four and five. 
Conclusion 
This review has found we are living in a time of increased exposure to crises, yet crisis 
decision-making research has been largely stagnant. Researchers have seldom engaged in 
constructivist and interpretivist inquiry as a means of producing new insights. Advancing novel 
methods for crisis decision-making research could offer insights to both researchers and 
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practitioners interested in crisis decision-making. Based on this literature review, it is argued that 
there is a need for a holistic research perspective to better understand how and why decisions are 
made during organizational crises.  Novel research opportunities exposed as a result of this 
review involve:   
• Understanding the role of contextual factors in influencing sensemaking and decision-
making,  
• Understanding why people assign heightened importance to some contextual decision 
factors, 
• Understanding why decision-makers adopts the strategies that they do, and  
• Understanding how decision consequences influence ongoing decision-making. 
The conceptual framework used in this study has been designed to explicate both the 
system elements and their relationships as a way to shed light on this study’s research questions. 
The next chapter will describe the research method used in this study. The description of the 
study begins with a discussion of philosophical underpinnings, leading to the study’s design and 
case description. Next, the chapter describes the sampling criteria used to identify participants. 
Finally, data collection and analysis methods are described, as well as how validity and 
reliability concerns are addressed.  
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Purpose of the Study   
The primary purpose of this study was to add knowledge to our understanding of 
decision-making within the context of organizational crises. The specific aims of the study were: 
(a) to better understand how people construct meaning during periods of crisis, (b) to enhance the 
understanding of why some factors influence the construction of meaning more significantly than 
others do, (c) to explore how the construction of meaning influences the decision-making 
processes and behaviors that people adopt, (d) and to gain insights into how decision 
consequences impact ongoing decision-making. The outcomes of this study were intended to 
help practitioners make better decisions during crises in order to reduce harmful consequences. 
Outcomes resulting from the study were also expected to inform contemporary theory, to give 
rise to novel areas of research, and to stimulate innovative practices. Furthermore, this study 
addressed gaps related to the interrelationships between the construction of sensemaking and the 
overall organizational crisis decision-making (OCDM) process. Finally, the study aimed to 
address a domain in which inquiry has been scarce, and in which some research perspectives 
have been largely unexplored.   
This chapter describes how the researcher sought to achieve this study’s stated purposes, 
starting with broad and conceptual aspects of the study, then leading to more specific design 
elements. This chapter begins by discussing the researcher’s philosophical basis and position, 
followed by a description of how the study was designed. Design elements described in this 
chapter include the research methodology, method, case description, sampling, data collection, 
50 
data coding, and data analysis. Finally, measures taken to overcome threats to validity and 
reliability are discussed. 
Philosophical Basis of this Study 
This study’s researcher adopted the philosophical stance that decisions made during 
crises are socially constructed (Cottone & Claus, 2000). This underlying philosophy supports the 
use of qualitative inquiry that fosters a connection between the researcher and the participants, 
and enables the creation of a co-constructed reality (Guba & Lincoln, 1982; Kim, 2001). This 
study acknowledged that in order to make decisions, people construct meaning based on their 
own values, experiences, expertise, social interactions, cultural influences, and numerous other 
factors: therefore, there is no single “true decision” to be uncovered (Smith, 2004). Cottone and 
Claus (2000) further suggested that decision processes cannot be extricated from the social 
contexts that created them, or from the values and intuitions that contributed to them (Hare, 
1991). In the same vein, Cottone & Claus (2000) claimed that few probabilistic theories have 
adequately accounted for psychosocial dynamics of decision-making, and that the inner workings 
of decision-makers are enigmatic and centered around “a contextual truth.” These assertions 
provide support for this study’s social constructivist and interpretivist perspective.  
Researcher Position 
In qualitative studies, positioning is an indicator of reliability, providing readers with 
information about the researcher’s perspectives, assumptions, and relationship to study 
participants (Charmaz & McMullen, 2011). Furthermore, the researcher’s position enables the 
readers to comprehend the study within the context of the researcher’s unique characteristics 
(Madge, 1993). Therefore, in this section, experiences and perspectives that informed this study 
are described.  
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The researcher’s professional experiences provided exposure to crisis situations and crisis 
decision-making in a number of settings: military, government, corporate, and others. Over that 
time, many decisions that raised questions about influences on decision-makers were witnessed. 
This study provided the researcher with the opportunity to explore the forces that could have 
been driving peoples’ decisions. Accordingly, the researcher’s interests were rooted in how 
people arrive at the decisions they do during crises, and why some influences appear to have 
preferential status. It is not suggested that a single study can fully clarify a highly complex 
phenomenon; rather, the study can be helpful in shedding more light on the phenomenon, and 
advancing theory, research, and practice.  
Ontologically, the researcher’s orientation is that of a social constructivist and 
interpretivist. As such, the researcher came to believe social interactions are better understood 
through a co-constructed lens: there is no single “true” answer that sits in a lockbox that research 
can open. Rather, this study was approached with the perspective that while there are no single 
truths to be uncovered in the form of a decision, some decision-making approaches may be better 
than others. Much has been written about what people have done during crisis-related decisions; 
this study intended to shed more light on why and how people engage in those behaviors, and 
how various decision components interact.  
Methodology 
This study employed a qualitative methodology as means of providing a rich and 
descriptive explanation of the central phenomenon. Qualitative inquiry is appropriate for this 
study in that the methodology seeks to illustrate a phenomenon within its context (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994), and to explain and describe complex personal or interpersonal phenomena 
(Krathwohl, 2009). Further rationale supports the use of qualitative inquiry in that it can 
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investigate unexplored aspects of a phenomenon, and produce novel perspectives about 
unexplored aspects of a phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This methodology is consistent 
with this study’s aims: to provide a thick, rich description of the OCDM phenomenon, and to 
examine how and why elements of OCDM interrelate as they do.  
Furthermore, the study’s conceptual framework accommodates a constructivist paradigm, 
recognizing that organizational decisions do not exist on their own, independent from decision-
makers. Rather, they are subject to varying contexts and influences, and are constructed by the 
decision-maker and others as part of psycho-social activities. For the reasons described in this 
section, some researchers have recognized the need for qualitative inquiry in the OCDM domain, 
observing that “few qualitative studies have linked crises to decision-making” (Alkharabsheh, 
Ahmad, & Kharabsheh, 2014, p. 283). 
Research Design 
This study employed a holistic single case study design as a means of addressing research 
questions in a manner consistent with a constructivist and interpretivist researcher perspective. 
The case study method supports the aims of this study by providing for an in-depth examination 
of a phenomenon within a specific context (Merriam, 1998; Yin, 2013a; Zainal, 2007). The 
rationale for the case study method is principally based on the alignment between the purpose of 
the method and this study’s research aims and questions. This study aimed to better understand 
the inter-relationships of decision-making influences, processes, and behaviors by investigating 
how and why those relationships occur the ways in which they do.  This inquiry adopted case 
study guidelines offered by Merriam because of her versatility and accommodation of ideas 
advanced by Yin, Stake, and other scholars experienced in case study research. Merriam found a 
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middle ground between Yin’s prescriptive approach to case study design and Stake’s loosely 
structured design. 
This case study involved consequential decision-making that individuals undertook for 
their organizations during the 2017 Northern California firestorm. This cluster of concurrent 
wildfires provided a context that allowed for a coherent analysis of decision-making processes 
and behaviors among a diverse group of individuals during crisis conditions. Consequential 
decisions of interest were those that carried significant outcomes and were made on behalf of 
individuals’ respective organizations.  
Case Description 
A thorough case study involves a description of the case and its context (Creswell, 2003). 
The purpose of this description is to provide the reader with an understanding within which 
findings and conclusions can be interpreted, and to assist the reader in determining whether study 
outcomes can be applied to other contexts (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In this section, the researcher 
described the firestorm itself, including its origination, progression, and consequences. Next, the 
researcher described the general context and conditions under which participants engaged in 
organizational crisis decision-making.  
A Description of the Firestorm 
The 2017 Northern California firestorm involved four concurrent wildfires that broke out 
in Sonoma and Napa counties on the night of October 8, 2017. Three of the four fires burned 
until the end of the month, and one was extinguished on October 12. By the time all fires were 
fully extinguished, they had inflicted unprecedented damages to the region and its people. In 
total, the fires burned an area exceeding 145,000 acres, damaging or destroying nearly 8900 
structures, killing 31 people, and displacing almost 100,000 people. California Governor Jerry 
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Brown said of the fire, “This is truly one of the greatest tragedies California has ever faced. The 
devastation is just unbelievable. It is a horror that no one could have imagined” (Associated 
Press, 2017).  
The firestorm was unique for several reasons. At that time, merely one of the four fires, 
the Tubbs Fire, had become California’s most destructive wildfire in history (Cal Fire, 2018d). 
Two other fires, the Atlas Fire and the Nuns Fire, were among the top ten most destructive in the 
state’s history (Cal Fire, 2018d). The total insured losses from the Northern California fires 
approached $11 billion (Artemis, 2018). In terms of human lives, the fires were the third 
deadliest at that time, having caused 31 deaths (Emslie, 2017). Table 2 summarizes the types of 
damage cause by each fire, and Figure 4 illustrates the physical boundaries of each fire contained 
within the scope of this study.  
Table 2  
Summary of Firestorm Impacts: Acres, Structures, and Fatalities (Cal Fire 2017a; Cal Fire, 
2017b; Cal Fire, 2018a; Cal Fire, 2018b; Emslie, 2017) 




Atlas 10-08-2018 51,624 903 6 
Nuns/Central LNU 
Complex 
10-08-2018 56,556 1527 3 
Thirty-Seven 10-08-2018 1500 0 0 
Tubbs 10-08-2018 36,807 5953 22 




Figure 4: Map of the 2017 Northern California firestorm. 
The Crisis Decision-Making Environment 
This study conceived of organizational crisis decision-making (OCDM) as a system. As 
such, the system represents as composition of various elements that interact within its 
environment. Nadler and Tushman (1980) suggested the environment is comprised of forces that 
act upon the overall system. In this study, these most significant forces upon the overall system 
emerged as conditions created by the firestorm, and the firestorms’ consequences. These factors 
are further described in this section. 
Firestorm conditions. 
Descriptions of the firestorm suggest and event that was dynamic, highly uncertain, and 
presented the potential for severe outcomes. The dynamic nature of the conditions was largely 
due to the shifting nature of the Diablo wind pattern, which caused new fires to move rapidly and 
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in unexpected directions.  Because the fires began during the late-night hours of October 8, most 
people in the area were asleep and unaware of the potential threat (Letson, 2018). Because many 
residents in the at-risk areas did not receive emergency alerts (California Governor’s Office of 
Emergency Services, 2018; Eberling, 2018), it was not unusual for people to become aware of 
the fires through unofficial channels: phone calls from friends and family, the smell of smoke, a 
dull red glow seen through the bedroom window, or someone banging on the front door. 
Uncertainty was exacerbated by extensive telecommunications disruptions that inhibited general 
communications (North Bay/North Coast, 2018). Participants in this study indicated that the 
combination of these factors created a situation in which conditions were changing, information 
was sparse, and uncertainty was high. While this study revealed that participants’ experiences 
were largely unique; a number of similarities revealed shared experiences. These similarities 
reflect the common context within in which participants engaged in decision-making for their 
organizations.  
Firestorm consequences. 
The consequences associated with this firestorm were unprecedented, as it was the 
insurance industry’s costliest wildfire event in history at that time (Artemis, 2018). Insurance 
payouts totaling $11 billion (Artemis, 2018) suggested outcomes were both vast in scope and 
extreme in destruction. Accordingly, participant comments reflected a wide range of impacts 
resulting from the firestorm. Table 3 provides a high-level summary of consequences 
experienced by participants’ organizations, as well as the consequences participants experienced. 
Types of consequences during the firestorm were consistent with crisis-related consequences 
identified by Mitroff et al. (1988): human, social, technical, and financial. As these categories 
pertain to this study, they are briefly described below: 
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Table 3 
Types of Consequences by Participant Organization and Participant 
Participant General Impacts to Organization Participant Impacts 
P1 
Grave threat to human lives; threat to 
structure; operational disruptions 
None stated 
P2 
Structure destroyed; operational disruptions, 
threats to people; financial losses 
Home evacuated 
P3 
Threats to property and assets; community 
recovery support; financial losses 
Home evacuated 
P4 Extreme impacts to member well-being  Home destroyed 
P5 
Structure destroyed, grave threats to human 




Structure destroyed, grave threats to human 
lives; reduced operational resources  
Family medical concerns 
P7 
Structures destroyed and damaged; extended 
operational disruptions; member well-being  
Home evacuated 
P8 
Structure damaged; extended operational 
disruptions; member well-being; community 
well-being 
Close family evacuated; 
Personal health toll 
P9 
Grave threats to human lives; reduced 
operational resources 
Family safety concerns 
P10 
Destruction of business and property; member 
well-being 
Home evacuated; Animals 
threatened 
P11 Extended operational disruptions. 
Home destroyed; Animals 
threatened 
P12 
Extended operational disruptions; 
infrastructure disruptions 
Family safety concerns; Loss 
of power and water 
P13 
Extended operational disruptions; 
infrastructure disruptions 
None stated 
P14 Business evacuated; structures threatened 
Structure destroyed; Home 
evacuated; Personal health 
toll; Animals threatened  
P15 
Structures damaged and destroyed, extended 
operational disruptions, member well-being 




An understanding of the study’s case and the environment is an essential component of 
understanding the decision-making system of interest. Within an unprecedented firestorm, 
participants experienced extreme change and uncertainty, while encountering wide-ranging 
consequences. It is within this common case and environment that participants formed an 
understanding of the conditions that they faced, and subsequently made decisions. The case and 
environment provide a backdrop for the closer examination of findings guided by the study’s 
conceptual framework. 
Sampling Procedures and Participants 
This research incorporated purposive sampling to identify participants of interest. 
Purposive sampling involves the selection of participants who can contribute the most to the 
insights and understandings to the research aims (Chein, 1981). In purposive sampling, 
participants are selected based on a set of pre-defined criteria (Merriam, 1998; Ritchie, Lewis, 
Nicholls, & Ormston, 2013).  Purposive sampling in this study involved a multi-step process 
based on the following criteria: (a) participants must have held or assumed a position of 
responsibility within their organizations at the time of the firestorm, (b) participants’ 
organizations must have experienced significant consequences related to the firestorm, and (c) 
participants must have made at least one consequential decision related to firestorm. Participants 
were excluded if at any point in the study all criteria were not met.  
To carry out the purposive sampling, the researcher first identified and examined 
secondary sources that provided descriptions of the overall firestorm. These sources involved 
government reports and articles published in various media outlets. With an understanding of the 
overall firestorm, the researcher established geographical boundaries that defined the region of 
interest in this study. Within this geographical region, the researcher conducted a map search and 
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identified a pool of 125 diverse organizations for potential inclusion in the study. From this 
overall pool, secondary sources were analyzed to identify organizations which had experienced 
significant consequences, as well as specific locations in which fire destruction was particularly 
severe. This process narrowed the potential participant organization pool to 45. Then, the 
researcher conducted a web search to identify individuals who were either organizational leaders, 
or who held safety or operational roles and would likely have had responsibilities associated with 
the firestorm. I sent initial recruitment email messages to these individuals. Individuals who 
responded with an interest in participating in the study were considered for inclusion. During a 
time in which the researcher was physically in the fire area, two organizations were directly 
approached about participation in the study.  
Discussions with study participants were expected to reveal other individuals who could 
shed additional light on research questions. Therefore, the study also employed snowball or 
chain sampling in which a participant suggested the inclusion of another person (Atkinson & 
Flint, 2001). Snowball sampling is appropriate for qualitative sociological research (Biernacki & 
Waldorf, 1981) involving qualitative and exploratory studies in that it can be effective in 
identifying previously unidentified participants (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). While snowball 
sampling was not proposed as the study’s primary means of identifying participants, the method 
was incorporated to allow for the identification of otherwise unknown individuals who could 
contribute to the study. Three participants were identified using snowball sampling. 
Individuals involved in this study were members of various types of organizations: 
commercial, government, critical infrastructure, faith-based, healthcare, and educational. Types 
of roles held by participants were also diverse, and included business owners, senior leaders, 
group leaders, and leaders of functions inclusive of safety matters.  As discussed previously, the 
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examination of diverse perspectives within the context of a single crisis event was intended to 
support a coherent analysis in which patterns, differences, similarities, and other outcomes of 
interest could be found. 
Sample Size 
 A primary consideration in determining the appropriate number of participants in case 
studies is the concept of saturation: the point at which the inclusion of additional samples does 
not result in additional data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Mason, 2010). Merriam (1998) offered 
several signals indicating the saturation has been reached. First, information collection reached 
the point of diminishing returns; second, a sense of regularity has been established; and third, 
new information is merely tangentially associated with other relevant categories that have 
emerged.  
An estimated sample size of eight to 18 participants was identified by reviewing seven 
studies that employed the case study method pertaining to decision-making and crisis response 
(Arthur-Mensah, 2015; Bennington, 2014; Berry, 2013; Eng, 2014; Godfrey, 2013; Johnson, 
2007; Queen, 2014). Through the course of the study, saturation was iteratively assessed in two 
ways. First, participant data were analyzed to identify new themes or patterns that were 
meaningful to the research questions. Second, participant data were analyzed to identify 
contextual details which would add to a thick, rich description of the phenomenon. When 
participant data did not present new themes, patterns, or meaningful contextual details, saturation 
was assumed to have been achieved. In total, this study included 15 individuals. 
Description of Study Participants 
This study involved 15 individuals representing 13 organizations in the following sectors: 
commercial, government, critical infrastructure, faith-based, healthcare, and educational. All 
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organizations were directly or indirectly affected by the fires. At the time of the interviews, 
participants were either leaders of their organizations, assistant leaders, or leaders of a unit 
within the organization. Ten participants were men, five were women. All participants 
characterized themselves as being experienced in their positions. Years of relevant experience 
ranged from approximately 10 years to over 35 years. At the time of the firestorm, one 
participant was new to the role, but not to the occupation. The units of analysis in this study were 
the individual participants engaged decision-making for their organizations during the 2017 
Northern California firestorm. Table 4 and Figure 5 provide summary information about 
participant and organizational characteristics. 
Table 4 
Study Participants: Sex and Organization Type 
Participant Sex Organization type 
P1 M Healthcare 
P2 M Commercial Industry 
P3 M Commercial 
P4 M Faith Based 
P5 M Government 
P6 M Government 
P7 F Education 
P8 F Education 
P9 M Government 
P10 M Hospitality 
P11 F Commercial 
P12 M Critical Infrastructure 
P13 M Critical Infrastructure 
P14 F Healthcare 




Figure 5: Numbers of participants in different organizational types (type, number of 
participants). 
Data Collection  
To enhance the study’s trustworthiness, the researcher collected and analyzed multiple 
data types. Findings emerged predominantly through primary sources. The researcher obtained 
primary data in the form of semi-structured interviews with study participants. Secondary source 
data were reviewed, although authoritative reports were limited due to the recent occurrence of 
the firestorm. Secondary sources consisted of reports, articles, social media, videos, and audio 
recordings. Furthermore, researcher journals were maintained throughout the inquiry, 
documenting connections, intuitions, questions, insights, and other types of data potentially 
yielding insights into the study’s research questions. This chapter will first describe primary 
source data collection and analysis, followed by secondary and other sources of data.  
Primary Source Data 
 Data gathered during participant interviews served as a principal source of information 
for this study. Ritchie et al (2013) suggested exploratory studies such as this one do not require a 
great deal of structure, as the researcher should have flexibility in eliciting participants' 
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conceptions and values, predominantly through discourse. Therefore, the interview method was 
semi-structured. Using this data collection method, a consistent set of general questions was 
created, but depending on participant comments, the researcher engaged in various types of 
probing questions in order to elicit additional information. Fourteen of 15 interviews were 
conducted in-person, providing close engagement with participants and enabling the detection of 
non-verbal cues such as body language and emotion. Thirteen of 15 interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed into word processing software for subsequent analysis.  
 Interviews incorporated strategies suggested by Merton, Fiske and Kendall (1990) in 
relation to interviews with people who were involved in a particular situation, but who adopted 
differing subjective perspectives of that situation. As suggested by Merton et al. (1990), a 
general structure was used in which interviews: (a) started in an open, non-directed manner to 
establish context; (b) continued by focusing on a specific decision event; (c) built on the specific 
event by examining the range of decision events throughout the firestorm; and (d) examined 
attitudes, beliefs, and perspectives that contributed to personal contexts. Consistent with the 
approach espoused by Merton et al. (1990), an interview guide was used to facilitate interviews. 
The guide contained questions designed to elicit information about specific inquiry aims. As an 
acknowledgment of the semi-structured nature of the interviews, prompts for further probes 
accompanied each question. The interview guide is found in Appendix A. 
Fifteen participants representing 13 organizations participated in interviews. To arrange 
for these interviews, I contacted each participant to schedule an approximately one-hour meeting 
at a time a place of their convenience. All interviews were held in-person in Northern California, 
with the exception of one telephone interview. Fourteen interviews were conducted during the 
month of May 2018, and one was conducted in June, 2018. Interviews ranged in length from 40 
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to 75 minutes, with a typical duration of one hour. Each participant received an informed consent 
form to sign, at which time they had the opportunity to ask additional questions about the study. 
As a preamble to each interview, and as a way to appropriately frame participant responses, the 
researcher described the intent of the study and the research questions. Interviews were semi-
structured and varied based how participants responded to questions. Because of the nature of 
participant responses, some interviews were more structured than others. In some cases, general 
questions yielded relevant information; in other cases, specific questions were asked or probed. 
 Thirteen of the 15 interviews were recorded. At the request of a participant, one 
telephone interview was not recorded, and one other interview took place while walking around 
the organization’s property. In instances when interviews were not recorded, the researcher took 
notes during and after the interviews in order to accurately capture participant comments. 
Recorded interviews utilized two digital recording devices: an iPhone 5 equipped with the 
“VoiceRecorder App,” and a digital recorder. Upon the completion of all interviews, recordings 
were transcribed verbatim to the researcher’s personal computer. The researcher used a two-step 
process to transcribe the audio. First, audio files were processed through a voice recognition 
application to create preliminary transcripts. Because the voice recognition applications 
transcripts contained many errors, preliminary transcripts were reviewed while listening to the 
audio files, and appropriate edits were made. During this process, each participant was assigned 
a non-identifiable code. The key to codes was securely stored in a separate computer file. 
Secondary Source Data 
Consistent with qualitative research techniques suggested by Hodder (1994), Lincoln and 
Guba (1985), Merriam (1998), and others, this study involved the collection and analysis of 
secondary sources. Secondary sources were collected and analyzed as a means of examining the 
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overall context of the case study, to identify participants, to examine participant decision-making 
influences, and to contribute to the thick, rich description of the phenomenon of interest. Types 
of secondary sources included various government reports, media accounts, social media, video 
and audio-recordings, public records, and web-page content.  
The researcher initiated the collection of secondary source data by using an iterative 
search approach leading from general to specific information. The researcher began identifying 
secondary sources by using general search criteria that would yield information about the overall 
firestorm. These types of sources primarily included media articles and reports generated by 
firefighting agencies that had been involved in the firestorm event. The information examined 
provided a better understanding of where the fire had caused the most damage, and which types 
of organizations had been impacted. This information provided direction in identifying and 
examining additional secondary sources which could provide more specific information about 
the event and its consequences. Some of these sources were useful in identifying study 
participants. Following the completion of participant interviews, secondary source searches and 
reviews were conducted to determine whether articles, reports, social media, or other sources 
could add more depth and context to each participant’s comments.  
While media accounts of the firestorm were abundant, the availability of official accounts 
was limited, likely because this study commenced within six months of the conclusion of the 
firestorm. The preponderance of secondary source data was general in nature, contained within 
newspaper and web-page articles. Very few sources related directly to this study’s research 
questions. To describe the role of secondary sources used in this study, two categories were 
created: those that provided information of a general nature and were not cited or referenced in 
this study, and those that were either germane to this study’s research questions, or that provided 
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supporting evidence or details related to the case study. The former category helped establish a 
thorough understanding of the larger crisis event, informing the researcher of contexts and 
influences that could have had a bearing on participant decision-making. This information 
proved valuable in the participant interviews. The latter category involved details which have 
been cited in the study. Only three of the cited sources were directly related to firestorm 
decision-making; these sources were coded using the same approach as was used with participant 
interview transcripts. Table 5 provides a summary of secondary sources that yielded general 
information and were not cited or referenced in this study. Table 6 lists and describes sources 




Types and Descriptions of Secondary Sources Containing General Information  
Type of Source Summary descriptions of sources 
Newspaper and web-page Articles Large market newspapers such as The Los Angeles 
Times, the San Francisco Chronicle, The New York 
Times, and USA Today reflected the national 
attention being given to the firestorm. Articles 
included various descriptions of the firestorm, 
California’s wildfire history, implications for the 
local wine-growing region, and other general topics. 
Local newspapers and associated web-pages, such as 
the Santa Rosa Press-Democrat and the Napa Valley 
Register, provided an extensive source of articles 
about the firestorm. Articles were written during and 
after the firestorm, and as opposed to the large 
market newspapers, tended to address individual 
accounts of the firestorm, localized damage 
estimates, impacts to specific business, impacts to 
the local tourism industry, local response efforts, and 
other topics of a local nature. 
Social media accounts  Numerous Twitter feeds and Facebook postings 
were reviewed for descriptions of the fire conditions, 
fire damages, and personal accounts during the 
firestorm. 
Video/Audio files Video and audio files posted by media, 
organizations, and individuals were reviewed. 
Organizational web-pages Web pages sponsored by each participant 






A Summary Inventory and Description of Cited Secondary Sources  
Source Description 
Government reports The California Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection (Cal Fire) published numerous reports 
describing fire conditions, fire damages, fire 
response actions, and fire investigations both during 
and after the firestorm. Several are cited in this 
study.  
California’s Office of Emergency Services 
published a report from the Governor’s Office 
describing the nature of communications challenges 
during the firestorm. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers published an 
account of regional rebuilding and recovery 
activities. 
Industry report A broadband consortium report described 
telecommunications outages during the firestorm. 
Newspaper and web-page articles Local news sources published articles spot-lighting 
actions taken by local individuals during the 
firestorm, as well as articles providing details about 
the fires’ behavior, and the ways in which local 
residents and businesses were impacted.  
 
Researcher Journaling 
Researcher journaling provided a rich source of data which supported the formulation of 
findings, instincts, and other thoughts about the meaning of various pieces of data (Bazeley, 
2013; Janesick, 1999; Silverman, 2003; Zeegers & Barron, 2015). In this study, journaling 
applied to all areas of inquiry and continued throughout the study. As a stimulus for journaling, 
the researcher asked several reflective questions that were routinely revisited and modified as 
necessary. The initial set of reflective questions was as follows: 
1. What are my reactions to each participant interview, and how could those reactions 
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influence how I interpret those comments? Have I applied any inappropriate 
assumptions or biases? 
2. Did participant comments challenge any assumptions that guided the design of the 
study? 
3. In what ways did participant emotions, gestures, tones, and intuitions add meaning to 
what they have said? 
4. Have participants implicitly suggested any understandings that are hiding “under the 
surface” of what they have actually said during interviews? What are they? 
5. Have participants discounted information that would appear to be important? Why? 
6. Have participants’ perceptions of crisis consequences related to the factors that they 
recognized as significant? If so, can this be explained? 
7. Have secondary sources suggested decision factors beyond those that have been 
described by participants? If so, what are they? 
Through researcher journaling, the researcher attempted to continually reflect on the 
possibilities that could lead to new theories and questions, the meaning of primary and secondary 
source data through theoretical and conceptual lenses, and the research also reflected on 
questions which would reveal insights to be found beyond the study’s a priori conceptual 
framework.  
Through the combination of primary sources, secondary sources, and researcher journals, 
the data collection approach used in this study was designed to support the development of a 
thick, rich description of the phenomenon of interest. Furthermore, it was intended to bolster the 
study’s trustworthiness through data triangulation, described further in this section.  The analysis 
of data collected during the study is described in the following section. 
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Data Coding and Analysis 
The coding and analytical techniques used in this study followed approaches consistent 
with qualitative case study research. Coding involved a three-step process involving open and a 
priori coding, axial coding, and the identification of key themes. The study adopted a hybrid 
analytical approach which highlighted pattern matching and logic modeling techniques. Coding 
and analytical approaches are further described in this section.  
Coding 
As described by Corbin and Strauss (2008) and Saldaña (2009), a three-step process of 
initial coding involving both a priori and open coding, axial coding, and identifying key themes 
and patterns was used. Because of the nature of the study, the preponderance of data was 
obtained from primary sources. However, selected secondary sources that were germane to the 
study’s research questions were coded using the approach described in this section. Figure 6 
provides a high-level diagram of the coding strategy used in this study. 
 
Figure 6: Coding strategy used in this study. 
The first step of data analysis involved a hybrid coding strategy using both a priori and 
open coding. The use of a priori coding allowed for a deductively-oriented form of analysis that 
recognized underlying theories and concepts. In contrast, open coding enabled a more inductive 
analytical process, recognizing the likelihood that new concepts, themes and patterns might be 
identified. The intent in using a hybrid deductive and inductive analysis strategy was to yield a 
robust analysis, and to recognize the possibility that previously unrecognized insights could be 
constructed. This step began with the analysis of a priori codes, followed by a more inductive 
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process of open coding. The overall step enabled the researcher to segment the data into small 
conceptual fragments and then to assign data to categories and concepts. Through this process, 
106 codes were identified.  
The second step of the analytical strategy involved axial coding, described by Charmaz 
(2014), Flick (2014), Saldaña (2009), Corbin and Strauss (2008), and Creswell (2003) as re-
assembling and synthesizing initial code sub-categories into broader categories, and establishing 
relationships between them. In performing axial coding, the researcher reviewed the initial codes 
in consideration of conditions, actions, contexts, interactions, and consequences. To illustrate, 
one example of axial coding involved the synthesis of several codes relating to how the climate 
within an organization affected the decision-maker. The a priori and open codes used were: 
clarity, commitment, control, love of the job, personality/demeanor/style, pride, and stress 
response. Emergent from these codes were the axial codes: role identities, modes, and personal 
attributes. During this process, a total of 28 axial codes were identified. Finally, the researcher 
raised axial codes to a higher level of abstraction to identify core themes and patterns that 
formulated the essence of this study’s findings (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Flick, 2014). A total of 
12 key themes were identified.  
As illustrated in Table 7, a coding strategy guide was developed for each research 
question, consistent with the study’s conceptual framework elements. A full list of open and a 
priori codes is included in Appendix B. This coding strategy was intended to be flexible, 
accounting for additional outcomes yielded through the data gathering process. 
The coding process involved all participant transcripts and relevant secondary sources. 
The researcher did not code researcher journal entries. As illustrated in Figure 7, the researcher 
used Atlas.ti qualitative data assessment software to facilitate coding, data analysis, and data 
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interpretation. Interview transcripts, articles, reports, and researcher memos were uploaded into 
the software. A priori codes were input into the system before coding was initiated, and open 
codes were added during the coding process further discussed in this section. 
 




Qualitative Analysis Coding Strategy Guide for Interviews and Documents 
Conceptual 
Framework Elements 
Code Description Analytical Focus/Considerations 
Main research question: How do people make decisions during organizational crises? 
Overall system 
environment 
A priori codes 
• Fire description 
• Fire duration 
• Changing conditions 
• Crisis perception 
• Nature of outcomes 
Open coding as appropriate 
These codes describe the nature of the 
firestorm from the standpoint of the 
decision-maker, explicating the nature 
of the perceived crisis. 
Research sub-question 1: What are the primary contextual factors that influence decision-making during organizational crises, 
and do some have more significance than others? If so, why? 
Contextual Factors 
 
A priori codes: 
Stress response 
• Self-identity 
• Past experiences 
• Cognitive biases and heuristics 
• Group cohesiveness and psychological safety 
• Social factors 
• Time pressures 
• Organizational policies 
Open coding as appropriate 
These codes identify the decision 
factors that were important to the 
participant in the initial phase of the 
crisis event. 
Research sub-question 2: What sensemaking frameworks do people employ during organizational crises, and why? 
Sensemaking 
Frameworks 








Open coding as appropriate 
These codes identify properties 
reflected in participant sensemaking, as 
well as the two-way influences between 
data and frames; the context is the initial 
phase of the Firestorm. 
 
Research sub-question 3: What types of decision-making strategies do people engage in during organizational crises, and why? 
Decision Strategies 





• Complacent  
Descriptive Codes: 
• Searching (for information) 
• Restricting (information) 
• Inclusiveness 
• Exclusiveness 
• Open (interpretation) 




• Others as appropriate 
Open coding as appropriate 
These codes describe the degree of 
vigilant or non-vigilant behavior 
displayed by the participant during 
initial sensemaking and decision-
making. 
Research sub-question 4: How and why do decision consequences influence ongoing decision-making? 
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Consequences 
A priori codes: 
• Human 
• Technical  
• Economic 
• Social/Organizational 
Open codes as appropriate 
These codes identify those outcomes 
perceived as significant to the 
participant during the initial period of 
the firestorm.  
Note: Other coding descriptions not identified a priori were used as appropriate (See Appendix B for a full list of a priori and 
open codes) 
Data Analysis 
In determining this study’s analytic strategy and methods, the researcher drew largely 
from Yin (2011), who proposed multiple approaches that can be used singularly or in 
combination. Yin (2013b) and others have argued the adoption of multiple analytical 
perspectives bolsters perspective triangulation, strengthening the validity and the transferability 
of case study inquiries. As such, this study adopted a combination of several approaches, further 
discussed in this section: (a) reliance on a theoretical and conceptual foundation, (b) developing 
a case description, (c) pattern matching, and (d) logic modeling.  
Theoretical and conceptual foundation. 
The conceptual framework described in Chapter one of this study also formed the basis of 
the studies compositional structure, which Yin (2011) described as being necessary for guiding 
data analysis. The core elements of the compositional structure are grounded in theory. These 
concepts are described in Chapter two, and are briefly summarized as follows:  
1. The organizational crisis environment; 
2. Contextual factors, or internally and externally-driven decision-making influences; 
3. Sensemaking frameworks that guide how people construct meaning; 
4. Decision-making strategies; and 




A second approach used in this study involved the development of a case description. 
This purpose of developing a case description is to provide a structure within which a thick, rich 
description can be developed (Yin, 2011). In this study, the case description was driven by two 
characteristics: (a) organizations that had experienced severe consequences because of the 2017 
Northern California firestorm, and (b) members of these organizations who had made at least one 
consequential decision during the firestorm. As suggested by Yin (2011), the development of the 
case description aligned with the data collection methods involving interviews, secondary source 
analysis, and researcher journaling. 
Pattern matching.  
Pattern matching was used as a method of analyzing data during this event. This 
technique is commonly used in case studies to compare predicted, theory-based patterns with 
those that emerged from empirical evidence (Trochim, 1989, Yin, 2011). To conduct pattern 
matching analysis, the researcher iteratively compared a priori, open, and axial codes with key 
concepts contained within this study’s conceptual framework. Patterns derived from codes were 
examined in relation to theory-based patterns. In some instances, predicted theory-based patterns 
were supported. In other instances, code-based patterns were not applicable to predicted patterns, 
or were only applicable in specific circumstances. Table 8 contains examples of patterns derived 













Vigilance  The predicted pattern of vigilance 
was found among all participants. 
Participants exhibited higher degrees 
of vigilance than predicted.  
Deconstruction of 
complex situations into 
smaller problems 
Decision Framing The predicted pattern of decision 
framing was found among some 
participants. Framing appeared to be 
related to self-perceptions. 
Use of various past 




The predicted pattern was found to 
have occurred in a modified form. 
People engaged in naturalistic 
decision-making using other than 
“close matches”. 
Member trust as a factor 
influencing participant’s 
sense of risk exposure and 
self-esteem 
Not predicted Patterns related to member trust and 
decision-making yielded an 
unpredicted pattern. This pattern led 
to implications concerning the 
relationships between crisis 




Secondarily, this study employed the concept of logic modeling, which has been 
described as a hybrid between pattern matching and time-series analysis (Baskarada, 2014). 
Similar to pattern matching, logic modeling sought to compare predicted cause-and-effect 
relationships with those that emerged from empirical evidence. The researcher deemed this 
technique to be relevant in that it helped to explicate presumed relationships between elements in 
the conceptual framework’s input-process-output (IPO) system model, as well as causal 
relationships identified within the framework’s underlying theory and research. Techniques such 
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as causal mapping and sequential modeling were used to identify relationships within and 
between framework elements. Table 9 contains examples of patterns derived from codes, 
comparisons with predicted causal relationships, and a brief description of outcomes related to 
the analysis. 
Table 9 
Examples of Causal Relationships Identified Through Coding, Theory, and Outcomes 
Causal Relationships  




The absence of time constraints 
was found to cause stress 
among some participants 
Time constraints will lead to 
heightened stress 
Crisis situations present 
various forms of time 
pressures, depending on the 
nature of the crisis context. 
The inability to control an 
unexpected event led to a focus 
on events that could be 
controlled, resulting in either 
reduced or mitigated stress 
responses. 
The inability to control an 
unexpected event having 
severe consequences will 
increase stress levels. 
In some crisis contexts, 
perceptions of control 
influence the way people 
made sense of their situations, 
and influence how they make 
decisions. In some contexts, 
perceptions of control offer a 
mechanism for mitigating 
stress. 
Sensemaking and decision-
making become inextricable in 
some OCDM contexts. 
Sensemaking precedes and 
leads to decision-making. 
In some contexts, 
sensemaking and decision-
making are both highly 
dynamic, leading to decisions 
before sense is made, or 
creating conditions in which 
the making of sense is 
essentially the making of a 
decision. 
Decision-making is changing, 
non-linear, and is not related to 
the preservation or resumption 
of a known equilibrium state. 
Decision-making is 
normative and follows a 
traditional input-process-
output (IPO) system that 
preserves or resumes the 
organization’s equilibrium 
state. 
In many contexts, 
organizational decision-
making is accurately described 
by a complex adaptive system 




Analysis of Secondary Source Data 
 As described previously, secondary sources were analyzed in two ways. First, sources of 
a general nature were reviewed for background knowledge about the affected communities, and 
general descriptions and stories related to the firestorm. These sources included government 
reports, media articles, and social media posts. Upon reviewing these sources, the researcher kept 
notes pertinent to the context of the case. These notes were routinely reviewed to prepare for 
participant interviews, as well as to contribute to the rich description of the phenomenon of 
interest.  
A limited number of secondary sources were germane to this study’s research questions, 
describing the contexts in which participants engaged in decision-making. As such, these sources 
provided insights about the external influences that decision-makers encountered. These sources, 
described in Table 6 in this chapter, were subsumed into the coding and analytical strategy used 
for primary sources. While some media articles described individual accounts that occurred 
during the firestorm and involved decision-making, the researcher deemed that second-hand 
accounts of were not credible enough to incorporate directly into this study’s findings. 
Research Validity 
In this study, internal and external validity were addressed primarily within the 
qualitative research-related concepts of trustworthiness and transferability. The study’s 
trustworthiness related to the degree to which others would find the results of the study 
believable, and transferability pertained to the extent to which this study’s findings could apply 
to other contexts (Bazeley, 2013; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The researcher addressed 
trustworthiness by attending to various forms of triangulation and researcher positionality. The 
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transferability of findings was attended to through thick, rich descriptions, case typicality and 
case diversity. Each is discussed further in this section. 
Internal Validity: Trustworthiness 
According to Merriam (1998), research trustworthiness is the extent to which “findings 
match reality” (p. 201). A key contributor to trustworthiness is the use of triangulation through 
the consideration of multiple perspectives (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Flick, 2014; Merriam, 1998; 
Stake, 2013; Yin, 2013b). Denzin and Lincoln (2011) proposed four types of triangulation: the 
use of different types of data sources (data triangulation); the use of different interviewers or 
observers (investigator triangulation), considering multiple perspectives (theory triangulation); 
and the use of different research methods— a practice often associated with quantitative research 
involving surveys (methodological triangulation).  Furthermore, Yin (2013b) suggested the use 
of multiple data analysis methods yields a further dimension of triangulation: perspective 
triangulation. This study employed data, theoretical, and perspective triangulation to achieve 
trustworthiness. 
The researcher used a combination of primary sources, secondary sources, and researcher 
journals to achieve data triangulation. As described earlier in this chapter, primary sources 
included individuals who made consequential decision for their organizations during the 2017 
Northern California firestorm, and secondary sources involved official reports, media accounts, 
social media, video-recordings, and audio-recordings. Research journals were used to explore 
and develop findings, and to attend to potential researcher biases and assumptions. 
Theoretical triangulation was used to add to the richness of the description and 
interpretation of several areas of the study. Sensemaking was considered within the contexts of 
both non-sequential and cyclical perspectives. Similarly, decision-making processes incorporated 
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both classic normative perspectives and more recent, naturalistic perspectives. A diversity of 
theoretical perspectives was used for the purpose of revealing rival theories and alternative 
explanations, yielding more robust outcomes than would a single-theory perspective.  
The researcher sought to achieve perspective triangulation through the use of multiple 
data analysis techniques. Pattern matching was used to examine how identified themes and 
patterns compared with existing theory (Yin, 2013b). Logic modeling was used to examine how 
cause and effect relationships observed during the study compared with expected relationships 
based on existing theory (Yin, 2013b).  
As suggested by Glesne (2006), the acknowledgement of a researcher’s biases and 
perspectives—researcher positionality— contribute to a study’s trustworthiness. By describing 
the researcher’s positionality in Chapter one, readers of this study are provided with insights into 
potential biases and assumptions that could influence the study.  Furthermore, a description of 
positionality explains reasoning behind the researcher’s ontological perspective and 
corresponding methodology.  
External Validity: Transferability 
External validity represents the degree to which a study can apply to other groups or 
situations (Merriam, 1998). Lincoln and Guba (1985) have argued that in qualitative studies, 
transferability is an indicator of external validity, demonstrating the degree to which findings 
apply to other contexts. Merriam suggested transferability in qualitative inquiry is achieved 
through a rich, thick description of a phenomenon, typicality of findings, and diversity of 
findings. A rich, thick description of a phenomenon—as is intended in the case study method 
(Njie & Asimiran, 2014)—enables others to assess whether the findings relate to them. The 
typicality of findings pertains to how representative the study is to other people in the same class, 
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enabling them to make comparisons to their own situations (Merriam, 1998). Finally, the 
diversity of findings is intended to bolster the degree to which a range of the study’s outcomes 
can be applied to other situations (Merriam, 1998). 
To provide a rich, thick description of the overall case and phenomenon, the researcher 
described participant’s decision-making contexts, challenges, influences, and used their own 
words to support findings. The researcher sought to achieve typicality by focusing on aspects of 
crisis decision-making that would likely be common among other groups, and intentionally 
steered away from lines of inquiry that would only be applicable in this study’s specific 
“firestorm” context. Finally, diversity was sought through the use of the case study design, which 
considered multiple participant roles, perspectives, assumptions, and behaviors within the 
context of a common condition.   
Threats to Research Validity and Reliability 
In this study, participant retrospection and recall about past events presented potential 
obstacles to research validity and reliability. For reasons related to cognition and motivation, 
retrospection is thought to involve inaccurate interpretations about one’s own past (Henry, 
Moffitt, Caspi, Langley, & Silva; 1994). People may not remember some things, or they may 
reinterpret the past in order to cast themselves in a more positive light (Henry et al., 1994), a 
phenomenon also referred to as “recall bias” (Blane, 1996). Although the event of interest 
occurred in 2017, attending to potential lack of recall and recall bias was intended to bolster the 
study’s trustworthiness. 
This study invoked several methods to account for validity threats related to retrospection 
and recall. First, the study involved landmark events, or experiences that individuals found 
significant. Research suggests landmark events can be recalled more accurately than less 
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significant events (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Henry et al., 1994). In this study, recall was aided 
by the presence of three conditions essential to landmark events (van der Vaart & Glasner, 
2011): (a) participants perceived that the event was important, (b) participants’ memories of 
interest were related to the domain of inquiry, and (c) memorable events held significant 
personal implications for participants. Second, this study focused on critical incidents, which 
have been associated with effective retrospective analysis (Hughes, Williamson, & Lloyd, 2007). 
Flanagan (1954) characterized critical incidents as having significant impacts on an individual, 
or which involve “a major crisis or turning point” (Hughes et al., 2007, p. 2).  
During participant interviews, the researcher incorporated four elements described by 
Hughes et al. (2007) to bolster retrospective analysis of critical incidents: (a) establishing the 
purpose of the investigation, (b) describing the situational context and relevance of the inquiry, 
(c) delineating the extent of data collection criteria, and (d) formulating categories and sub-
categories of behaviors and other actions through data analysis. 
As a primary means of ensuring research validity, the researcher focused on 
consequential decisions that were highly significant to each participant, and expected that the 
Northern California Firestorm would have been perceived as being personally significant 
because of its potentially severe outcomes. Second, Henry et al. (1994) suggested that a 
comparison of retrospective data with previously validated measures aids in the interpretation of 
retrospective data. In this study, the researcher used historical reports and other accounts to 
frame discussions in order to assist participants with recall and to verify the occurrence of 
various events. Third, Ericsson and Simon (1984) suggested that the quality of recall and 
retrospection can be increased through data gathering that mirrors the events being recalled. As 
such, the interview guide used in this study established a broad context of crisis decision-making, 
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and then addressed more specific issues that reflected the firestorm’s sequence of events. Finally, 
De Leon and Cohen (2005) described the use of artifacts during interviews as effective in 
eliciting recollections during interviews. Such objects are thought to focus interviewers on the 
topic of interest and trigger buried memories (De Leon & Cohen, 2005). In this study, materials 
were anticipated to include maps, pictures, or objects that were relevant to the participant and the 
event. As suggested by De Leon and Cohen (2005), where such objects were thought to be 
relevant, participants were asked to discuss their importance.  
Chapter Summary 
Chapter three outlines this study’s purpose, underlying philosophy, research design, and 
methods. A qualitative methodology was used to enable an in-depth exploration of the topic of 
interest. A holistic single case study method following Merriam’s guidance was used to support 
exploratory inquiry and to answer “how and why” research questions. In addition to a 
comprehensive review of secondary sources, the study involved fifteen participants identified 
through purposively sampling. Researcher journaling was undertaken to support the development 
of findings and to address potential researcher biases. The common context bounding the case 
was the 2017 Northern California firestorm; an event in which numerous organizations 
experienced extreme crises.  
To bolster trustworthiness, this triangulated multiple data sources, theories, and data 
analysis methods. Furthermore, researcher positionality was described. Inaccurate or revised 
participant recall of factual events were identified as obstacles to validity and were attended to 
through data triangulation and a focus on landmark events. The critical incident technique and 
focused interviewing strategies were also used to support the trustworthiness of the study’s 
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outcomes. Transferability of findings was attended to through a thick, rich description of the 
phenomenon of interest, and by emphasizing the typicality and diversity of findings. 
The next chapter describes this study’s key conclusions. The structure of the findings is 
organized in alignment with the study’s research questions. Other findings which fell outside of 
the study’s framework are also discussed.   
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Introduction and Structure of Findings 
 This chapter presents the results of this study as they correspond with each research 
question. The chapter begins with an overall summary of key findings and is followed with a 
more detailed description of the findings.  
Overview of Key Findings 
The findings in this study are intended to either answer each research question, or to add 
to the understanding of OCDM in relation to each research question. In this section, each 
research question is stated, and is followed by an overview of findings. Following this section, 
more details about each of the study’s findings are provided. 
Main research question: How do people make decisions during organizational crises? 
This study’s findings suggest that within severe VUCA (volatile, uncertain, chaotic, and 
ambiguous) contexts, the nature of decision-making often deviates from predictable, normative 
processes described by traditional input-process-output (IPO) system models. Rather, 
organizational crisis decision-making frequently reflects the characteristics of a complex 
adaptive system. This finding is consequential in that decision-making theory and research have 
predominantly adopted normative frameworks that are consistent with IPO system models. This 
finding is suggested as being over-arching because it pertains to all aspects of decision-making. 
Furthermore, this finding suggests various implications for theory and research, as described in 
Chapter five.  
Sub-Question 1: What are the primary contextual factors that influence decision-making 
during organizational crises, and do some have more significance than others? If so, why? 
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This study’s findings suggest that five primary contextual factors influence decision making. 
Each contextual factor is identified and briefly described.  
1. Cohesion and trust among group members. Based on how people perceive trust and 
cohesion among members in their groups, those perceptions can affect the degree to 
which they are willing to make decisions.  
2. Self-perceptions. People form strong connections between themselves and the roles that 
they fill, which influences how they make decisions. People also tend to project their own 
traits and attributes onto problems that they encounter, which affects their decision-
making behaviors.  
3. Past experiences. While research has suggested that similar past experiences serve as 
frames for making time-constrained, highly consequential decisions in the present 
moment, people can refer to dissimilar past experiences to form decision frames. 
4. Time pressure. Research has traditionally linked decision-making time constraints with 
heightened stress levels. However, in protracted crises, the absence of time constraints 
was found to raise stress associated with decision-making.  
5. Social factors. When making consequential decisions for an organization, potential 
impacts on family, friends, organizational members, and community members are 
important influences. 
Among these contextual factors, influences related to self-perceptions were found to present 
the greatest degree of significance. Whether as a lone contextual factor or in combination with 
other factors, self-perceptions were found to consistently influence decision-making. This 
finding supports the observation that when making decisions, “utilitarian and social gains are 
important, but you have to live with yourself” (Janis & Mann, 1998, p. 9). 
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Sub-Question 2. What sensemaking frameworks do people employ during organizational 
crises, and why? 
This study did not yield compelling evidence explicating how and why decision-makers 
adopt various sensemaking frameworks during an organizational crisis. However, the study did 
suggest that in highly complex situations, people are apt to commingle sensemaking and 
decision-making. The fusion of sensemaking and decision-making may in part be due to the 
complex and adaptive nature of crisis decision-making, in which assumed linkages between 
decision elements become non-linear and entangled. 
This study also suggested that participants frequently made sense of organizational crises 
based on how much control they believed they could exert over various situations. While 
contemplating numerous consequential situations, some participants tended to focus on those 
problems which they felt they had some degree of control, while paying less attention to those 
that they felt they could not control. In this way, they made sense of situations within the scope 
of what they believed they could influence. Furthermore, participants’ focus on problems that 
could be controlled served to mitigate decision-maker stress. 
Sub-Question 3. What types of decision-making strategies do people engage in during 
organizational crises, and why? 
This study found that participants engaged in differing decision-making strategies, 
largely for reasons concerning time availability and problem complexity. When participants were 
faced with severe outcomes and very little time to act, they frequently adopted a modified form 
of naturalistic decision-making. Consistent with naturalistic decision-making, they recalled past 
experiences from which they were able to derive viable courses of action. However, past 
experiences were not highly similar to the real-time challenges that they faced, as would be 
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expected within the context of naturalistic decision-making. In other instances, when some 
participants faced complex circumstances while not under strict time constraints, they tended to 
reframe multi-dimensional predicaments into a sequence of smaller, more approachable 
problems.  
Sub-Question 4. How and why do decision consequences influence ongoing decision-
making? 
Within the complex and dynamic conditions that participants encountered, their decisions 
often changed their environments rather than reducing the quantity of problems requiring 
decisions. Because conditions were frequently complex, and because the various facets of the 
crisis environments were so entangled, the consequences of participant’s decisions often 
generated new dynamics within their environments. As such, the outcomes of decisions often 
created new decisions to be contemplated. 
The consequences of decisions were also found to relate to the ways in which participants 
reflected on, and learned from, their experiences. Consequences associated with quick and 
resolute decisions that were made in the early phases of the firestorm largely reinforced decision-
makers' perceptions about these problems, suggesting a single-loop learning model. In contrast, 
the consequences of longer-term decisions tended to alter participant’s views of the problems, 
suggesting a double-loop learning model.  
Detailed Discussion of Findings 
This section more fully discusses findings related to this study’s research questions. Each 
research question corresponds with an element of the study’s a priori conceptual framework. For 
each research question, findings are preceded with a table describing the coding progression that 
led to key themes. Selected participant comments are provided as evidence of findings. In some 
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instances, comments were assigned to multiple findings or multiple framework elements. For 
instance, P7’s statement, “I had been trained…for a disaster situation, so it's like, okay, let's think 
through what we'd probably need to do” is related to categories concerning both past experiences 
(a contextual factor) and a sequential problem-solving (a decision behavior). The multiple 
relationships between some comments and framework elements mirror the complex nature of 
crisis decision-making, a topic further discussed in Chapter five. To contribute to a thick, rich 
description, many findings are preceded by brief introductions that provide a semi-narrative 
backdrop to the participant comments. 
Main Research Question  
The main research question asked in this study was: How do people make decisions 
during organizational crises? The key finding associated with this question suggests that during 
crisis contexts involving extreme chaos, change, and unpredictability, decision-making can be 
characterized as a complex adaptive system. This finding is significant in that it departs from 
traditional perceptions of crisis decision-making as a normative process that can be described 
within a traditional input-process-output (IPO) system model. Table 10 includes this finding’s 
open and a priori codes, axial codes and categories, and key themes. Following the table, 




Main Research Question: Codes, Categories, and Key Theme 










Chaotic and changing conditions: Some 
people perceived a sense of disorder and 
confusion. Environmental and contextual 
factors, and the relationships between 
them, were dynamic  
An unstable organizational equilibrium: 
The natural state of the organization 
changed temporarily or permanently 
 
OCDM transpired 
as a complex 
adaptive system  
 
*Indicates a priori code 
Discussion 
P2: I mean, it’d be just complete chaos  
P9: It was the perfect bait and switch  
P14: Things kept changing  
 
Themes and patterns that emerged in this study suggested that for several participants, 
OCDM transpired as a complex adaptive system (CAS). Participants described these phenomena 
with terms associated with CAS: “chaos,” “change,” and “unpredictability” (Lansing, 2003; 
Schneider & Somers, 2006). Researchers have discussed CAS in terms of systems that are 
comprised of interactive environments and independent agents (Ng, 1998). Palmberg (2009) 
described CAS environments as those in which interacting agents must constantly adapt. This 
study’s environment consisted largely of the firestorm and its related contextual factors, while 
independent agents involved people and groups internal and external to participants’ 
organizations. Because of the way the fire’s behavior changed, the nature of the relationships 
between agents was unpredictable and constantly changing. Similarly, decision factors within the 
changing environment were subject to the same patterns of change and unpredictability. 
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Chaotic and changing conditions.  
A majority of the participants described OCDM conditions as being chaotic and 
changing. Chaotic and changing conditions were described by participants as involving the fire’s 
unpredictability, a lack of information, changing social forces, the disruption of public 
infrastructure, and people behaving in unexpected ways. These conditions translated directly into 
changing and unpredictable risks to the participants and their organizations. Each aspect is 
further described in this section. 
The chaos and change involved with the firestorm was most often ascribed to the highly 
dynamic and unpredictable nature of the fires’ behaviors, largely because the fires began and 
grew in arbitrary and erratic ways. P9 described the arbitrariness of the fire’s destructive nature 
on the first full day of the firestorm, resulting in a hazy understanding of how resources might 
best be allocated. P4 described the high degrees of uncertainty and inability to make sense of 
conditions as a by-product of the fires’ unpredictable behavior. These comments were highly 
reflective of other participants’ sentiments about the firestorm and their ability to understand 
conditions: 
P9: the timing was chaotic. … If somebody was controlling this fire, it was a perfect 
bait and switch, right? So, the Tubbs fire starts and all the resources go up to the Tubbs 
fire … It was just enough time to get that shift up there…about an hour. And then the 
Atlas fire starts. And there's now only limited resources here.  
P4: There wasn't an awful lot that I could do or anyone else could do. I mean, we were so 
much at the mercy of the winds. I mean, you had this convergence of the perfect 
storm…  
Beyond the fires’ rapidly changing behavior, participants commented that the scarcity of 
information contributed to chaotic conditions. Participants and secondary sources suggested 
problems with information-sharing were ubiquitous throughout the region (North Bay/North 
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Coast, 2018). P11, P2 and P13 described how the lack of information contributed to the sense of 
uncertainty and chaos: 
P11: I think there's that sense of well you don't know, you just had to wait and see what 
came out of it. 
P13: So, it was a lot of chaos because nobody really knew what was going on. Just not 
enough information and dissemination. There's too many unknowns….no one really 
knew anything. 
P2: And I mean, it'd be just completely chaos, so the only thing we could do as an 
operator of this facility, is being very vigilant because there was no warning from anyone. 
Furthermore, participants commented that the absence of critical infrastructure 
contributed to their perceptions of uncertainty. In this study, critical infrastructure involved 
electricity, water, transportation, and telecommunications. Electrical outages impacted 
organizational operations. The lack of water impeded fire prevention measures. Transportation 
disruptions prevented people from accessing areas at which they felt they could be most 
effective. Telecommunications outages contributed to uncertainty, as information was scarce and 
difficult to share. The conditions created by infrastructure disruptions were described as 
contributors to the abnormal and chaotic conditions imposed upon their participants’ 
organizations.   
As described earlier in this section, within complex adaptive systems, various people and 
groups are viewed as independent agents. Participants described how the unpredictable 
interactions between agents contributed to change and chaos. The independent agents in this 
study involved participants, their organizations, work groups, institutions, family members, 
friends, communities, social connections, politicians, and others.  As examples of these 
interactions, P1 commented the reactions of staff members and clients contributed to an 
environment of change and unpredictability. And similarly, in the aftermath of the fires P2 and 
P8 described how external agents added to the chaotic nature of decision-making. P14 described 
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the uncertain and changing nature of rebuilding, a situation that was faced by six of the 
participants’ organizations.  
P1: And so, um, some of the … staff were panicking. They didn't know what to do. 
P2: You tell a sub[contractor] … you can work up to 2:00. And they don't show the 
whole week. They got somewhere else to go. 
P8: It was pretty chaotic. Especially with the politicians not giving us clear directions. 
We spent hours and hours a day on conference calls and couldn’t nail them down on 
clarity. That hindered us greatly.  
P14: It's been difficult to try to find the permits and a place that could get the permit to 
have the facilities. So, we were counting how many…which version we were on and you 
know which scheme A to B to C, you know. I think we're now on, on G … And, and 
some of it was just things kept changing. 
An unstable organizational equilibrium.  
Complex adaptive systems diverge from traditional IPO systems in that they do not 
assume stable states of organizational equilibria. While the components of a classic system 
would seek to either maintain or return to a pre-existing equilibrium, a complex adaptive system 
can evolve into new state. As described by participants in this study, new states of organizational 
equilibria took many forms. Some firefighters described that newly encountered conditions as 
temporary “new normal” states that portended unknown implications for their organizations. 
Several participants described temporary equilibrium states while organizational members were 
displaced from damaged or destroyed building. Still, other participants found opportunity for 
beneficial change in the midst of crisis. Participants’ sentiments about changing equilibrium 
states were reflected in the comments of several participants: 
P8: Then [400 people] go to other sites, And that was very difficult ...There are different 
rules, different cultures, different ways of going. Each of these notions had to be 
confronted. 
P7: We've had this horrible thing. Now what do we do to be better? To be back. To go 
forward.  
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P4: This is probably one of the most devastating events that the [organization] has faced 
in 200 years and at the same time as a clarion call for why it exists in the first place.  
In limited instances, the firestorm’s destruction was described as presenting an existential 
threat to participant’s organizations, throwing into doubt whether it could continue in a similar 
form. In these cases, decision-makers faced the likely prospects of new organizational locations, 
structures, ownership, employees, services, and customers.    
Summary.  
The types of change and chaos described by the participants were wide-ranging, 
suggesting highly dynamic and unpredictable conditions in several contexts. Moreover, these 
participants also made decisions within the midst new equilibrium states. For the participants 
who experienced these conditions, decision-making experiences were characterized as being 
complex adaptive systems. 
Sub-Question 1: Contextual Findings 
The first sub-question asked in this study was: What are the primary contextual factors 
that influence decision-making during organizational crises, and do some have more significance 
than others? If so, why?  
Findings related to this question yielded six key themes: (a) group member trust and 
cohesion, (b) self-perceptions, (c) personal well-being, (d) past experiences, (e) time influences, 
and (f) social factors. Table 11 includes examples of a priori and open codes used to analyze this 
element, as well as axial codes and categories, and key themes. Each theme is further elaborated 
upon in this section.  
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Table 11  
Sub-Question 1 - Contextual Factors: Codes, Categories, and Themes 
A priori and Open Codes Axial Codes/Categories Key Themes 
Cohesion and trust 
Leadership and management 
Organizational culture 
Organizational effectiveness 
Time in the group 
Group cohesion; Group member 
trust; Psychological safety: the 
presence or absence of group 
cohesion and trust can influence 
peoples’ sensemaking and 
decision-making. 









Participant Roles: Various types of 
role-based identities and 
temporarily adopted “mode 
identities” which can influence 
peoples’ decision-making. 
 
Participant Attributes: demeanor, 
personality characteristics and 
other observable behaviors which 
can influence peoples’ decision-
making. 
Mode identities: Temporary roles 
and attributes that are adopted 









Physical, emotional, and 
psychological health  
Stress response* 
Personal impacts: Fire-related 
impacts on participants’ health, 
homes, health, family, animals, 
close friends. 
Decision inhibitors: Firestorm 
impacts that prevented participants 







Participant and organizational 
history: Various types of past 
experiences can influence how 








Time pressures; time uncertainty: 
Various types of time influences 
can factor into how people engage 








relationships; external party 
relationships; community member 
relationships: Various types of 
relationships can influence how 
people engage in sensemaking and 
decision-making. 
Social factors 
*Indicates a priori code 
Cohesion and Trust Among Group Members 
P4: Trust…with it you can do so much. Without it… everything is suspect. 
P11: We had a great crew…And so you garner that strength. 
P8: I’m not part of the inner circle. 
 
The degree to which participants trusted group members and felt a sense of cohesion 
within those groups emerged as an unexpected but common decision factor during this inquiry. 
Participants who described the presence of group cohesion and trust indicated that they felt a 
sense of confidence in members, and were willing to make decisions, even when unsure about 
the outcomes. P4 succinctly encapsulated perceptions about the importance of this influence:  
P4: I think there's another piece that it's attached to this and to other organizations that 
can respond effectively in times like this…which is trust. And with it you can do so 
much. Without it I mean, everything is suspect. Everyone's at blame. [It is] such a big 
piece here…. not just informs how I lead and make decisions, but because it's part of 
the fabric of I think, who collectively we are. 
In some instances, although members did not know each other well, conditions of trust 
and cohesion were assumed. For example, due to the scale of the firestorm, 351 firefighting 
entities were involved in the response (Rossman, 2017), totaling approximately 11,000 
individuals (Harms, 2017). In this environment, P9 observed how an assumed bond with other 
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firefighting entities provided positive working relationships and were conducive to making 
decisions. While the reasons for the assumed bonds were not explored in depth, the context of 
the statements suggested the presence of institutional trust and cohesion: 
You recognize a lot of people who don't ever wear name badges. So, I know this person, 
I've worked with this person, I've trained with this person. I probably should know his 
name, but I don't. But I know him well enough to have a working relationship with him. 
So, I felt comfortable in that … so, we had already developed a team. 
Among different participants, the sense of cohesion and trust was described at different 
levels: groups, organizations, institutions, and communities. One participant highlighted member 
trust in the organization’s leadership group. In this instance, P15 pointed out that the cohesion of 
the group and the trusted support of management helped in navigating decision-making. P15 
stated “99% of the decisions were not stressful” due to the participant’s sense of trust and 
confidence in senior management. Another participant, P1, described the importance of trust and 
confidence at the group level: 
P1: It played a major part that they knew who I was. They knew what kind of person I 
was. For the most part, everyone here knows each other very well and they know 
that…me personally.  
For some participants, particularly those who were new in their roles or organizations, the 
absence of trust and cohesion were described as impeding decision-making. P8 provided two 
examples of this condition. P8’s first comment described how being new to the organization 
created a perceived decision-making deficit, and P8’s second comment touches on the realities of 
crisis situations, during which abnormal conditions cause organizational members to interact 
with different groups in different ways: 
I was hired [very recently]. I didn't know almost anybody in the organization…I didn't 
know anybody. I was working from a deficit…I’m not part of the inner circle … that 
was difficult.  
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There are different rules different cultures different ways of [doing things]. Each of these 
notions had to be confronted. It was hard on the [employees] and it was probably hard 
on me because I was new to everybody and everything. 
Summary.  
A common theme among participants as they engaged in OCDM was the influence of 
group member cohesion and trust. Participants suggested that group member cohesiveness and 
trust influenced participants’ confidence that decisions would be supported. Some participants 
implied that high levels of group cohesiveness gave them a sense of confidence in making 
decisions. Furthermore, participants described that group cohesion reduced anxiety about making 
“the wrong decision.” Participants who described low levels of cohesion and trust among 
members appeared to have experienced higher levels of anxiety, uncertainty, and hesitance in 
making decisions.  
Self-Perceptions 
This study suggested participants’ self-perceptions were significant decision-making 
influences. Participant comments indicated that two aspects of self-perceptions were salient: 
decision-maker roles, and decision-maker attributes. Each are discussed further in this section. 
Decision-maker roles. 
Participants suggested during the firestorm, they closely identified with a myriad of roles 
that influenced their decision-making. Types of roles included those of leaders, family members, 
change agents, friends, and others. That several participants identified closely with their roles 
may in part be explained by opportunities for enhancing self-esteem: rescuing people, protecting 
property, protecting member well-being, restoring organizational operations, and others. Table 
12 provides examples of the types of role-identities described by participants, and their 
implications for decision-making. 
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Table 12 
Examples of Participants’ Role Identities and the Nature of Impacts for Decision-Making 
Participant Role Identities Nature of Impact on Decision-making 
P1 
Leader, mentor, organizational 
family member 
Decision emphasis on care for staff and 
clients, with consideration for individuals 
needs 
P3, P4, P6 Leader, family member 
Changing decision focus between family 
and organizational needs 
P7 Leader, change agent 
Decisions designed to introduce 
organizational changes 
P9 Leader, difference maker 
Decisions regarding firefighting and 
rescue tactics and strategy  
P14 Head of organizational family  
Decisions emphasized benefit to members 
over participant self-interest 
 
As an example of how one participant’s leadership identity influenced decision-making, 
P7 described the role’s wide-ranging implications concerning member engagement, 
communication, organization, delegation, and organizational improvements. As such, the role 
was described as significantly influencing the way decisions were made, and provided insight 
into types of decisions that were deemed important: 
The first major obstacle was to get my community at large to understand that I was in 
charge and that I needed to set a direction and get steps in place and then engage people 
as to how they could help them forward … So, standing, taking my leadership 
responsibilities, and putting them out there and then organizing who I needed to put 
forward first and then moving and then getting going on a plan, whatever that plan was 
… Maybe it's my leadership style. I am not the kind of leader that needs 43 people 
doing my job. I felt like I engaged the people around me … I'm going to have to make 
some decisions about what we're doing and not doing and who's doing what as we move 
forward. …It's also for me and as a leader, it's an opportunity to really look at the 
structure you have in place for how you are leading; How is the business working, not 
working and should you make changes now? 
Other participants described different roles during the firestorm. For example, P1 alluded 
to the filling a role of “family member” within the organization. P1’s role-identity implied 
100 
feelings of personal responsibility for organizational members’ lives and well-being, much as a 
traditional family member might experience. From a decision-making standpoint, P1 took 
initiative concerning decisions to evacuate staff and clients during the first hours of the fire. For 
other participants, traditional family member roles significantly influenced their decision-
making, as participants had to balance family concerns with those related to organizational 
matters.  
Decision-maker attributes. 
 An emergent pattern in this study revealed that participants demonstrated a high sense of 
self-awareness concerning their personal attributes and characteristics. Participants’ comments 
about their own characteristics explicitly or implicitly evoked such attributes as: analytical, type-
A, calm, optimist, calm, engineering mindset, organized, instinctual, unexcitable, and 
competitive. Table 13 provides examples of the ways in which people explicitly or implicitly 
described how they viewed themselves. While these attributes tend to suggest positive forms of 
self-perception, it is foreseeable that further examination of this matter might reveal other types 








Nature of Impacts on Decision-making 
P1, P15 Compassion 
Individual member, client care 
considerations were integral to decisions 
P3, P13 Calm, Analytical 
Sequential and measured analysis and 
decision selection 
P4 Deliberate 
Decisions emphasized long-term member 
well-being 
P7 Type A 
Ambitious and bold decisions guiding the 
organizations future 
P9 Passion 
Decisions reflected a persistent optimism 
about what the group could accomplish 
P14 Unselfishness 
Decisions occasionally sacrificed personal 
well-being in order to promote the 
interests and well-being of organizational 
members 
 
 Participants shared that these personality attributes were instrumental in how they went 
about making decisions, as well as influencing the decisions that they made. For instance, P3 
described personality attributes of remaining calm and unexcitable, even during stressful 
situations.  P3 further implied that these attributes enabled a rational and analytical approach to 
decision-making, even as fires burned toward the facility. When asked about how P3 arrived at 
multiple decisions, P3 responded “They were just obvious”; suggesting that an analytical 
approach to decision-making simply led to a logical conclusion.  Similarly, P13 described a 
tendency to adopt an “engineering” mindset and manner during unexpected situations. In 
working through critical decisions, P13 described how the engineering mindset played into the 
decision-making process.  
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Stay calm, figure out the problems, keep going through to the solution, solve it, fix it. 
And I tend to have more of an engineering mindset so it's very logical for me. 
P2 implied that earlier life experiences as a professional athlete influenced P2’s self-
perception. This experience appeared to contribute to P2’s personality traits as being competitive 
and determined, and as such appeared to perceive that obstacles presented by the fires were 
merely challenges to be overcome. This was implicit in comments made about the decision to re-
open the facility two months prior to a timeframe suggested by insurance adjustors:  
It was just a march toward that [schedule]. There was nothing ever like, oh, we, you 
know, coulda, shoulda, woulda or, or, you know. It was very singular in our direction…. 
what had to happen. 
Temporary roles and attributes: mode identities. 
Several participants described that in some instances, circumstances caused them to 
temporarily adopt roles or attributes that guided their behaviors and decision-making: these were 
described as “modes.” Participants implied that temporary modes served as transient attributes 
and roles that framed decisions. For example, P9 described how personal connections caused 
difficulties disconnecting work priorities from needs associated with personal relationships. To 
manage potential conflict over personal connections, P9 commented that a “business-like” mode 
was adopted as a way to achieve separation from personal influences. In this way, P9 was able to 
concentrate on assigned responsibilities and their associated decisions: 
I wanted to help….at least give them information … It was, it was “[P9]: is a friend” … 
so that was a little less business-like … So, I did have to temper some, I don't know what 
I want to call it, like business-like, you get in the mode. I kind of had to get in … mode, 
like very curt, matter of fact, you could almost call it rude to a certain extent. I couldn't 
do that with those people [friends], but I still had to be firm. 
In another example related to a more formal sense of mode, P5 and P6 discussed that 
traditional firefighting strategies were abandoned due to the fires’ extraordinary amount of 
destruction. In this instance, the participants were compelled to adopt a “rescue mode” behavior 
103 
and role instead of the traditional “extinguishment mode”. P6 described this condition as highly 
unusual, and that the mode was not adopted naturally or easily. P6 implied that this abnormal 
mode presented decision-making difficulties such as heightened stress, complexity, and 
uncertainty.   
I've been in the fire service for about 34 years. I had never heard dispatch say on the radio 
to all responding people that it's a rescue mode, not extinguishment mode. So that was, 
that was a different animal. … They were pretty much surrounded by fire at that time. 
And like I said, they were in rescue mode. … So, it would be just bump and run, you 
know, from house to house. So yeah, a very hard mode to go into. 
Participants stated or implied several types of modes: crisis mode, triage mode, business-
like mode, theory-X mode, event management mode, rescue mode, and others. While these 
modes were diverse in nature, they appeared to consistently act as attributes or roles that guided 
how participants went about decision-making. Participants’ comments suggested that these 
modes were latent aspects of their self-identities, triggered as a result of transient real-time 





Examples of Participants’ Temporary Mode Identities 
Participant Modes Nature of Impacts on Decision-Making 
P4 “Theory X” 
Behavior diverged from a natural tendency 
to engage in participative decision-making 
to a more directive style 
P5, P6 Rescue mode 
Decisions reflected new strategies and 
tactics that were abnormal for the 
organization 
P8 Crisis mode, Triage mode 
Adoption of a new mental model in which 
normal operations and assumptions were 
abandoned, and during which only vital 
decisions would be addressed 
P9 Business-like mode 
Introduction of a sense of distance 
between the participant and social 
connections as a way of maintaining a 
disciplined approach to decision-making 
P15 
Crisis mode, Event management 
mode 
Differing perceptions on the condition of 
the organization and the nature of how 
decisions were perceived   
 
Summary.  
In this study, participants suggested that various aspects of their self-perceptions were 
influential factors in their decision-making. Aspects of self-perception included both the roles 
that participants held, as well as attributes that characterized participants. Furthermore, 
participants described temporary modes relating to their roles and attributes, affecting decision-
making in a more transient manner. 
Personal Well-Being 
Findings suggest that despite this study’s focus on organizational decision-making, 
participants consistently perceived decisions related to personal concerns as a top priority. Types 
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of personal concerns identified by participants included personal safety, family safety and health, 
home destruction, home evacuation, physical and emotional strain, and animal safety. For the 
purposes of this study, these were classified as types of impacts within a theme designated as 
“personal well-being," Participants consistently commented that decisions related to personal 
well-being were a top priority during the early stages of the firestorm. This finding suggested 
participants either considered matters of personal well-being to be a top priority due to the nature 
of their consequences, or they realized that they could not attend to other organizational matters 
until personal matters were resolved. Comments offered by P7, P4, and P3 were indicative of a 
common sentiment among participants who faced personal impacts.  
P7: So, at the start, at the start it was definitely personal. I mean, the first twenty-four 
hours.  
P4: We were awakened at about midnight by the incessant banging on our front door and 
my wife and I woke up … And uh, the guy across the street came over to wake us up and 
said there’s a wildfire that just crossed [the highway], and it's coming right down our 
street. Get out of here as fast as you possibly can ... And we ran for our lives. And at 
that point I wasn't thinking about the [organization] at all.  
P3: We knew we were going to get back to business, we didn't know when. Yeah, you 
know, I think our concern was more for the county and for people and obviously, you 
know, our home from a personal standpoint, um, and just trying to, you know, when 
are we going back to normal life. 
This finding was not unsurprising when thinking holistically about participant 
experiences. However, it was surprising that within a study which was explicitly focused on 
organizational decision-making, every participant that faced significant personal consequences 
included those decisions within the context of organizational decision-making. These comments 
suggested that participants tended to view matters of personal well-being with the context of 
organizational concerns. This implications of this finding are further discussed in Chapter five.  
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Past Experiences  
Participants indicated that past experiences played a part in how they perceived current 
firestorm conditions and how they engaged in decision-making. In some cases, participants used 
dissimilar past experiences to guide their understanding of real-time circumstances, as well as 
framing decisions about courses of action. While this was true for general types of sensemaking 
and decision framing, it was not true for specific tactical decisions.  
Six participants described that they had experienced previous natural disasters but stated 
that the scopes of those disasters were limited in comparison to the extreme nature of the 2017 
firestorm.  For example, P7 described how the perception of past experiences informed current 
circumstances:  
I was a head of [an organization] when the Oakland hills fire occurred, which was 
another terrible disaster. I was in another … leadership role in the 1989 earthquake 
occurred. And then I was also head of another [organization] on the peninsula when [the] 
gas fire happened … So those would be disaster experiences that I was actually 
working when those things were happening. And how to…what do you do first? 
Second. Third. 
When participants invoked aspects of very dissimilar past experiences, they tended to 
apply only some relevant aspects of those experiences to current conditions. This was 
demonstrated in participants’ recollections of non-crisis experiences that they found demanding. 
In these instances, participants appeared to judge that conditions experienced in the past were 
relevant enough to apply to the current crisis, despite the different nature of the experiences.  
Participants described these types of past experiences as demanding, but not as crises. Because of 
the indirect relevance of these past experiences, participants tended to be selective about how 
experiences were perceived to have informed decision-making. In doing so, they identified 
relevant aspects of the past events that could be applied to current conditions. For example, P1 
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described how experiences as a volunteer were employed as a means of decision-making and 
problem solving during the fires: 
I'm a [volunteer]. We do a lot of event planning and there is a lot of delegation that is 
involved when we do have events and sometimes the time is getting closer and they're 
still a lot of stuff to do and I think that I did get into this … mode to where it's almost 
like this is an event that has to get done at this time. We don't have a lot of time and 
there's still some things that need to get done…So yeah, I just got into this leadership 
role, which… I'm drawing on that experience… 
 Some participants described recollections of past experiences in a manner evocative of 
iterative sensemaking. In these instances, participants indicated that their interpretation of data 
emerging from past events changed as the firestorm evolved. P3 described an example of such an 
instance. During the first few hours of the firestorm, P3 also recalled memories of another fire 
event in Oakland. In this case, P3 suggested that a seemingly similar past event evolved to 
become quite different, putting a significantly different complexion on the decision-making 
environment: 
…this is fire weather, this is just like what happened in Oakland. [But over time], this 
was very different. I mean the conditions that started were the same, the hot dry fall 
weather condition that we get. But [in Oakland] it wasn't this sort of extended anxiety of, 
when is this gonna be over? You know, when, when does the risk go away? 
Summary.  
In discussing the relevance of past experience on decisions made during the 2017 
firestorm, participants described several types of past events. Some events were vaguely similar 
and provided a framework for decision-making. Other past experiences were entirely dissimilar 
but contained elements that could be selectively applied to current decision-making. These 
recollections support the concepts related to retrospective sensemaking, during which people 
scan experiences, even dissimilar ones, for salient cues in order to make sense of current 
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conditions. Furthermore, comments revealed that participants engaged in iterative sensemaking 
by reframing conditions as new data emerged.  
Time Influences 
Participants in this study consistently indicated that the presence or absence of time 
constraints influenced their decisions. Severe time constraints affected short-term decisions such 
as evacuations, rescue operations, and property protection. Unexpectedly, some participants 
recalled that time uncertainty, or the absence of time constraints, was a significant contributor to 
decision stress. Both types of time influences are discussed further in this section.  
 Time pressures. 
As expected, participants explained that time pressures presented the need to rapidly 
make or adjust various tactical decisions, such as how to fight a fire, whom to rescue, what 
property to protect, or how to evacuate people from an area. The sources of time pressures were 
primarily associated with the early phases of the fire, when it was burning most erratically and 
presented the greatest potential for harm. Consequently, the types of decisions subject to these 
time pressures tended to be related to initial actions taken in response to the fire: rescue 
operations, evacuations, and the protection of assets. P1, P2, and P6 described how the fast-
moving fire and changing conditions forced rapid decisions concerning the protection of 
employees’ and clients’ lives.  
P1: At the time it was so fast…I just wanted to get everybody out as soon as 
possible…. just in case. Yeah. We weren't even told to evacuate. I said, I'm not going to 
wait. Let's get outta here. 
P2: But at the time it was so fast that mean, I mean, yeah, we did the plan. 
P6: Well that report kind of validates what we were seeing and what we're thinking. We 
had no idea how fast. It was heading over towards Sonoma County. Then we started 
hearing reports on the radio that it's already to this point, it's really hard to believe it 
was going that fast. So that was a very unique situation. So, in a case like that, do you 
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respond to calls, or are you making more strategic decisions about where the fire could 
go? 
 Time uncertainty. 
Of greater interest was the degree to which an absence of time pressure, or time 
uncertainty, generated participant stress, as this was unexpected. These situations were 
associated with the aftermath of the firestorm and the long-term recovery processes endured by 
participant organizations. These processes tended to center around building repairs, 
reconstruction, and re-occupation. Because of the uniqueness and extreme consequences of the 
fires, various administrative systems designed to support recovery activities were often both ill-
understood and overwhelmed. For example, P14 described how a lack of information about 
rebuilding contributed to time pressures. In this instance, the inability to understand rebuilding 
requirements impeded P14’s ability to make timely and high-quality decisions about how to 
rebuild the organization’s facility. One example provided concerned rebuilding permit processes: 
I didn't understand the permit process that was going to have to go on with the city or the 
county. It's been difficult to try to find the permits and a place that could get the permit to 
have the facilities. So, we were counting how many…which version we were on and you 
know which scheme A to B to C, you know, I think we're now on, on G. 
Similarly, P4, recalled a perception shared by several other participants who faced long-term 
recovery challenges in the wake of the firestorms’ aftermath:  
There’s a period, it's like a ghost town right now in parts of [the town]. And all the lots 
have been cleared…that took about six months…But that's over. And what they found 
out after all the cleaning occurred, many of the plastic pipes that were delivering water 
melted. Polluted the water. And so, you've got thousands of people that are caught in 
this no-man's land. Literally being unable to rebuild and being unable to sell and 
they're still contending with all the insurance issues. They got kids trying to figure out 
where to go to school. Its crisis…the crisis continues. 
Summary.  
Participants shared differing views of time pressures associated with crisis decision-
making. These pressures were experienced in two ways: threats that required immediate 
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decisions, and uncertainty about unbounded timelines associated with long-term recovery 
decisions. Both of these types of pressures were described as stress-inducing. While literature 
has tended to associate stress with severe time constraints, this study has found the absence of 
time constraints can also cause stress and influence decisions.   
Social Factors 
Participants in this study described social factors as significant within the context of 
better understanding conditions and implementing decisions. Types of social factors involved 
connections with organizational members, external organizations, and community members. 
Each of these types of social connections is further discussed.  
Organizational member relationships. 
Participants consistently described the importance of their organizational members as a 
factor in their decision-making. These social factors typically revolved around decisions 
concerning member safety and well-being. Without exception, every participant organization had 
members who had experienced significant personal impacts, both in the early phases of the 
firestorm, and during its aftermath. Several participants described a sense of responsibility for 
organizational members, and the importance of the decisions that could affect them: 
P8: I guess the other considerations were for the employees that lost their homes. We 
were trying to be considerate. Our decisions affected everyone in our organization. 
P4: Primarily [decisions were] to provide a source of community and connectivity and 
caring right at a time when people were feeling very threatened in isolated. 
P3: Fortunately, none of our staff lost homes, but just trying to keep track. We had a 
couple of people who went through some real close calls during the week. And so, 
staying in touch with them. 
Concerns about member well-being were uniformly described as significant influences on 
decision-making, suggesting that participants perceived member well-being as an important 
aspect of organizational crisis decision-making.    
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External party relationships. 
As a component of social factors, several participants indicated that relationships with 
external parties influenced decision-making. In this study, external parties represented people or 
groups which were not members or constituents of the participants’ organizations. External 
parties included government agencies, local businesses, and various types of service providers. 
Participants shared that interactions with external organizations influenced decision-making in 
various ways: some external organizations provided information, and some provided assistance. 
Several participants described examples of the significance of the support they received from 
external organizations: 
P13: We were able to work with PG&E. We worked with their governmental affairs 
coordinator person. We were able to get elevated on the repower effort. 
P7: So, FEMA reached out to us and our [executive] was able to make a contact with 
someone locally in San Francisco that then got us to our right FEMA representative…and 
he said, “great, we're here for you.” 
P14: [The insurance services] were incredibly helpful, you know, because I mean, like 
they know me … They were like, you might need to do this, do you need to take care of 
this? How can we help you get this going? So there, there was a lot of, of help that we 
had. 
P3: My friend who's a fire chief here at the station was sort of a go-to…he's part of a 
circle of friends. Our kids all grew up together, so he was, he was on the receiving end of 
constant phone calls. We were trying to get updates. 
Community member relationships. 
Because of the extent of damage sustained by Napa and Sonoma counties, their 
communities were severely impacted. Participants commented that, as a result of the fires, 
fabrics of the local communities were strengthened, creating a constructive environment in 
which decisions could be made and enacted. The environments were described as those in which 
the communities were highly supportive of the participants and could provide assistance with the 
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implementation of various activities. Comments made by P6 and P7 demonstrated this 
perception: 
P6: A local grocery store, for example, just left the key. “Take whatever you need.”  
Which we took advantage of. We took inventory of everything we took. We kept all the 
receipts and reimbursed them, but they didn't care about that. 
 P7: Our strength has been in this feeling of community that no matter what we were 
going to hang together and not give up and push forward. And that's helped us 
tremendously, and not get caught in the “I can't do anything” state. 
P6 further described how a sense of commitment to the community directly influenced decisions 
involving where to deploy firefighting resources. In this case, the participant described enormous 
pressure to send local firefighting resources to a different municipality: 
Well, briefly you think about the politics behind it. How are we going to look to 
everybody else? But then you quickly realize, well our best bet for our people is to 
protect our town because we weren't getting the outside help that we'd normally get if it 
were just an isolated fire. So that quickly was an easy decision. 
One participant offered a counter-perspective about the positive nature of social forces 
associated with the local community. Being relatively new to the region, P7’s comments 
described the sense of being somewhat detached from the local community. As opposed to being 
a detriment, P7 viewed that same independence from the community was perceived as a benefit, 
providing a degree of freedom from community expectations and perceived obligations: 
I have not grown up here … And so, I don't have the historical attachment which 
many of these community members do … Frankly, it's, it's helped me be more 
objective. So, we had a natural disaster and I didn't get stuck. I moved, you know, I 
knew I had to do things. I have to get going. … Things are just more sequential and you 
can just kind of approach things that way rather than, everything's sort of connected and 
you don't get through anything really. 
Summary. 
Participants recognized that their organizations did not exist as insulated units, but they 
were subject to forces involving various social entities: organizational members, external 
organizations, and communities. Consequently, participants uniformly shared social factors 
113 
influenced their decision-making, providing access to information and support for decisions and 
actions. In contrast, one participant recalled that a detachment from social forces allowed for 
more subjective decision-making, a condition that the participant viewed as favorable.  
Contextual Factors Summary 
The contextual factors considered in this study were internal and external forces that 
influenced participant sensemaking and decision-making.  While types of influences were wide-
ranging, participants’ comments suggested member trust, cohesion and participants’ self-
perceptions were of high importance. Other significant factors discussed by the participants 
involved past experiences, time pressures, and social forces.  
Sub-Question 2: Sensemaking 
The second research sub-question asked: What sensemaking frameworks do people 
employ during organizational crises, and why?   
The findings related to this question describe how perceptions of control influenced 
sensemaking. Table 15 includes examples of a priori and open codes used to analyze this 
element, axial codes and categories, and key themes. Following the table, findings associated 
with this question’s key theme are further described. 
Table 15  
Sub-question 2 - Sensemaking Frameworks: Codes, Categories, and Themes 







Stress, satisfaction and problem 
scoping; People can make sense of 
conditions based on what they 
believe they can control or influence. 
This sensemaking can result in stress 
response, a sense of satisfaction, or it 




* a priori codes 
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Perceptions of Control 
P4: Yeah, there was certainly a feeling of almost resignation and helplessness in terms 
of not being able to at least come over here and hold a garden hose. 
 
This section discusses the concept of control as a factor influencing participant 
sensemaking. Because the firestorm event was uncertain and changing, participants reflected 
they had to continually make sense of their current situations to make decisions, or merely to 
understand whether situations required decisions. Participants indicated that they made sense of 
their situations based in part by what they felt they could control. Within the emergent theme of 
control, this study identified elements involving stress, satisfaction, and problem scoping, each of 
which is further discussed.    
Stress. 
Within crisis contexts, research has discussed the concept of control largely in terms of 
its relationship to stress. In this vein, the more someone can exert control over a situation, the 
less likely the person is to experience heightened stress and anxiety (Lazarus, 1993). The ability 
to control a situation relates to the coping and response resources at an individual’s disposal. 
These resources can be cognitive, emotional, social, physiological, and material (LeBlanc, 2009). 
Therefore, a lack of resources results in a lack of control and higher stress levels.  
In the case of the 2017 firestorm, participants generally described that they did not have 
control over many of the problems that they encountered. Moreover, they stated that had very 
few resources to draw upon. P4’s comments related to the lack of control were representative of 
other participant experiences:  
It's interesting in terms of; what did you do? What important responsibility did you feel? 
Those are great questions because there wasn't an awful lot that I could do or anyone else 
could do. I mean, we were so much at the mercy of the winds. I mean, you had this 
convergence of the perfect storm… high winds, high temperature, downed power lines, 
and fires just raging … Yeah, there was certainly a feeling of almost resignation and 
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helplessness in terms of not being able to at least come over here [to the facility] and 
hold a garden hose. 
Control, or the lack thereof, took various forms. Often a lack of control stemmed from 
high levels of uncertainty, implying that participants could not control what they could not 
understand. Participants also described the inability to control conditions which impacted them 
negatively, but which they could do nothing about. This was seen in several instances while the 
fires were raging, when some participants lacked resources and capabilities to fight the fires. In 
some cases, organizations that under normal circumstances would have been able to address 
various problems were completely overwhelmed because of the magnitude of the firestorm’s 
destruction. An example of this was shared by P6, who described that inadequate resources 
influenced the ability to take meaningful actions:   
There's just absolutely nothing anybody could do. There's not enough water. Not 
enough firetrucks. Not enough guys to make a stand on that. It was moving so quick. 
Based on common conditions involving a lack of control, it was expected that 
participants would have consistently experienced heightened degrees of stress. This was true for 
some participants. For example, P14 related the lack of control experienced during the fires as a 
contributor to stress and uncertainty: 
To me, I think it's a level of stress and uncertainty and I mean, I think that the control in 
your life may be kind of an illusion in the grand scheme of things. 
Contrary to expected findings of heightened stress, two unexpected but more consistent 
themes were identified. First, some participants described a sense of satisfaction about what 
could be controlled, rather than stress about what could not be controlled. Second, some 
participants described that uncontrolled aspects of their conditions were disregarded, reducing 




While facing conditions that were partially beyond their control, several participants 
shared that they felt a sense of calm and satisfaction about the situations that they could 
influence. For these participants, their sense of contribution seemed to carry more weight than a 
sense of futility or resignation. For example, P9’s comments suggested while many issues could 
not be controlled, doing the best at executing whatever decision was made provided a sense of 
satisfaction: 
And so, I felt like once we were out there, that was it. It was comforting to know that I 
don't have to worry about [the Partrick fire] and I don’t have to worry about Tubbs. My 
job is right in front of me. 
These feelings of satisfaction did not indicate participants were complacent about ongoing 
problems, rather that they were at ease with themselves as they focused on problems under their 
control. 
 Problem scoping.  
Some participants suggested that uncontrollable events influenced how they made sense 
of the problems that they faced. For these participants, a lack of control appeared to be a 
heuristic that narrowed the problems under consideration. If the problem was out of a 
participant’s control, it was removed from the set of problems under consideration. P10 shared 
an example of this phenomenon. Over the first three days of the firestorm, P10 faced two 
immediate concerns: harm to the business establishment, and harm to horses resident on the 
property. When the researcher probed whether a priority was assigned to either of the concerns, 
P10 described a feeling of helplessness and resignation about potential harm to the business, 
while at the same believing the fate of the horses could be influenced. P10 summed up those 
feelings as follows: 
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Whether the [business] burned down was beyond our control, but we could save our 
horses. 
Similarly, P11 expressed a sense of acceptance that as an organizational leader, certain 
situational dynamics could not be controlled. These comments appeared to suggest that certain 
decisions did not need to be contemplated at that time. The comments also implied perceptions 
of control served to regulate the level of stress experienced by the participant:  
There's that sense of well, you don't know, you just had to wait and see what came out of 
it … I try to keep a focus on being here [at the facility] 
The concept of control appeared to serve as a sensemaking heuristic that enabled people 
to comprehend conditions that were complex, uncertain, and potentially overwhelming. First, 
participants described that by segregating problems they could control from those that they could 
not control, they were able to derive a sense of satisfaction about their decision-making. 
Moreover, participants suggested a perceived lack of control over various problems played a part 
in reducing the scope of large and complex problems. In these cases, problems that could not be 
controlled were eliminated from the set of problems requiring decisions. 
Summary. 
Research suggests the lack of control over a situation results in decision-maker stress. 
This was true for some participants; however, other participants implied that they felt a sense of 
satisfaction related to the situations that they could control. Another theme indicated that by 
framing an event based on a perceived sense of control, participants reduced the scope of the 
problems and decisions that they faced. In doing so, these participants removed some uncertainty 
in order to achieve a sufficient understanding of a situation. The fundamental influence that the 
sense of control had on the individuals appeared to be “do I worry about this or don’t I?” This 
finding departs from research which correlates a lack of control with higher stress levels.  
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Sub-Question 3: Decision-Making Strategies 
The third research sub-question asked: What types of decision-making strategies do 
people engage in during organizational crises, and why?   
Findings associated with this research question are described by the strategies people 
adopted while making decisions. As described in Chapter one, in this component of the study’s 
framework the researcher identified three predominant strategies found in literature, while at the 
same time recognizing the potential for other strategies to emerge. The three strategies in this 
study included conflicted decision-making, naturalistic decision-making, and unstructured 
decision-making. Table 16 includes examples of a priori and open codes, axial codes and 
categories, and key themes used to analyze this research question. Following the table, findings 




Sub-question 3 - Decision-Making Strategies: Codes, Categories, and Key Themes 








making: People engaged in 
varying decision strategies based 
on consequences, time 
availability, and the complexity 







and sequencing; When facing 
complex problems people might 
reframe key decisions as a 
sequence of problems, each of 








Perceived certainty; social 
factors; group member trust: 
Different factors can contribute to 
varying degrees of conflict 








Openness to information: People 
engage in varying degrees of 
information searches, and 
incorporate that information into 
ongoing decision-making. 
Decision adherence: People can 
adhere to prior decisions for 
various reasons and resist making 
adjustments. 
Decision vigilance 




Strategy Adoption  
P13: If Baskin and Robbins had 300 flavors instead of 31, I think you’d never pick your 
ice cream. 
 
Previous sections of this chapter have discussed findings related to “why” people make 
the decisions they do during crises, primarily based on how they make sense of conditions, and 
which factors influence their decision-making. This section discusses findings related to “how” 
people go about decision-making. As described in Chapter two of this study, decision strategies 
were investigated within the context of three types of decision strategies: conflicted decision 
making, naturalistic decision-making, and unstructured decision-making. Two of the strategies 
(conflicted and unstructured decision-making) are normative and processual, indicating that they 
involve a methodical analysis of relevant information, followed by the selection from among 
several decision alternatives. In the case of naturalistic decision-making, individuals do not 
consider multiple alternatives; rather, they rapidly adopt a course of action that most closely 
resembles a past experience. This study revealed that people used elements of each strategy, 
depending on the nature of the decisions they faced. The underlying reasons for the adoption of 
different strategies appeared to be related primarily to time constraints and personal factors. 
Participants’ use of decision strategies is further described in this section.  
 Modified naturalistic decision-making. 
As a way of understanding decision strategies, participants were asked to describe 
decisions that stuck out in their minds as being significant. Some participants described time-
constrained problems with severe outcomes. For these participants, decision-making appeared to 
occur naturalistically. However, while scholars have suggested that naturalistic decision-making 
involves the recollection of a highly similar past event, none of these participants suggested they 
had experienced anything comparable to the 2017 firestorm. Rather, participants recalled a 
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myriad of events that formed a framework for action. Some past experiences were vaguely 
similar, and others were highly dissimilar. For this reason, they implied they engaged in a 
“modified” naturalistic decision-making strategy. 
Normative decision-making.  
Participants shared a tendency to adopt normative decision-making strategies in crisis 
contexts related to long-term recovery, rebuilding, and business resumption efforts. In these 
situations, participants were not subject to immediate time constraints which would have 
prevented analysis and deliberation. Because long-term recovery activities tended to involve a 
number of decision factors—regulatory requirements, finances, internal and external pressures, 
member well-being, and others— participants indicated they were compelled to gather and 
evaluate information before deciding what to do.  
An unexpected aspect of normative decision-making was that some participants 
iteratively eliminated possibilities based on various contextual factors, leaving them with only 
one alternative. This decision-making process is not suggested to be sub-optimal; rather, it is 
suggested to deviate from traditional normative decision strategies. Based on some participants’ 
descriptions, they accepted or rejected possibilities as they progressed toward a final alternative, 
but they did not explicitly identify multiple alternatives for concurrent analysis. P13’s comments 
were representative of participant’s sentiments, suggesting that minimizing the number of 
options under consideration was a way to fend off decision paralysis: 
There were so many [possible alternatives] to pick from that was almost paralyzing. 
It's like if Baskin and Robbins had 300 flavors instead of 31, I think you’d never pick 
your ice cream. 
Summary.  
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Depending on the nature of their environments, participants engaged in decision-making 
strategies that tended to reflect either a modified naturalistic or normative strategy. Naturalistic 
decisions involved identifying past experiences that could provide real-time guidance. Normative 
decision-making was described as engaging in information collection and analysis; however, in 
several cases, multiple alternatives were not articulated. In these cases, the analysis tended to 
involve an ongoing elimination of possibilities as a way to arrive at a final decision.   
Decision Reframing  
P7: I'm an organizer and I can visually sense steps.  Decision...next step. 
Participants in this study faced multiple decisions within highly complex environments. 
Types of decisions involved human safety and well-being, property and asset protection, animal 
safety, and the continuation of operations. These decisions occurred under conditions that were 
changing, uncertain, and in some cases uncontrollable. To cope with such difficult conditions, 
some participants suggested they deconstructed complex situations into manageable problems, 
and sequenced solutions in ways that would allow them to make progress.  
 Deconstruction, simplification, and sequencing. 
Several participants suggested that they reframed complex situations into manageable 
problems with identifiable solutions. This reframing strategy was seen during the first hours and 
days of the firestorm, as well as during its long-term aftermath. While the urgency of decisions 
was different in each of these contexts, both created conditions that were complex and unfamiliar 
to participants. For example, during the first hours of the fires, P1 described that nobody in the 
organization was aware of any fires, even as the Tubbs fire was razing the adjacent neighborhood 
and moving quickly toward P1’s facility. At that time, commercial electricity had failed, police 
cars and fire engines were rushing by the facility, and dazed residents had wandered into the 
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facility. When P1 realized the fires were approaching, the situation was complicated by the 
presence of both staff and clients at the facility. P1’s simplification of this complex situation was 
described as follows: 
At that time, my only focus was… get everybody to the lobby and then we'll take it 
from there. That's step one. … All I could think of was, um, we got them out of there 
and they're safe. And, uh, anything else that came after that was kind of like, not that big 
of a deal. 
Other participants also described the deconstruction of complex situations. For example, 
P12 and P13, managed critical transportation services in the region; services which were 
essential to enable local residents to leave the area, and also necessary to bring additional 
firefighters and equipment into the area. During the firestorm, these participants faced fully 
interrupted operations, no electricity, disrupted communications, minimal staffing, political 
pressure, and a high volume of demands from both customers and government agencies. As a 
means of coping with the overall situation, the entangled web of crisis conditions was reframed 
into a sequence of problems and solutions. 
P12: It's just like, oh, there's a problem here, let's find a solution. Okay. So, we have a 
generator here; let’s get it over there and so then we can start charging our phones, maybe 
taking phone calls and just get things going. So as soon as we have power we started 
making phone calls, so to find out where our guys are and see who's safe, who's not safe.  
P13: It was probably a good two to three days before all the procedures got ironed out on 
reporting, but then it got into a steady routine of a couple times a day. What's your 
employee status? Who showed up? What resources you have today? What's the status on 
the [site] and the resumption of [operations]? … Stay calm, figure out the problems, 
keep going through to the solution, solve it, fix it. 
Some participants reframed decisions through de-construction during the firestorm’s 
aftermath and prolonged rebuilding activities. As described in the following participant 
comments, P7 faced challenges associated with the organization’s long-term recovery strategy. 
P7’s organization had suffered significant property damage and destruction, the displacement of 
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many organizational members, and was under internal and external pressure to speed up recovery 
activities:  
For a disaster situation, so it's like, okay, let's think through what we'd probably need to 
do … I'm an organizer and I can visually sense steps.  Decision...next step. 
Summary. 
Participants in this study were required to make decisions in highly complex and 
uncertain conditions. Rather than become paralyzed by the enormity of the challenges they 
faced, several participants re-framed complex situations into a series of more discrete problems. 
While the problems were not simple, they were simplified because they could be addressed with 
identifiable solutions. In this way, participants were able to re-frame decisions into problems that 
had lesser degrees of complexity and uncertainty.  
Decision Conflict 
This study yielded evidence that degrees of conflict, or being torn over risks associated 
with different decision alternatives, varied among participants, and ranged from very little to 
significant. Furthermore, some participants indicated that their feelings of conflict changed as the 
context of the firestorm changed. Reasons for the varying degrees of decision conflict were 
related to contextual factors involving perceived certainty, social factors, and member trust. 
Perceived certainty about positive outcomes. 
Unexpectedly, during the early stages of the firestorm when conditions posed the highest 
threats to people and property and time pressure was greatest, some participants indicated they 
experienced very little decision conflict. Reasons for the lack of conflict varied. For instance, P9 
suggested even if some decisions were not optimal, they were perceived as having positive 
outcomes. Therefore, P9 was not torn over those decisions:  
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There were times where I knew that if I put out 100 percent effort, regardless of the 
decision I made, whether it's to save this house or save that house, I knew if I put out 
100 percent effort I was going to save one of them. And I don't know, maybe it's not 
normal, but that never weighed heavy on me because I just figured we're doing the 
best we can and knowing that we were doing…. at least my crew was doing the best we 
could… sometimes bad things happen … I never really felt like, oh my gosh, I'm torn 
with this decision because…. sometimes it was first come, first serve. 
Similarly, while encountering numerous types of complex problems, P4 indicated a lack 
of conflict because of a certainty about overall decision-making responsibilities: 
I think I had clarity and I think the people, others who had responsibility for leading the 
[organization], and indeed the [members] all had real clarity in terms of what our role 
was. 
In contrast, in cases when high degrees of uncertainty were experienced, some 
participants indicated that they experienced decision conflict. P14 and P8 described experiences 
following severe damage to property. In the aftermath of the firestorm, these participants faced 
strategic decisions about how their organizations would continue. Confounding these decisions 
were unknown factors related to regulators, insurance reimbursements, environmental 
conditions, and others. These participants indicated the uncertainty created significant decision 
conflict: 
P14: We don't know whether or not a, we're going to be well served by waiting for 
FEMA to clear a lot, or do we spend $75,000 of our own money to do it, right? To get a 
head start? Uh, we don't know if we're going to have the ability to rebuild our own 
property. Either because we got polluted water or were under-insured or simply cards are 
stacked against us and we need to go somewhere else…. We know what the questions 
are, but we don't know what the answers are, you know, and I, and I think it's that 
unknown rather than the known, which is huge. So, one of the things that we've tried to 
do as [an organization] is to address the unknowns.” 
P8: And so was hard not to say, OK let's just go back. I mean, really hard. But our 
main focus is always the [people].... What’s going to happen to [them]? …You don't 





Social factors were also described as a source of decision conflict.  Participants described 
being torn between organizational priorities and social relations. For example, P9 recalled being 
torn about decisions arising from family and friend requests for help:  
It weighed on me because there were a couple of times where like a really close family 
member of mine [asked] “Can you do something?” The answer's no … But this is also a 
family member of mine that asked me to do that and so I'm, I'm trying to like…. through 
text message… “sorry”, trying to eloquently and politely say I can't do this. That was a 
pain in the ass because I also then spent 20 minutes dwelling on it.  
In contrast, P7 described how the absence of social connections influenced decision-
making. In this case, P7’s lack of close connections to the organization and community were 
described as mitigating decision conflict. P7 commented that some organizational members’ 
attachments to each other and to the community caused them to “get stuck” and become 
paralyzed. P7’s suggested the sense of detachment allowed for objective decision-making: 
I don't have this, this high level of loss that some of my colleagues do. … Frankly, it's, 
it's helped me be more objective. So, we had a natural disaster and I didn't get stuck. I 
moved, you know, I knew I had to do things. I have to get going. 
Group member trust. 
In several instances, participants suggested that group member trust and cohesion 
mitigated decision conflict. When participants described trust and cohesion among 
organizational members as being low, they also described experiences of decision conflict, as 
they were unsure about how decisions would be interpreted and supported by members. In cases 
when member trust and cohesion were high, participants suggested that decision conflict was 
mitigated. For example, P15 stated a general sense of support from organizational leadership 




Decision conflict arises when people perceive that their decisions could lead to negative 
personal consequences. As a result, they experience anxiety and stress. In this study, participants 
described degrees of decision conflict ranging from minimal to significant. Some participants 
suggested that simply having certainty that their actions resulted in positive outcomes, even if 
limited, served to mitigate decision conflict. Other factors influencing decision conflict were 
suggested to involve uncertainty, social connections with family and close friends, and trust 
among group members.  
Decision Vigilance  
 P2: it'd be just completely chaos, so the only thing we could do as an operator of this 
facility, is being very vigilant  
 
This section discusses decision vigilance as a contextual factor being comprised of two 
elements; openness to information and decision adherence. This study revealed two areas of 
interest concerning vigilance. First, most participants implied that they were open to new 
information. Second, some participants described an adherence to their initial decisions based on 
factors related to self-perceptions. Each of these areas is further described in this section.  
Openness to information. 
Participants in this study consistently shared the need to seek out information in support 
of their decision-making. This need was fueled both by the highly uncertain fire conditions 
during the first days of the fires, as well as uncertainties during long-term recovery activities. 
Particularly in the first days of the firestorm, conditions changed rapidly, and so the basis upon 
which to make decisions required routine information updates. Similarly, participants shared that 
long-term recovery activities were steeped in uncertain requirements and changing conditions. 
Consequently, regardless of whether decisions that were made during the immediate onset of the 
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firestorm, or months after the fires had been extinguished, participants described the desire for 
more information upon which to make decisions. Examples of these sentiments are found in 
comments made by P2 and P4: 
P2: And I mean, it'd be just completely chaos, so the only thing we could do as an 
operator of this facility, is being very vigilant because there was no warning from anyone.  
P4: Just getting information, with the information you have a little more control with 
which to make decisions.  
In their efforts to be vigilant about changing conditions and filling information gaps, 
participants described that they relied on numerous sources: government agencies, friends, social 
media postings, television, and community members. P8 described, despite being as vigilant as 
possible, the organization still encountered an information deficit related to important decisions: 
We’d gather as much information as we could and then move forward. So, when we 
decided to move back [into our building], we didn’t all feel good about that, because we 
felt like we didn’t have all of the information we needed to make that decision, but 
we felt like we had enough to try it out and see what happened. It was very scary 
because we didn’t know if we were making a bad decision on behalf of our [people].  
Finally, some participants described how the uncertainty and confusion about their 
conditions hampered vigilance. For instance, P14 described conditions in which more 
information was needed to make better decisions, but because of the uncertainty of conditions, 
P14 was challenged to clearly understand the problems that needed to be addressed. 
Consequently, P14 implied it was difficult to know how to be vigilant: 
I also didn't kind of go, hey, tell me some more about why I should do this … I didn't 
think to ask more questions …And now I'm kind of like, you know what, what should I 
have asked you about that I didn't?  
Decision adherence. 
 Several participants showed little adherence to prior decisions, suggesting that high 
degrees of uncertainty and change resulted in a continual re-evaluation of information and re-
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consideration of previous decisions. P2 and P14 shared changing conditions and the ongoing 
exposure to new information had a significant influence on building reconstruction decisions: 
P2: You get into the [rebuilding] process and, and, and you kind of find out stuff as it 
goes in front of different desks for approval and the often, oh no, “you need this”. And 
all of a sudden that changes from plans C; okay, that's not gonna work. 
P14: It's been difficult to try to find the permits and a place that could get the permit to 
have the facilities. So, we were counting how many…which version we were on and you 
know which scheme A to B to C, you know. I think we're now on, on G … And, and 
some of it was just things kept changing. 
 In contrast, other participants described adherence to prior decisions due to perceptions of 
pragmatism and self-perceptions. From the standpoint of pragmatism, some participants implied 
in the midst of changing conditions, they felt the need to establish a clear course of action for the 
organization to follow and wanted to avoid changing course. In these cases, changes in strategic 
decisions were simply viewed as non-viable. In other instances, self-perceptions appeared to 
contribute to decision adherence. In these cases, participants implied a tendency to adhere to 
decisions that reinforced those perceptions. Types of self-perceptions were described as being 
related to be role-based descriptors such as “leader” and “change agent”.  
Summary. 
 Participants consistently suggested they engaged in vigilant decision-making behaviors. 
To the extent that they could gather and incorporate information into their decisions, they did. 
For decisions that were associated with long-term recovery activities, several participants 
described that they continued to evaluate new information and adjusted their decisions 
accordingly. Some participants indicated that they adhered to earlier decisions because, in part, 
those decisions were representative of decision-makers’ self-perceptions.  
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Sub-Question 4: Decision-Making Consequences 
The fourth research sub-question asked in this study was: How and why do decision 
consequences influence ongoing decision-making?   
The primary themes associate with this research question involve system enactments and 
interactions, as well as decision-maker learning. For the purposes of this study, decision 
consequences have been viewed within the frame of their outcomes, as opposed to the decisions 
themselves. Findings in this section have not ascribed value judgments to decision consequences; 
rather, they have been examined as influences affecting ongoing decision-making. Table 17 
includes examples of a priori and open codes, axial codes and categories, and key themes 
applicable to this sub-question. Following the table, findings associated with key themes are 
further described. 
Table 17 
Sub-question 4 - Decision Consequences: Codes, Categories, and Themes. 
A priori and Open Codes Axial Codes/Categories Key Themes 
Action types 
Initial action  
Changing decision 
Decision type 
Existing relationships  
Organizational response 
Enactments and interactions:   
The outcomes of decisions can 
both enact and interact with their 
environments and contextual 
factors in ways that introduce 
new and ongoing decision 
considerations. 






Learning styles; Retrospection 
and lessons learned; People 
tended to engage in single or 
double loop learning, depending 
on the stage of the crisis. 
Decision-maker learning 
*Indicates a priori code 
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System Enactments and Interactions 
 The results of this study suggest that decision outputs enact and interact with the overall 
OCDM system environment. Within the context of this study, enactments were viewed as 
decision outputs that produced new decisions. Interactions, in contrast, involved decision outputs 
that changed the environment in ways that altered ongoing decision-making. Each aspect is 
further discussed, and Table 18 provides examples of decision enactments and interactions that  
Table 18 
Examples of Decision Enactments and Interactions with System Elements 
Nature of Decision  Types of Enactments and Interactions 
Business re-opening 
date established  
Decision introduces factors involving new external compliance 
requirements, social relations, and work rules. Compressed timelines 
result in time constraints and stress factors.  
Alternate business 
location identified 
Decision enacts an unfamiliar physical and social environment for 
the organization, further leading to altered influences such as stress, 
work procedures, social interactions, and the extent to which 
organizational changes could be controlled. 
Re-population of 
evacuated areas   
Altered nature of crisis environment and need for new construction 
of meaning that drives strategic and tactical decisions. The crisis 
environment essentially “flips” from how to get people out of town 
safely to how to get them into town safely. Factors such as 
communications, work rules and procedures, communications, and 




The decision refocused the participant sensemaking about the 
organization’s core purpose, further recasting the organization’s 
environment. Social relations were significantly affected by new 
organizational procedures introduced for the purpose of member 
support. 
Upgrading of destroyed 
structures  
The concept of new physical structures precipitated an altered vision 
of the organization and shifted the environment from one of 
recovery to one more aligned with renewal. The re-cast 




As participants made decisions, they frequently created conditions under which new 
decisions had to be contemplated. By making decisions, participants did not necessarily reduce 
the number of problems requiring decisions; rather, they often changed the nature of ongoing 
decisions.  This phenomenon reflected the entangled nature of the crisis, as conditions requiring 
decisions were seldom isolated matters. For example, consequences pertaining to the 
continuation of operations often entailed system enactments. Because the firestorm caused such 
extensive damage to property, several of the participant’s organizations were displaced 
permanently or temporarily. As such, these participants had to make decisions about how work 
would be performed on a temporary basis, and when facilities could be re-occupied for the 
purposes of resuming normal operations. P8, for example, was engaged in decision-making that 
concerned temporary work arrangements. These decisions sparked a chain of other types of 
decisions associated with logistics and member well-being:  
We need transportation…who is that going to fall on? Did that person lose her house? 
Can she handle it? What safety net do we need for her here? So, there were a lot of 
contingency plans. I arranged for counseling services…that was outstanding. Some of 
the staff didn’t know how to cope in their personal lives or with the things they were 
hearing from [other members]. 
Similarly, P5 and P6 made decisions concerning the re-population of areas that had been 
evacuated. In this case, the decision to re-occupy an area led to a series of additional decisions. 
P5 shared the types of new decisions that were introduced: 
 There wasn't a pre-established plan before the incident. That was something that 
…once we evacuated, we started discussing. Okay, at some point we're going to have 
to let people back in … Grocery stores and people without power … groceries are going 
to spoil so they're going to need somewhere to go right away. Having the fuel stations 
opened up so that when people got here they could kind of get their lives back to normal. 
So, we started to prioritize who do we need in town helping us facilitate that before 
we start letting people in and…. Do we reopen this side of town and then that side of 
town? 
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In addition to the enactive nature of decision consequences, participants described that 
decisions interacted with their environments in ways that altered ongoing decision-making. 
These types of interactions influenced a range of decisions factors: personal, social, political, and 
others. P14 described a situation in which a decision pertaining to how business insurance claims 
were received created certainty about staff availability, but high levels of uncertainty about 
financial implications: 
So, I said, I'm able to pay you for up to two years. …  I had to pay taxes on it. So instead 
of having this huge devastating loss on the taxes, I had to show this big chunk of income 
… I didn't know. I know that now. So that was kind of a big shock. About April 13th. It's 
like, wait, what? Oh okay. And I didn't have a plan. Like what am I going to do with my 
business if there is [another] disaster. 
Decision-Maker Learning 
P9: Never in my wildest dreams would I ever say that this was possible, so it's made me 
rethink what it can do, 100 percent. 
P14: There are things that I wish I had known then that I know now. So, you know, 
live and learn.  
The outcomes of this study provided some insights into participants’ reflections on their 
own decisions. The nature of these reflections provided two types of insights: (a) participants 
indicated the contexts of decisions influenced the way they learned from those decisions, and (b) 
participants formed new perceptions about plausible future crisis events. 
 Decision contexts and learning styles. 
This study suggested that the ways in which participants learned from their decisions was 
related to the context of those decisions. Most participants suggested they were satisfied by the 
decisions that they made during the early phases of the fire, when the risk of harm presented by 
the firestorm was greatest. As such, reflections upon those decisions tended to reinforce that they 
were appropriate. Comments provided by P9, and P1 represent these types of participant 
perceptions: 
134 
P9: ...it's like bad things happen, and give 110 percent and then you can sleep at night 
knowing that you made the right decisions and you tried your hardest and bad things are 
still going happen. Yeah. So, I don't know if that's what I cognitively thought at the time, 
but I think in that kind of post review …. going back home and thinking back on it, I 
never really felt like, oh my gosh, I'm torn with this decision because…. sometimes it 
was first come, first serve. 
P1: I think that now that it actually happened … what we did worked. So that gives us 
a little sense of security... 
Because these types of decisions were time-constrained, they tended to suggest a 
naturalistic decision strategy. Given that naturalistic decision strategies do not involve the 
identification and evaluation of multiple alternatives, this “single solution” decision process may 
explain participants’ tendency to not question or re-evaluate those decisions. In contrast, 
participants were more likely to re-examine decisions that were made during the aftermath of the 
firestorm, as suggested by P14: “I'm not really trained in how to alleviate all of those 
uncertainties. … But you know, I did the best I could and I had my own stress.” Comments 
made by P8 and P14 further suggested the conflicted nature of decisions made during the fires’ 
aftermath: 
P8: [A community member] didn't feel like she could be authentic and genuine about 
welcoming first responders who didn't save her house but who did save our [facility]. 
And so, I had no idea that that sentiment was out there. I'm so very sorry, I would've 
been more sensitive.  
P14: I immediately got a hold of the insurance people, and there are things that I wish I 
had known then that I know now. Um, so, you know, live and learn… So, you know, 
I've learned a lot of things that I didn't know and, there were things that I just didn't 
know and I didn't even know that I needed to know them, you know? And, and there 
were just so many different things pulling so many different ways.  
P7: And the structure I'm thinking about is going to create some change … maybe a 
surprise … to my colleagues as we go forward, but I see that we have to make some 
changes. 
Participants’ tendencies to re-examine longer-term decisions may be explained by the 
normative strategies that were used to make those decisions. Longer-term decisions were less 
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time-constrained, and often considered multiple possibilities.  As such, this study’s findings 
suggest decisions involving multiple alternatives were more prone to retrospective re-
examination than those that were naturalistic and involved a single solution.   
Reflections and lessons learned. 
Several participants suggested after the fires were extinguished, they had not had an 
opportunity to reflect broadly on their experiences. During the participant interviews, several 
people shared information about lessons learned at the organizational and personal levels. At the 
organizational level, several participants described tactical improvements. Types of tactical 
improvements included the purchase of communications equipment, the improvement of 
contingency plans, and the types of training exercises being conducted. At the personal level, 
participants were unanimous in stating that they re-considered what types of crisis events they 
believed to be plausible. P9’s comments reflected a common change among participants in how 
they framed what types of crisis events might occur.  
I've looked at like the hills…for 15 years…I never thought that that fire could start there 
and ended up there… never in my wildest dreams would I ever say that was possible. 
You're crazy. That could never happen … No, no way would I ever think that. So, it's 
made me rethink what it can do, 100 percent, 100 percent. 
Summary.  
During this event, participants implied retrospections about past decisions were largely 
related to the strategies that had been used to make those decisions. Participants tended not to re-
examine naturalistic decisions, while they were retrospective about normative types of decisions. 
Furthermore, participants suggested that lessons resulted in changes in tactical measures, as well 
as a re-consideration of what types of crisis events are plausible.  
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Chapter Summary 
 This chapter presented the results of various types of data collected during this inquiry. 
Data were presented in categories that mirrored the study’s research questions. Highlights of the 
study’s findings are summarized below, and key conclusions and implications arising from these 
findings are further discussed in Chapter five. 
The finding relating to this study’s main research question suggests that traditional input-
process-output system models may not accurately describe some OCDM contexts. Rather, 
decision-making during VUCA (volatile, uncertain, chaotic, and ambiguous) contexts can be 
more accurately conceived as a complex adaptive system. The employment of a complex 
adaptive system model in the examination of crisis decision-making could offer novel insights 
into the OCDM phenomenon, and is further discussed in Chapter five.  
The contextual factors considered in this study were both internal and external to each 
participant. Factors involving member trust and cohesion were identified as being significant, as 
were participant self-perceptions. Member trust and cohesion were found to create environments 
in which people felt that they could safely make decisions without negative repercussions from 
other members. Self-perceptions were significant in that participants identified closely with 
various roles, and so adopted characteristics that they believed defined those roles in a positive 
light. Several of the participants described temporary roles and attributes, or “modes”, as being 
significant influences on their decision-making.  
 An unexpected aspect of sensemaking involved the concept of control. While research 
has suggested a lack of situational control heightens stress levels, this study found something 
different. Some participants identified situations that they could not control as being out of their 
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decision scope. As a result, the inability to control some aspects of a crisis situation served to 
reduce, not heighten, stress levels. 
With respect to decision strategies, this study found that some participants engaged in a 
modified form of naturalistic decision-making. While this decision style followed the pattern of 
naturalistic decision-making, participants generally did not invoke highly similar past 
experiences. Rather, they derived general guidance from a variety of past events. Other 
participants deconstructed complex and uncertain conditions into sub-problems for which they 
could identify clear solutions. By adopting this approach, these participants avoided the potential 
for decision paralysis by re-framing decisions into problems that were more comprehendible.   
Findings concerning decision consequences suggested that individuals’ decision 
retrospections are influenced by the strategies they used to make those decisions. Decision 
consequences have provided insights that have improved tactical measures, as well as individual 












 The principal purpose of this study was to better understand decision-making during 
times of organizational crises. The problem this study aimed to address pertains to the scarcity of 
crisis decision-making research and theory (Roux-Dufort, 2016) during a time which crises are 
increasing in frequency and intensity (Dirmeyer, 2014; Freedman, 2014; Merchant, 2014; Mileti, 
1999; Mitroff, Shrivastava, & Udwadia, 1987) and costs (Economist, 2012). To explore this 
topic, this study employed a holistic single case-study method centering on the 2017 Northern 
California firestorm. Numerous organizations experienced crises due to the firestorm, and a 
range of organizational decision contexts were encountered. This study involved a diverse set of 
participants, all of whom were engaged in decision-making for their organizations. The case 
study method was used to develop a thick, rich description of organizational crisis decision-
making to enhance the overall understanding of the phenomenon. Ideally, these results will be of 
interest within both the scholarly and practitioner communities, leading to more insightful 
research, theory, and practice. 
Chapter four presented this study’s findings, and Chapter five elaborates on those 
findings. First, key conclusions are interpreted, discussed, and related to existing research. In 
some cases, new conceptual models are proposed to stimulate further research and discussion.  
Second, the limitations of key findings are discussed. Finally, implications for further theory, 
research, and practice are discussed.  
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Discussion of Key Conclusions 
 The key conclusions presented in this chapter are those which may have the most 
significant implications for organizational crisis decision-making (OCDM). These conclusions 
are summarized as follows: (a) complex adaptive systems apply to VUCA crisis decision-
making, (b) crisis decision-making strategies can vary within a common event, (c) decision-
makers’ personal well-being is an important OCDM factor, (d) self-perceptions evoke an OCDM 
system archetype, (e) temporary mental models influence sensemaking, (f) perceptions of control 
influence OCDM’s stress and scope, (g) psychological safety influences OCDM, and (h) 
sensemaking can be inextricable from decision-making in VUCA circumstances.  
Complex Adaptive Systems Apply to VUCA OCDM 
 With respect to the research question “how do people make decisions during 
organizational crisis?” this study has suggested that peoples’ decision-making behaviors and 
processes are often non-linear and dynamic, particularly during VUCA (volatile, uncertain, 
chaotic, and ambiguous) circumstances. This finding is a departure from traditional explanations 
of crisis decision-making, which have routinely employed linear process models and traditional 
systems-based approaches. As a reflection of this established tendency, this study’s a priori 
conceptual framework also incorporated a traditional process model. However, the results of this 
study indicate some types of crisis decision-making phenomena are better conceived as complex 
adaptive systems (CAS). This conclusion is further discussed, and an alternate model is 
proposed. 
Systems theory limitations. 
Aguilar-Savén (2003) described organizational processes as involving a set of actions 
that are logically ordered and lead to a desired result, and further suggested that modeling these 
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processes fosters a comprehensive understanding of a set of actions. Numerous techniques have 
been used to model various processes, but they reflect a common characteristic: they utilize 
assumed relationships between various inputs, processes, and outputs (Aguilar-Savén, 2003). 
The perception of phenomena as processes is further supported by von Bertalanffy’s (1968) 
systems theory, which proposes that the complex relationships between the components of a 
phenomenon can be understood using a holistic (process) perspective. Furthermore, systems 
theory suggests systems maintain an equilibrium state by adapting to external forces (von 
Bertalanffy, 1968). Such thinking about processes modeling and systems theory has become 
foundational to practices that continue to thrive in contemporary social sciences (Dooley, 1997; 
Hayles, 1991; Walby, 2007), and has also become a consistent theme in theory and research 
related to OCDM.  
Despite the assumptions used to construct this study’s conceptual framework, its 
outcomes have indicated that during times of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, or 
VUCA, process modeling and traditional systems theory are incongruent with how OCDM might 
really take place. This is argued for several reasons. First, process goals and outcomes are not 
always clear and can be subject to change. Second, linear input-output relationships between 
process elements change and cannot be consistently described. Finally, an organizational 
system’s equilibrium state can be unstable. In essence, the chaotic nature of some OCDM 
contexts can contradict the structure of predictable process/system relationships.  
The relevance of complex adaptive systems.   
In contrast to the linear and organized nature of process models, complex adaptive 
systems (CAS) are characterized by change, irregularity and disorder (Dooley, 1997; Stacey, 
1995). Furthermore, CAS’ underlying complexity theory perspective accepts that the states of 
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component parts, and the relationships between them, are emergent: they can be present, absent, 
independent, overlapping, or non-linear (Schneider & Somers, 2006; Walby, 2007). And unlike 
conventional process models, CAS does not assume that a system’s equilibrium state is inclined 
to remain stable. As such, the CAS perspective provides an alternate interpretation of component 
interactions within VUCA crisis environments.  
For the participants in this study, the 2017 Northern California firestorm reflected the 
characteristics of a VUCA crisis. The event was an unprecedented, and involved extreme levels 
of uncertainty, complexity, and change. Decisions were subject to many uncertain internal and 
external forces: human reactions and stress, decision-maker self-perceptions, random fire 
behavior, social interactions, administrative requirements, changing resource availabilities, 
organizational cultures, and others. The nature of problems requiring decisions involved the 
complex interplay between numerous internal and external contextual factors, and key decisions 
often interacted with other decisions that were subject to their own entangled influences. 
Participants were faced with the challenge of preventing or stemming severe consequences while 
being subject to continually changing conditions and navigating fluctuating roles, time pressures, 
senses of control, social influences, and other factors. Therefore, rather than operating within  
relatively orderly input-process-output decision-making systems, participants were subject to 
random and unpredictable sequences of events. Examples of unpredictable relationships between 




Examples of Varying Relationships Between Decision Factors 
Factors  Description Varying Relationships Between Factors 
Time pressure 
and stress 
The expected relationship between time pressure and decision-maker stress 
was inconsistent. Even in cases of severe outcomes including loss of human 
life, under time pressure some decision-makers described feelings of 
excitement, exhilaration, and focus. In some cases, extreme stress was 




Decision-maker stress did not consistently yield non-vigilant decision 
behaviors. Generally, regardless of the degree of stress experienced by 
participants, they acted in a vigilant manner. Exceptions to this observation 
did not appear to be related to stress factors. 
Work rules and 
work practices 
Work rules did not consistently influence work practices, as would be 
expected. In a number of cases, even when contingencies had been 
developed, the unique nature of the fires caused participants to create novel 
solutions to unforeseen problems. 
 
OCDM implications for naturalistic decision-making. 
This study further yielded interesting results concerning the adoption of naturalistic 
decision-making (NDM) as it relates to complex adaptive systems (CAS). Klein (2008) has 
proposed that in complex real-world settings, people refrain from identifying and examining 
decision alternatives because time does not allow for such deliberation and analysis. Rather, 
people scan their own experiences and “naturalistically” adopt a previous course of action that is 
a close match with the current situation. According to NDM research, relevant previous 
experiences are those that are similar to current conditions. In this study, several participants 
employed NDM-like strategies, but none had previously experienced any situations that were 
similar to the firestorm. In some cases, participants invoked vaguely related experiences, such as 
less destructive emergencies or natural disasters. In other cases, participants invoked entirely 
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unrelated previous experiences, such as overcoming difficult work tasks. However, in both types 
of NDM-like behaviors, participants described that these previous events were helpful in 
establishing a framework for decision-making. This outcome suggests that applications of NDM 
may be broader than previously assumed, as with CAS types of crises. The applicability of CAS 
may be explained in part because, by their very nature, CAS events do not repeat. Therefore, in 
CAS decision-making contexts, it is highly improbable that an individual will identify an 
appreciably similar past experience. This study suggests the possibility that during CAS events, 
people may scan for and adopt whatever experiences or lessons that they perceive will help with 
real-time decision-making.   
As a final discussion point regarding the applicability of CAS to crisis decision-making, 
this study suggested that participants were making decisions while organizational equilibrium 
states were unstable. These instances were seen in the following examples: (a) several 
organizations temporarily ceased normal operations in order to focus on supporting fire 
evacuees: in one case, this focus became integral to ongoing services; (b) some organizations 
were completely displaced for extended periods during which they operated within unfamiliar 
cultures, norms, and practices; and (c) for some organizations, the severity of damage posed 
questions as to whether the organizations could continue in a similar state, or if they could 
continue at all. These examples suggest that equilibrium states can be altered temporarily or 
permanently, further supporting the conceptualization of OCDM as a complex adaptive system. 
In summary, this section has suggested VUCA crises can be more appropriately 
described as complex adaptive systems than as traditional IPO process models. In this study, 
decision-making was complex, contextual factors continually changed, decision processes were 
non-linear, and organizational equilibria were unstable.  
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A proposed model. 
As discussed in this section, VUCA crisis decision-making can occur within a system that 
is complex and adaptive. A model for understanding OCDM through a CAS perspective is 
proposed in Figure 8. This model envisions a conceptual framework for exploring crisis 
decision-making contexts which are highly dynamic and complex. The intention of this model is 
not to describe decision processes; rather it is to stimulate thought about contexts in which 
certain factors become significant and interact to influence decision-making. Such contexts 
might involve classes of individuals, types of groups, or specific crisis scenarios.  
 
E(x): External or Environmental factor (x)       IF(x): Internal factor (x)      O(x): Outcome (x) 
Figure 8: Crisis decision-making envisioned as a complex adaptive system. 
Within the CAS perspective, the following frames form the structure of the proposed 
model: (a) the organizational crisis environment, including factors external to the decision-
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maker; (b) factors internal to the decision-maker; (c) crisis outcomes, or consequences, and (d) 
sensemaking and decision-making behaviors and processes. The dashed lines between 
components represent sporadic, changing, and unpredictable relationships within an open and 
changing environment. The model functions as sort of a “neural network” in which various 
nodes can become significant, influencing sensemaking and decision-making in various ways at 
various times.  
This model introduces an alternative philosophical underpinning to crisis decision-
making in that it diverges from sequential assumptions about system components; an observation 
that Walby (2007) suggested is relevant to social relations. In this model, a singular reductionist 
paradigm is supplanted with the idea that multiple ontologies can underlie the phenomenon. 
Consistent with Walby’s (2007) studies of social sciences, this proposal “avoids the rigidity of 
the notion of a system as made up of its parts. Systems can be over-lapping and non-nested” (p. 
454). This model represents a marked departure from past systems-based conceptions of OCDM, 
perhaps providing a means of more fully understanding the phenomenon. 
An example of how the model might inform the understanding of OCDM is offered in 
Figure 9, within the context of a decision made by a participant during this study. In this case, 
the destruction of the organization’s main building resulted in a decision regarding temporary 
work arrangements. The outcome of this decision resulted in an altered work design and work 
processes that yielded further decision requirements. For example, the altered work design led to 
new types of interactions between members and external parties. From a participant standpoint, a 
heightened level of stress was experienced, as was the decision-maker's need to adopt a 
temporary “family leader” role in light of the new work environment.  
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Figure 9: CAS model example: decision regarding temporary work arrangements. 
By simultaneously considering relevant internal and external contextual factors, 
combined with decision outcomes, this model is proposed to help envision “how and why” 
various factors interacted to influence decision-making within a particular circumstance. Because 
the number of contextual factors and the dynamic relationships between them is vast, the 
usefulness of such a model will likely require a narrowly defined decision case. Primarily, this 
model is proposed to serve as a useful springboard for the further investigation of the OCDM 
phenomenon.    
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OCDM Strategies Can Vary Within a Common Event 
Given the common characteristics of a crisis— uncertainty, time constraints, and severe 
outcomes— it was expected that common perceptions of crisis conditions and characteristics 
would be found during this study. To the contrary, participants were found to view the nature of 
crises in considerably different ways, leading to different decision-making strategies.  
Differing views of crises. 
A discussion of crisis decision-making should naturally consider the notion of a crisis 
itself: what it is, and what it is not. This study’s review of literature has found that scholars 
generally agree on a small number of crisis characteristics: uncertainty, time constraints, and 
severe outcomes. But beyond that, descriptions and conceptions of crises are a matter of debate 
(Hermann, 1972; Phillips & Rimkunas, 1978; Roux-Dufort, 2016). The results of this study 
indicated that participants also perceived their own crisis situations in different ways, leading to 
varying decision-making behaviors and approaches. This section describes how several aspects 
of the 2017 firestorm were perceived differently by participants: crisis duration, decision time 
constraints, stress, uncertainty, and the nature of outcomes. Following these descriptions, 
implications for decision-making behaviors and processes are discussed.  
Crisis duration.  
Participants’ perceptions of crisis durations ranged from hours to months. For some, the 
crisis involved the immediate response to dangers posed by the fires, and was limited to the first 
few hours or days of the fires. For others, the crisis involved the long-term recovery from losses, 
and the uncertainty surrounding the firestorm’s aftermath. For some of these participants, the 
crisis continued while this study was undertaken, and they insinuated that it would continue long 
after the study was completed. Others perceived the crisis as being of a more medium-term 
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duration, involving specific organizational recovery activities over a number of weeks or months. 
Decision time constraints.  
Some participants’ key decisions were greatly constrained by time, and some were not. 
Several participants perceived that consequential decisions had to be made within minutes of 
becoming aware of a problem. This rapid decision-making tended to relate to saving the lives of 
people, animals, and property. In contrast, other consequential decisions were viewed as being 
strategically-oriented, such as determining how to approach the replacement of destroyed 
property, or the ongoing well-being of organizational members. Still other consequential 
decisions were viewed as being virtually unbounded by time, largely because understandings of 
the decisions themselves were unclear, and the factors influencing them were ambiguous and 
changing.  
Stress factors.  
Participants described a wide-range of stress perceptions and responses. Some 
participants perceived that stress was not a factor in their decision-making, while others indicated 
that they were under extreme levels of stress. Furthermore, some participants indicated they did 
not feel stress, but rather a feeling of focus, adrenaline, or excitement. The degree of stress 
perceived by participants appeared to be related to internal factors such as self-perception and 
past experiences, as opposed to the nature of the decisions themselves. Furthermore, some 
participants related stress to the lack of time constraints, and not knowing when important 
recovery activities could occur.  
Uncertainty.  
All participants viewed their decisions as involving a significant degree of uncertainty. 
However, some participants were able to simplify or deconstruct highly complex and uncertain 
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situations into problem sequences that they could make sense of and act on. In these cases, 
uncertainty did not substantially inhibit decision-making. Other participants suggested the 
presence of many unknown and changing factors, coupled with a lack of information, created 
environments in which it was difficult merely to identify and understand problems that might 
require decisions.  
Crisis outcomes.  
Participants’ concerns over the fire’s outcomes were wide-ranging. Although this study 
was framed within the context of organizational crises, participants consistently stated that 
personal matters were initially their most important concerns, suggesting that they could not be 
separated from organizational concerns—a point that will be further discussed in this chapter. 
Consequently, participants adopted a wide-ranging view of organizational concerns: personal 
losses, as well as harm to people, animals, property, business operations, and stakeholder well-
being.  
OCDM strategies: behaviors and processes. 
This study found, based on varying perceptions of crisis situations, participant decision 
behaviors and processes varied. This section further discusses decision behavior and processes 
within the contexts of conflicted decision-making, naturalistic decision-making, unstructured 
decision-making, and crisis decision-making heterogeneity. Each is summarized and discussed in 
relation to this study’s findings.  
Conflicted decision-making. 
As described in Chapter two, Janis and Mann (1976,1977) have suggested the quality of 
consequential decisions is largely a function of decision-makers’ vigilance, or the extent to 
which people seek out and are open to new information when comprehending problems. From a 
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behavioral standpoint, participants in this study generally exhibited high levels of vigilance. 
Participants’ comments demonstrated they sought out and were open to new information that 
would enable better comprehension and decision-making.  
Two factors may explain participants’ general pattern of vigilant behavior. The first 
factor relates to self-appraisal. During the initial phases of the firestorm, participants did not 
appear to experience significant losses of self-esteem caused by actions for which they were 
ashamed. Janis and Mann (1977) have suggested feelings of shame and self-disapproval can lead 
to irrational, non-vigilant behavior. During this study, nothing the participants did was 
instrumental in creating the initial crises encountered by their organizations. Therefore, it can be 
speculated participants were not subject to feelings of guilt, defensiveness, or losses of self-
esteem that could contribute to non-vigilant behavior.  
Second, high levels of participant vigilance appeared to involve social appraisal. During 
this event, the fires’ damages were so devastating and unprecedented that utilitarian losses 
appeared to be perceived by organizational members as being out of the participants’ control. 
Consequently, the losses of social appraisal related to those damages was not a significant risk. 
During the early phases of the fire, comments indicated that decisions intended to save lives and 
property were well-received, regardless of whether they were optimal. In the fires’ aftermath, 
however, participants described conditions that involved losses to self-esteem and social 
standing. These decisions were described as being strategic, and more subject to the judgments 
and political influences of organizational members (Allison, 1971; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 
1992). In these cases, participants commented their decision-making became more conflicted, 
and information-seeking and appraisal were more likely to have been curtailed. In these cases, 
participants implied they relied on their own instincts and judgments to guide strategic decision-
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making. It is possible that if these participants had engaged in more information-seeking and 
appraisal while making strategic decisions, those decisions would have yielded different results.    
Naturalistic decision-making.  
Klein (1993, 2008) introduced the idea of naturalistic decision-making (NDM) as 
involving decision situations in which people lack adequate time to identify and examine 
alternatives. During these conditions, people associate a current problem with a similar past 
problem, and then conduct mental simulations to quickly identify a course of action (Klein, 
1993, 2008).  This study found evidence that NDM behaviors and processes were used, but in a 
modified fashion. The modifications to NDM appeared to stem primarily from the unprecedented 
nature of the firestorm. This event produced entirely unique conditions; none of the participants 
indicated they had experienced, or even envisioned, an event of such magnitude. Therefore, few 
participants suggested they were able to recognize and directly apply knowledge gained from 
past experiences. However, some participants suggested they indirectly applied various types of 
past experiences to guide their current decision-making. Some past experiences were vaguely 
similar to the firestorm, such as with other natural disasters. Others invoked experiences entirely 
unrelated to the firestorm. This behavior was well represented by P8, who had not previously 
experienced a fire, but stated, “this wasn’t my first rodeo.” 
In summary, while the study participants were experienced in their roles, the highly 
unique fire conditions did not allow them to identify similar past experiences. Rather, the 
participants identified indirectly related past experiences to prime their thinking about viable 
courses of action. Consequently, this study suggests people may engage in NDM even when 
current problems would seem to be unrelated to past experiences. In these cases, people make 
indirect connections they perceived as being relevant to real-time decision-making.  
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Unstructured decision-making. 
Mintzberg et al. (1976) proposed that when facing complex and unfamiliar situations, 
decision-makers deconstruct problems into sub-problems which are more familiar to them. 
Mintzberg et al. further suggested this behavior enables people to limit their decisions to the 
most immediate problems, thereby filtering out decisions which are less urgent. This study found 
evidence of the problem deconstruction behavior described by Mintzberg, et al. (1976). In a 
variety of situations that involved a complex arrangement of multiple decision factors, 
participants focused on identifying actionable components of overall problems, as described by 
the following comments: 
P12: There's a problem here, let's find a solution … stay calm, figure out the problems, 
keep going through to the solution, solve it, fix it. 
P7: I'm an organizer and I can visually sense steps.  Decision...next step. 
P11: We’re pretty good at this little shell game, right? Right. In terms of, okay, we got to 
take care of this, put this fire out and then we'll move over to this or whatever. 
P1: At that time, my only focus was…get everybody out…that’s step one… 
P13: Stay calm, figure out the problems, keep going through to the solution, solve it, fix 
it. And I tend to have more of an engineering mindset so it's very logical for me. So that's 
probably just my first thought was okay, what's the work? Keep going in steps. 
The reason that participants adopted a problem deconstruction behavior appeared to 
relate, in part, to their self-perceptions. Participants’ self-perceptions were ascribed to views of 
their own personality attributes, as well as their various role-identities, as exemplified by the 
comments: [P7] “I’m an organizer”; [P1] “I like to consider myself somewhat of a leader in any 
role I take; [P9] “I tend to be an optimist in most situations.” Participants who implied they saw 
themselves as being analytical, or wanted to be seen as strong leaders, were more apt to engage 
in the deconstruction of problems. Comments suggested making tangible progress was important 
to these participants. Factors such as past experiences and training were also influential, but 
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participant comments suggested those factors did not rise to the same level of significance as 
self-perceptions. 
This study indicated that, to varying degrees, strategic decision-making aligned with 
Mintzberg et al.’s (1976) three-phased model involving identification, development, and 
selection. Furthermore, evidence did not consistently reflect the model’s underlying assumptions 
that decision-makers act on sufficient information and without predisposition. In cases where 
decisions were quick, decisive, and bold, some participants implied some degree of ongoing 
partiality in support their decisions rather than engaging in an ongoing deliberation about the best 
alternatives. Comments by P7 and P9 illustrate how self-perceptions of confidence and 
assertiveness were suggested as decision influencers: 
P7: I needed to put forward first and then moving and then getting going on a plan, 
whatever that plan was … Maybe it's my leadership style. I am not the kind of leader that 
needs 43 people doing my job. 
P9: I actually want to go out now. Where's the next fire and then where's my name on that 
list? I hope it's number one because I want to go out. So yeah, I think that all helped to 
my stress level was um, was that I, you know, I've always said this to people because I 
don't want to sound like I want somebody’s house to burn down, but they're going to… 
eventually, somewhere in the city there'll be another fire. 
In contrast, other participants implied that they took a more deliberate decision-making 
approach when high levels of uncertainty impeded the evaluation of various strategic decision 
choices. Furthermore, in these cases some participants found themselves stymied by unforeseen 
interim decisions of a tactical nature, and so found it difficult to identify a plausible strategy. In 
these cases, the significance of participants’ self-perceptions did not appear to outweigh their 
decision-making uncertainty: 
P8: How am I supposed to know? This is not my field of expertise, you got to get 
someone who knows to tell me but no one wanted to do that. That was a lot of back-and-
forth. 
154 
P11: I think there's that sense of well you don't know, you just had to wait and see 
what came out of it. 
P14: I'm not really trained in how to alleviate all of those uncertainties. That's not…  
If I had, had a really, really incredible practice manager or something, maybe they would 
have done a much better job than I did. But you know, I did the best I could and I had my 
own stress to that role… 
The comments and observations in this section suggest that Mintzberg et al.’s decision 
process was employed to varying degrees, primarily based on self-perceptions and uncertainty. 
Individuals who displayed confident and assertive self-perceptions were more apt to make 
decisions based on incomplete information. In contrast, people with more conservative self-
perceptions demonstrated a tendency to seek more information and certainty before making 
decisions. 
Crisis management heterogeneity. 
 This study suggested that the behaviors and processes used by decision-makers during 
organizational crises are heterogeneous and cannot be consistently conceived through a single 
model. Existing crisis models (Janis & Mann, 1976, 1977; Klein, 1993, 2008; Mintzberg et al., 
1976) were not found to be applicable to any participant in totality. The results of this study did 
not suggest the models used in this study are flawed; rather, the results advocate that no single 
decision-making model is universally applicable to the wide-ranging nature of crises. This point 
can be underscored merely by looking at the dramatically different decision-types faced in two 
well-known crises: the Mann-Gulch fire and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Decisions during the 
former were immediate, local, and involved self-preservation.  Decisions during the latter were 
longer term, global, and involved geo-political strategy. Like the 2017 firestorm, the vast 
spectrum of crisis decision-making types and conditions are not fully explained by a single 
model. 
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 This conclusion suggests that there is fertile ground for theorizing and research. This 
researcher suggests that, rather than attempting to apply broad models as explanations of crisis 
decision-making, it may be helpful to more precisely associate existing models with various 
crisis situations or characteristics, refining the ways in which both theory and research are 
applied. The ancillary outcome of such research could also assist in addressing identified 
difficulties associated with defining crises (Hermann, 1972; Phillips & Rimkunas, 1978; Roux-
Dufort, 2016) and theorizing about crises (Topper & Lagadec, 2013).  
Furthermore, research rooted in diverse ontological and epistemological perspectives is 
recommended as a means of developing a well-rounded understanding of the phenomenon. As 
discussed earlier, the vast majority of research related to this topic has adopted a post-positivist 
perspective, and to a far lesser extent, interpretivist. Moreover, this study found no indication 
that a critical theory paradigm has been applied to this topic, despite the possibility that power 
structures involved with OCDM might shed a different type of light on the phenomenon. 
Similarly, a post-modern perspective might also illustrate ways in which individuals develop 
their own unique perceptions of crisis decision-making. 
Decision-Makers’ Personal Well-Being is an Important OCDM Factor 
Despite the researcher’s efforts to limit this study’s scope to organizational matters, all 
participants discussed personal impacts as significant decision-making factors. The researcher 
initially considered these comments to be extraneous, as they did not correspond with prevailing 
views of organizational crises concerns. These views have tended to emphasize economic, 
reputational, and operational impacts, or work-related injury and death, and environmental harm 
(Mitroff et al., 1988; Mitroff et al., 1987; Pearson & Clair, 1998; T’Hart, Rosenthal, & Kouzmin, 
1993). In contrast, the types of personal and consequential decision factors discussed by 
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participants involved threats to their own lives, the loss or evacuation of their home, threats to 
their friends and family, the loss of basic needs, threats to their animals, and threats to their 
social relationships. These concerns are discussed in this chapter as matters of personal well-
being. 
Within the context of personal well-being, participants implied that if they failed to 
address their own needs, they would not be able to assist their organizations effectively. When 
participants were asked about critical decisions, their responses evoked the well-known air travel 
pre-flight safety instruction to “put on your own oxygen mask before helping others.” None of 
the participants indicated that they initially placed organizational concerns over significant 
personal matters. Therefore, upon further examination and reflection, the researcher recognized 
that these concerns should be explored as a meaningful (but thus far absent) crisis decision-
making factor. Accordingly, this section explores the nature of significant personal well-being 
influences on decision-making from the perspectives of (a) victimization, and (b) real-world 
limitations. 
The need to attend to decision-maker impacts is partially described by the cognitive 
impacts of traumatic experiences and a resulting sense of victimization. Taylor’s (1983) theory 
of cognitive adaptation proposes people who are victims of traumatic events suffer a loss of 
meaning, control, and self-esteem, leading to negative psychological functioning. Building on 
Taylor’s theory, Pearson and Clair (1998) proposed that crises undermine peoples’ conceptual 
systems, potentially leading to decision-making impairments and negatively impacting 
organizational dynamics. This phenomenon was exemplified during Hurricane Katrina’s 
aftermath, which created victims out of numerous emergency responders (Moynihan, 2009).  
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The findings of this study also suggest that during the initial hours and days of the fires, 
most participants were unable to tend to organizational matters because of practical limitations. 
Even as organizations were being impacted, eleven of the participants were being evacuated 
from their homes or were helping extended family members as they were being evacuated. Two 
participants lost their homes, and at least three of the participants were involved in saving 
animals that were threatened by the fires. Furthermore, participants described the damage caused 
by the fires as involving communications disruptions, road closures, power outages, loss of 
water, and other impacts. Through these comments, participants described conditions that simply 
prevented them from addressing organizational matters. This situation was in no way unique; a 
similar situation was also observed during Hurricane Katrina, during which Runyan (2006) 
observed that many business owners were compelled to “direct immediate attention to their 
homes before turning to their businesses” (p. 18).  
The reader may assume conclusions about the importance of personal concerns are self-
evident, but that view is not strongly supported by organizational practice. The International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
have developed commonly recognized crisis planning, management, and response standards for 
industry (ISO, 2009, 2012; NFPA, 2010); none of which have emphasized personal well-being as 
a matter of concern. Rather, ISO standards emphasize concerns related to organizational 
activities, processes, structures and services, while the NFPA standard discusses concerns related 
to security, financial impacts, and organizational reputation. Furthermore, top risk concerns cited 
by practitioners do not identify problems associated with personal well-being; rather, they relate 
to organizational matters such as information technologies failures, regulatory changes, and 
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corporate scandals (Deloitte, 2018). In a 2018 report on industry crisis preparedness, concerns 
related to natural disasters did not include personal well-being matters (Earth Networks, 2018). 
While personal well-being has been found to be a significant decision factor during some 
crises, this study recognizes that such matters are not relevant during all types of crisis 
circumstances. Crises which occur strictly within organizational boundaries are not likely to 
trigger the types of personal well-being impacts of interest in this finding. Based on this study’s 
results, characteristics of crisis in which personal well-being impacts become an element of 
OCDM are proposed to include crises which: 
• Threaten the life and safety of decision-makers in contexts that are external to their 
organizations; 
• Threaten decision-makers’ families or loved ones, to include animals;  
• Damage or destroy decision-makers’ homes or other property; or 
• Damage or destroy infrastructure upon which decision-makers rely in contexts 
external to their organizations. 
This conclusion holds implications applicable to OCDM theory, research, and practice. 
From a theorizing perspective, personal well-being may represent an important construct that 
touches on self-concept, emotional health, psychological health, and other important humanistic 
considerations. Such a theoretical perspective would arguably support views related to human 
capital theory: viewing people as “capital” would also suggest that capital has value and should 
be cared for. With respect to research, some studies have indirectly touched upon matters of 
decision-maker personal well-being; but these findings appear to have been ancillary 
observations rather than areas of emphasis. From the perspective of practice, professional 
standards organizations can consider ways to meaningfully incorporate personal well-being into 
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planning guidance. Such practices would be appropriate in the contexts of risk assessments, 
contingency planning, and business continuity planning.  
Self-Perceptions Evoke an OCDM System Archetype 
The prominence of participants’ self-perceptions as decision-making factors emerged as a 
common theme during this study. Of 15 participants, ten described circumstances suggesting that 
their decisions appeared to stem considerably from how they perceived themselves. As an 
example, participants who viewed themselves as strong leaders tended to make decisions that 
reinforced that perception: decisions tended to be bold and decisive. People who viewed 
themselves as analytical tended to take a measured and sequential approach to decision-making. 
The nature of participant self-perceptions related to both role-types and personal attributes. Table 
20 contains brief descriptions of categories of self-perceptions and how they translated into 
decision-making. 
Table 20 
Examples of Self-Perceptions and Implications for Decision-Making 
Self-Perceptions Implications for Decision-Making 
Analytical; Engineer Complex situations were broken down into sequential tasks 
Athletic; Competitor Problems were approached energetically, proactively and decisively 
Strong Leader; Capable 
The crisis was used as opportunity to instill positive change and 
improvement 
Calm; Unflappable Approached imminent hazards deliberately and unemotionally 
Family head; Mentor Assumed role of life-saver and staff 
Coach; Connector  Emphasized decisions pertaining to mutual support and care 
The attachment of self-perceptions to decision-making may in part be understood through 
people’s tendencies to perceive events in ways that are beneficial to their self-concepts (Weick, 
1993, 1995). Despite the influence of self-perceptions, participants did not appear to perceive 
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their decisions as self-serving, but in ways that legitimately benefited their organizations. In most 
circumstances, participants who implied that decisions were related to their self-perceptions also 
believed their decisions to be high quality. On the other hand, people who appeared to struggle 
with decision-making challenges were less vocal about their self-perceptions. 
Self-enhancing cognitive biases may have played a role in these perceptions, as positive 
characteristics people see in themselves tend to be correlated with positive outcomes (Kelley, 
1987; Miller & Ross, 1975). While people tend to associate personal characteristics with 
successful outcomes, they also tend to associate unsuccessful outcomes with forces that are 
external to them. As a result, more attention is directed toward that which decision-makers 
associates with their own attributes.  
For the reasons described in this section, participants’ self-perceptions and associated 
expectations about the failure and success of various problems evoke the underlying principles of 
the “success to the successful” system archetype (Senge, 1990). According to this model, when 
multiple activities rely on limited resources, resources are assigned to the more successful 
activities, thereby depriving the other of resources and causing its demise. As such, success or 
failure is essentially a self-fulfilling prophecy based on resource allocation. A similar 
phenomenon may be true within the context of OCDM. Like the success-to-the-successful 
archetype, whether any particular aspect of a crisis is given attention and resources can be based 
on decision-maker self-perceptions rather than the severity of the outcomes or other salient 
factors. If a decision-maker perceives a problem’s outcomes are positively related with his or her 
traits, the problem is likely to receive more attention. In contrast, if a problem’s outcomes are 
viewed as relating to external factors, it is likely to receive less attention. The model is presented 
visually in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Self-perception in OCDM envisioned as a system archetype. 
In this model, Problem 1 is perceived as being positively related to the decision-maker’s 
self-perception, and therefore receives more emphasis, leading to a higher degree of success. The 
opposite is true for Problem 2. Because it is not perceived as being associated with positive 
aspects of the decision-maker’s self-perception, it is de-emphasized and fails as a result. In 
retrospection, the decision-maker’s self-perception is reinforced because of Problem 1’s success.  
The results of the model suggest a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby people solve problems that 
they relate to how they view themselves. While personal attributes are perceived as indicators of 
success, they actually serve as gate-keepers which direct our attention to one problem or another. 
Temporary Mental Models Influence Sensemaking 
“You make a decision, but…you get into a mode a little bit.” [P9] 
An emergent theme in this study involved the temporary adoption of cognitive states 
described as “modes.” Types of modes explicitly identified by participants were crisis mode, 
rescue mode, problem-solving mode, triage mode, event management mode, leadership mode, 
and ministry mode. These temporarily adopted cognitive states appeared to have created 
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transient self-perceptions and mental models that shaped the ways in which participants made 
sense of conditions. Further exploration of temporarily adopted states may shed light on the ways 
in which people form mental models that mediate contextual factors and sensemaking. 
As discussed earlier, the nature of complex adaptive systems (CAS) involves uncertainty 
and change which inhibit the ability to make sense of one’s environment. And yet, making sense 
of one’s environment has been identified as intrinsic to decision-making (Helms Mills et al., 
2010; Weick, 1995). Therefore, decision-makers face dilemmas in which they must make sense 
of environments that cannot be well-understood. The decision-makers are therefore challenged to 
establish some form of meaning upon which decisions can be made and enacted. Mental models 
are suggested to assist in addressing that need. 
Mental models have been described as mechanisms that enable people to understand and 
interact with their environments (Gentner & Stevens, 2014), and to form expectations of future 
environments (Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992). Rouse, et al. (1992) further asserted 
mental models enable connections from “situation-general knowledge structures to situation 
specific expectations” (p. 1300), which suggests that the use of mental models in CAS conditions 
may serve to bridge gaps between uncertain environments and sensemaking. If, as this study has 
suggested, some crisis situations are accepted as CAS, it is plausible that the role of mental 
models can enable sensemaking during extreme crisis conditions. The mediating role of mental 




Figure 11: Mental models as a sensemaking mediator during CAS crisis contexts. 
As opposed to Weick’s (2005) characterization of mental models as being intrinsic to 
sensemaking, the temporary nature of some mental models may suggest that they are not innate 
to a decision-maker but are adopted situationally. As such, the valence of temporary mental 
models might be seen as mediating the way in which sensemaking occurs. 
 Furthermore, participants’ invocation of temporary behavioral modes might be partly 
explained by trait activation theory (TAT). TAT suggests some personality traits can be triggered 
or amplified by trait-relevant situational cues (Tett & Guterman, 2000). While researchers have 
put forth various arguments about the relationship between situations and traits, they are 
reconciled by an agreement that peoples’ perceptions of situations mediate how their behaviors 
are influenced (Mischel, 1973). Some situation-trait relationships are predictable and 
identifiable. For example, Newman, Donohoe, and Eva (2017) have suggested organizational 
climates can be created and observed to understand how individual traits are affected. In contrast, 
crises are unexpected, unpredictable, changing, and occasionally unprecedented. This suggests 
crisis situations may have the capacity to induce latent decision-maker personality traits. 
Whether these traits positively or negatively influence decision-making may not be known until 
a crisis occurs. This “real-time” understanding of decision-maker behavior is counter to the 
proactive nature of organizational preparedness. This reality supports the appropriate use of 
proactive interventions for the purpose of inducing otherwise unidentified modes or traits that 
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could significantly influence decision-maker behavior. Such interventions might include mock 
exercises or drills, but these events must be compelling in order to reveal “unmasked traits” 
(Mischel, 1977; Tett & Guterman, 2000).   
Perceptions of Control Influence OCDM’s Stress and Scope 
 A research sub-question in this study asked how and why decision-makers ascribe more 
significance to some decision factors than others. The results of this study indicate perceptions of 
control emerged as significant decision factors. However, participants appeared to perceive 
control in different ways than have been identified in literature.   
Peoples’ beliefs about having little or no control over a problematic situation has been 
recognized as a contributor to decision-maker stress (Lazarus, 1993). Significantly heightened 
stress levels have been found to impair decision-making due to cognitive and physiological 
reactions (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987; Selye, 1965). This study, however, sheds a different light 
on how decision-makers perceived control, and how those perceptions affected their 
sensemaking and decision-making.  
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, several participants described crisis decision-making 
as involving factors which were uncertain, ever-changing, and non-linear. Within this entangled 
web of influences, some decision-makers identified problems they felt they could not influence 
or control. But, rather than becoming anxious about these situations and experiencing heightened 
stress levels, some participants excluded aspects of problems over which they had no control. In 
doing so, they eliminated stress factors, reduced the scope of problems under consideration, and 
transformed their own crisis landscapes into ones that were more manageable, predictable, and 
actionable.   
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This behavior may in part be explained by the association between feelings of control the 
preservation of one’s self-esteem. Kelley (1987) described this as “effective control,” suggesting 
that people place a high degree of importance on their ability to influence their environments. 
Similarly, Bradley (1978) argued that individuals interpret past events in ways that are not 
destructive to their self-esteem, and in doing so, can exclude factors that they perceived to be out 
of their control (Miller & Ross, 1975). Hastorf, Schneider and Polefka (1970) succinctly 
described this behavior in positing that “We attribute success to our own dispositions” (p. 73). 
This assertion is consistent with research on sensemaking, which attaches great importance to the 
maintenance of ones’ self-concept (Weick, 1993). By ascribing failures to forces beyond their 
control, people can avoid responsibility for those failures (Brown & Jones, 1998) and protect 
their social standing (Miller & Ross, 1975).  
This study observed that feelings of control may not only be retrospective but can be 
“prospective” in that they can apply to future events. As opposed to perceiving that a situation 
“was out of my control”, comments evoked the belief that a situation “will be out of my control.” 
Participants assigned an understanding of what they believed they could control onto a situation 
that was ever-changing, and during which the aspects of control were likely to change. As a 
result, a participant’s level of control was subject to have been under- or over-estimated at any 
given point in time.  
Because this study did not delve deeply into why people perceived control in the ways 
that they did, the roots of these behaviors were not uncovered. Consequently, this observation 
may suggest that additional research about feelings of control during crises can shed light on 
decision-making behaviors. Three areas of research are envisioned: (a) within the entangled 
nature of OCDM, explore meaningful relationships between feelings of control and other 
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decision factors; (b) explore more deeply how and why people project retrospective sensemaking 
into the context of future events; and (c) examine relationships between self-concept and feelings 
of control during crisis situations. 
Psychological Safety Influences OCDM 
Schein (1992) and Edmondson (1999, 2002) suggested mutual trust and confidence 
within a group creates a climate of psychological safety. In a psychologically safe organization, 
people believe that their words and actions are protected from negative interpersonal 
consequences (Schein, 1992). While it has become an accepted group dynamic, psychological 
safety has been researched primarily within the context of group learning in small group settings.  
In this study, some participants implied the climate of psychological safety had a 
significant influence on their decision-making. Participants suggested trust and confidence were 
significant in relation to how much support they felt they would have if a decision turned out to 
be a mistake. Some decision-makers implied they felt empowered to make decisions because 
they believed they would not be penalized for a mistake. Because they felt empowered to make 
decisions, they did not experience stress produced by social pressures, and they were not 
compelled to engage in a potentially paralyzing analysis of important decisions. In one instance, 
a participant made decision motivated by personal factors, while knowing that it did not conform 
to organizational priorities. The participant stuck to the personally-motivated decision, knowing 
others would be supportive even though the decision was counter to what others would have 
expected. In other instances, where trust was deemed to be low, participants expressed a sense of 
isolation in the decision-making process, reflecting an anxiety as to how decisions would be 
received and supported. In these cases, decisions were described as highly conflicted and 
stressful. 
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This study suggested the influences of psychological safety may extend well beyond the 
context of organizational learning and are far broader than small group settings. Consequently, 
further studies into psychological safety in organizational decision-making contexts may yield 
novel insights into decision-making behaviors. Complementary to another finding in this study, 
further investigations could reveal meaningful insights between psychological safety and self-
concepts, enhancing understandings about how people feel empowered to engage in risk-taking, 
and are “comfortable being themselves” (Edmondson, 1999, p. 354). 
Sensemaking Can Be Inextricable from Decision-Making in VUCA Circumstances 
“…it just seemed obvious” —P3 comment regarding a decision-making process. 
Researchers generally agree sensemaking is a precursor to decision-making (Boland, 
2008; Bolander & Sandberg, 2013; Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015; Weick, 1995). According to 
this view, people must understand a situation before they can evaluate and decide upon a course 
of action. However, this perspective rests upon two assumptions about decisions: (a) the 
recognition of a “problem space” requiring a decision (Simon, 1957), and (b) decisions involve 
the identification and analysis of options. The results of this study identify instances which 
deviated from those assumptions. Therefore, an alternate interpretation of the relationship 
between sensemaking and decision-making is further explored. 
As previously discussed, instances in which problems were unclear, and in which 
multiple decision options were not evaluated, involved situations described as volatile, uncertain, 
complex, and ambiguous, evoking characteristics of complex adaptive systems. These instances 
tended to have occurred in the early phases of the fire, during which participants were reacting to 
immediate threats. Because of the chaotic nature of the situations facing participants, problems 
could only be vaguely understood. Within these unclear and changing environments, participants 
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simultaneously faced multiple and vaguely-understood problem types: threats to self, threats to 
others, threats to property and assets, and operational disruptions. Rather than analyzing various 
identified problems, participants appeared to have faced entangled issues, and often were merely 
trying to understand “what the main problem was.” As described in other sections of this study, 
numerous internal and external factors were included in participants’ cognitive calculus.  
Some participants inferred that once situations were sufficiently comprehended, decisions 
emerged. In other words, “to understand was to decide”:  through the understanding of a chaotic 
environment, decisions became self-evident. In some cases, participants did not appear to 
recognize discrete problems and then identify decision options. Indeed, when asked about 
consequential decisions, many participants were at a loss to identify one, even though they made 
decisions concerning multiple problems. Rather, once a situation was sufficiently understood, 
action was taken. One participant who faced a myriad of problem types exemplified this 
behavior. Having been asked about how decisions were arrived at, the participant simply 
responded, “it just seemed obvious.” 
The essence of Weick’s underlying assertion about sensemaking is not under debate: 
people need to understand situations before they act on them. However, the sequential nature of 
that relationship is of interest. As opposed to sequential processes, some participants’ 
experiences evoked an iterative and ongoing relationship between sensemaking and decision-
making. This relationship may be partially explained by Klein et al.’s (2006a, 2006b) assertion 
that people constantly use “frames” of understanding as way to interpret data, and as new data is 
introduced, pre-existing frames evolve and change. In this way, “meaning” is constantly shifting 
and adjusting. Logically, this would be especially true during complex and dynamic crisis 
situations.  
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Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) may further aid in exploring how a frame of 
understanding might transform into a decision. Klein (1993) suggested that NDM occurs in 
natural settings where experienced people must act within time constraints. The NDM model 
describes that people associate a frame of understanding with a past event that provides guidance 
for action; therefore, analysis of decision options is not required. While Klein’s NDM model 
suggests that frames lead to decisions, participant behaviors indicated that the frames actually 
became the decisions. In that way, the decision-making process was virtually transparent to the 
participants, potentially explaining why they did not tend to recall specific decisions, nor did 
they imply that sensemaking was a distinct activity.  
Summary 
The conclusions described in this chapter reflect the variable nature of crises and their 
associated decision-makers. Rather than identify sweeping inferences that apply to all crisis 
contexts, this chapter has demonstrated the fickle nature of OCDM. Based on an argument that 
OCDM can occur as a complex adaptive system, elements of the decision-making system can 
produce countless decision influences. This chapter has discussed these variables as involving 
variable perceptions of crises, decision strategies, self-concepts, perceptions of control, 
temporary mental models, and psychological safety. Furthermore, this chapter suggested that 
decision-maker well-being has been an under-represented aspect of the overall OCDM system.  
Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice 
This study has merely scratched the surface of an important but largely unexplored topic. 
Ideally this study will inspire others to take a closer look at the nature and inner workings of 
OCDM, shedding more light on the phenomenon. Although the results of this study may have a 
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wide range of implications for both individuals and organizations, this section discussed those 
that the researcher viewed as being the most significant.   
Implications for Theory 
The outcomes of this study may provide some contributions to how the philosophical 
underpinnings of OCDM are perceived, and how those perceptions influence theory-building. 
Highlighted in this section are considerations regarding theoretical ontology, and implications 
concerning organizational studies. 
Re-thinking how crises and crisis models are conceived. 
 “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” -Attributed to George E. Box 
Problems associated with how crises are conceived are nothing new. This study’s review 
of literature and analysis of interview data suggest that a re-conception of “what a crisis is” may 
provide for much-needed insights, potentially removing conceptual impediments that have 
stymied the inclusion of the crisis phenomenon as a part of organizational studies. The ways in 
which crises are conceived logically lead to implications for derivative topics such as crisis 
decision-making, crisis leadership, crisis management, crisis communication, and others. But to 
date there has been little consensus about what constitutes a crisis, contributing to the topic’s 
under-representation from management literature (Roux-Dufort, 2013). Consequently, revisiting 
how the topic is conceived may prove beneficial within a number of disciplines.  
Scholars have interpreted the concept of a crisis in several ways. Contrary to researchers’ 
concerns about conceptual differences, this study may suggest they are actually not distinct 
enough. This is argued because various crisis concepts purport to describe similar phenomena, 
when perhaps they do not. For instance, should a common theoretical model apply to both losing 
one’s wallet and avoiding global nuclear catastrophe? In literature, both are crises, yet the 
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contexts are hardly similar. Merely within the bounds of the 2017 Northern California firestorm, 
crisis situations differed for a myriad of reasons: the number of people involved, the nature of 
harm posed, time pressures, political influences, organizational cohesion, and numerous others. 
Even in a common setting, this study revealed a wide range of perceptions about the nature of the 
event. For some, it was long-term and simmering, and for others, it was immediate and VUCA. 
Some participants experienced debilitating stress, and others were energized. In summary, real-
world crisis situations varied tremendously, despite researchers’ calls for conceptual consensus.  
Rather than search for a universal and standard interpretation, perhaps crises can be 
usefully conceived at various levels of abstraction. For instance, the understanding of a crisis 
might be well-served by theorizing at a grand level, recognizing and accounting for broad 
situational and contextual differentiators: unexpectedness, outcome severity, and uncertainty. To 
supplement grand-theory abstractions, mid-range and local theories might be developed in 
constrained ways that account for more defined variables or aspects: individual or organizational 
contexts, types of consequences, crisis durations, and other contexts. By viewing the topic 
through the lens of various abstraction levels rather than universal applicability, substantially 
different types of crisis situations might find theoretical and conceptual homes that are, in Box’s 
words, “useful.” 
Moving beyond traditional systems thinking.  
To date, the philosophies underlying OCDM theories have almost exclusively reflected 
reductionist and process-based paradigms. In these paradigms, the view of OCDM as a construct 
is one that can be broken down into core components, and the relationships between those 
components can be identified and described. In this view, the phenomenon seeks a natural state 
of equilibrium, and when variances from that state occur, the system acts to restore balance. 
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While this may be an accurate theoretical perception of some crisis conditions, this study 
revealed alternate possibilities: both OCDM components and their relationships can be emergent, 
changing, and non-linear in VUCA (variable, uncertain, chaotic, and ambiguous) situations, and 
equilibrium states can be unstable or changing. In light of that finding, this study proposed an 
alternative perspective that reflects a complex adaptive system (CAS).  
The introduction of alternate paradigms such as CAS suggests fundamental changes in 
how VUCA crisis decision-making can be theorized. Diverging from the historically 
reductionist, predictive, and post-positivist stances ascribed to the existing OCDM theories and 
models, a re-imagined theory could reflect a context in which components and relationships 
appear, disappear, and change, depending upon circumstances. While this type of theorizing 
might not advance predictive or normative modeling, it could stand to be very useful in 
understanding “what is plausible” from both organizational and individual sensemaking and 
decision-making perspectives.  
Furthermore, a CAS view of crises would represent a departure from ontological norms 
associated with the current post-positivist era within the social sciences (Potter, 2016), and 
insights based on interpretivist perspectives could illuminate the topic in different ways. This 
implication does not oppose post-positivist thinking, rather it is an argument that a more 
expansive perspective will yield a broader set of insights. For example, it would seem likely that 
power structures could factor into some crisis decision-making contexts, and as such, critical-
based theory-building could shed more light on the nature of those influences. Alternatively, if 
one subscribes to findings regarding the importance of internal factors as influencing decision-
making (specifically, that the nature of the crisis is largely conceived in the mind of the decision-
maker), engaging in theorizing from a post-modernist perspective would likely add unique 
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understandings to the phenomenon. Generally stated, viewing the phenomenon from diverse 
theoretical perspectives is apt to yield new and useful insights.  
Implications for Research 
OCDM has been consistently described by researchers as being a complex phenomenon. 
But despite this recognition, the illumination produced by scientific research has primarily 
originated from a common reference point; one that is post-positivist and quantitative. Even this 
study’s departure from the overwhelmingly post-positivist research tendency has yielded modest 
insights that may not have been previously discussed. As an outgrowth of this study, the 
following areas of research are suggested as being worthy of further epistemologically-diverse 
investigation. 
Psychological safety and OCDM. 
This study suggested that group trust and confidence among members create conditions 
of psychological safety, an important antecedent condition that significantly influences OCDM. 
In the presence of psychologically safe conditions, participants demonstrated they were more apt 
to make decisions and were less constrained by concerns about the organizational repercussions 
of those decisions. In climates that were more psychologically unsafe, participants faced 
additional stress and uncertainty that impeded decision-making. 
 While studies pertaining to psychological safety have largely focused on organizational 
learning, they have gradually branched out into other areas such as leadership, creativity, self-
efficacy, and others. However, this study has not revealed evidence that the topic has been 
studied within the context of OCDM, or more generally, decision-making. Further extending 
psychological safety into OCDM research would appear to be both relevant and insightful. The 
relevance of such research might be traced to several factors identified in Edmondson’s (1999) 
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psychological safety scale. While the psychological safety scale factors reflect team contexts, 
Edmondson (1999) indicated the outcomes of psychological safety are realized by “individuals’ 
willingness to engage in otherwise threatening learning behavior” (p. 353). Therefore, this 
researcher submits that “individuals” are often decision-makers, and “threatening learning 
behaviors” often relate to decision-making during crisis situations. Inductively, psychological 
safety would therefore appear to relate to the willingness of individuals to engage in decision-
making, crisis-related or otherwise.  
 Insights from research concerning OCDM and psychological safety could touch on both 
individual and organizational matters. As discussed previously, research from diverse ontological 
and epistemological paradigms is encouraged to shed light on the following questions: (a) is 
there a relationship between psychological safety and decision-making conflict as described by 
Janis and Mann (1976, 1977)? If so, what is the strength and nature of that relationship?; (b) to 
what extent does psychological safety influence naturalistic decision-making as described by 
Klein (1993, 2008)?; (c) over what period of time is psychological safety typically developed 
within teams?; (d) what are the implications of psychological safety for decision-makers who are 
new to their teams?; (e) how and why do decision-makers perceive the state of team 
psychological safety in the ways that they do?; (f) have effective means of accelerating 
psychological safety been established?; and (g) do conditions of psychological safety alter during 
crisis events? If so, how and why? A more complete understanding of these areas could support 
the development of more effective team and individual interventions related to OCDM. 
Decision-maker well-being. 
 This study suggested that crisis conditions can debilitate decision-makers, effectively 
inhibiting OCDM. Yet research on this topic is scant and often peripheral to other areas of 
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emphasis. Studies related to large natural disasters have noted that key decision-makers were 
incapacitated for various reasons (Moynihan, 2009; Runyan, 2006), but those conditions were 
not described in depth. Further comprehensive inquiry into decision-maker well-being would 
offer additional insights into the nature of these factors, as well as their degrees of consequences 
within the context of OCDM. Important questions might relate to concerns such as: (a) what 
types of crisis contexts have yielded significant decision-maker well-being difficulties?; (b) what 
types of personal well-being problems have decision-makers had to contend with?; (c) what are 
the characteristics of decision-makers who have experienced personal well-being problems?; and 
(d) is there evidence of conditions or practices that have reduced the degree of decision-maker 
well-being impacts? Through an evidence-based and comprehensive understanding of these 
conditions, scholars and practitioners may be better equipped to mitigate or prevent such 
impacts.  
Research transferability. 
 This study was not intended to be limited to a specific type of organization, participant 
role, or crisis type. Rather, it was intended to explore the ways in which people made decisions 
for their organizations during times of crisis, using the 2017 firestorm as a common reference 
point. While this study did not presume that a firefighter’s decisions would be similar to that of a 
business owner, it was designed in a way that did not exclude the possibility that their decision-
making experiences might be mutually informative. As such, this study could serve as a launch-
point for a more comprehensive and bounded inquiry that can be more closely associated with 
identifiable types of organizations or individuals.  
To the extent that organizational characteristics are aligned with external decision 
influences, patterns and themes germane to these influences could offer more granular OCDM 
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insights. Types of organizational characteristics bounding further explorations could involve 
industry sectors, employee population sizes, organizational structures, organizational cultures, 
the nature of the organizations’ missions, and others. Similarly, examining individual 
characteristics in future OCDM research could illuminate matters concerning internal decision 
factors. Such outcomes could be transferrable to categories of individuals that span various 
organization contexts. Characteristics of interest could involve role types, leadership styles, years 
of experience, personality types, gender, self-perceptions, and others. Through more focused 
research, it is suggested that outcomes may be more readily applicable to the population of 
interest.  
Implications for Practice 
Ultimately, improved crisis decision-making offers the prospect of protecting lives, 
property, reputations, human well-being, and other organizational interests. Literature suggests 
that, as a practice, OCDM has not been treated as its own domain. Rather, it has tended to fall 
into the broader topic of crisis management. Therefore, the implications for practice identified in 
this study are discussed as elements of overall crisis management practices. Proposed in this 
section are several possible ways in which to improve practice: the enhancement of guidance 
standards, and the incorporation of reflective practices into OCDM learning.  
Enhancement of guidance standards and frameworks. 
 A great deal of OCDM practice is influenced by regulatory or voluntary standards and 
frameworks: the International Organization for Standardization (2009, 2012), the National Fire 
Protection Association (2010), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, and others. The guidance documents produced by these organizations 
offer recognized ways of addressing organizational crises and factors that drive decision-making: 
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data collection and analysis, team structure, communications, and others. As discussed 
previously, these standards are oriented predominantly at matters that are internal to an 
organization. As such, the standards do not address two findings identified in this study: (a) 
decision-maker well-being, and (b) psychological safety.  
Decision-maker well-being. 
 Guidance standards influencing OCDM tend to address personal well-being in the 
context of issues that are internal to organizations. These types of issues focus on safe working 
conditions, response to emergency situations, employee pay and benefits, employee security, and 
other conditions that the organization can influence. However, these standards remain silent on 
matters for which organizations do not have direct responsibility. Issues that fall into this 
category can include matters such as the health and well-being of employees’ families, the health 
of employees’ animals, damage to employees’ homes, emotional trauma that is unrelated to the 
workplace, employees’ residences loss of water, power, or other infrastructure, school closures, 
and others. Because key decision-makers are subject to these conditions, organizational decision-
making is also affected. As reflected in this study, the risk involved with these standards is that 
crisis conditions may render decision-makers unable to support their organizations because of 
over-riding personal matters. A recognition of this possibility within standards is suggested as a 
means of mitigating this risk. The introduction of “good practices” aimed at these conditions 
might fall into both proactive and reactive measures. Proactive measures might involve: 
• promoting, encouraging, and assisting key decision-makers with the development of 
“home response plans.” Such plans might include family emergency contact lists, 
access to medication during evacuations, and ways to communicate with family 
members if normal methods fail; 
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• assisting key decision-makers with reducing home-related risk such as power loss, 
fire danger, and flood exposure; and 
• assisting key decision-makers with the identification of animal care and sheltering 
services. 
Reactive measures may include activities that would occur during a crisis, such as: 
• arranging for support services such as transportation, child-care, animal care, or 
temporary lodging; 
• establishing informal communication networks among families; and 
• assigning unaffected employees to provide assistance to families of affected decision-
makers. 
While these measures may be common practices for some organizations, they have not 
been recognized as standard practices. Consequently, the practices are likely to be implemented 
inconsistently across organizations, without the benefit a comprehensive set of 
recommendations. This study indicates that the integration of employee well-being into 
recognized standards would positively affect organizational crisis decision-making. 
Psychological safety.  
The standards referred to in the previous section tend to reflect crisis management 
activities as occurring within the context of teams that are functioning well. However, this study 
pointed out this assumption is not always valid. On occasion, teams are not cohesive, trust 
among members has not been established, and decision-makers can be negatively impacted by 
those conditions. Despite a psychological safe climate’s influence on OCDM, this condition is 
not addressed in established guidance standards pertaining to crisis management. The nature of 
psychological safety practices offered in this study include: 
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1. Considering the absence of team cohesion and trust as an organizational risk 
factor; 
2. Engaging in team building activities for ad hoc groups that come together only 
during times of crisis; and 
3. Creating team member awareness of the implications of psychological safety.  
Improving OCDM through reflective practice. 
Roux-Dufort’s (2000) research offered a very simple claim: after a crisis, most 
organizations do not learn very much. While there are many reasons for the claim, Roux-Dufort 
cited several that pertain to the outcomes of this study: (a) crises are minimized or excused 
because their complex and unexpected nature are often considered aberrations from the status 
quo; (b) crises impede cognitive flexibility associated with learning due to stress and anxiety; 
and (c) learning activities are often focused on social or political concerns as opposed to real 
learning. In other words, research suggests crises are difficult, uncomfortable, messy situations 
that we would rather not deal with.  
In spite of organizations’ general distaste for learning from crises, some common 
practices exist. One common practice is the crisis debrief (Lagadec, 1997). Unfortunately, the 
usefulness of debriefs is limited, as Lagadec (1997) found organizations tend to focus their 
learning on deviations from expected results, while at the same time shying away from exposing 
ill-understood aspects of the organization. Under these conditions, debriefings may have little to 
do with truly understanding the decision-making processes and behaviors that have been 
experienced during a crisis. Furthermore, this limited view of crisis learning fails to touch upon 
many of the issues found to be salient in this study: organizational trust, well-being problems that 
impede decision-making, the non-linearity of crisis situations, changing status quos, and others.  
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In contrast to common learning techniques such as debriefings, novel approaches to 
learning may further advance OCDM understandings. For instance, reflective practices have 
been established as an effective way to learn (Husebø, O'Regan, & Nestel, 2015). In reflective 
practice, people learn by thinking about previous knowledge as they evaluate their experiences, 
and therefore they can incorporate those learnings into future actions (Gibbs, 1988). The results 
of this study suggest that reflective practice may provide an effective individual and 
organizational means of learning about OCDM. Through reflective practices, individuals are 
likely to consider the wide range of factors that are germane to OCDM. This study proposes that 
Gibbs’ (1988) six-step reflective cycle may provide a sounds basis for OCDM reflective practice. 
The cycle is described below in the context of OCDM:  
1. Description. What happened? What situations emerged that required decisions?  
2. Feeling. What thoughts and feelings did the decision-maker experience? 
3. Evaluation. What aspects of the situation were thought to be positive or negative? 
4. Analysis. How did (or could) the decision-maker make sense of the situation? Do 
other experiences apply to the situation? Do experiences of other people apply? 
5. Conclusion. What else could have been done.? Is there a general conclusion that can 
be drawn?  
6. Action Plan. In future crises, what can be done, and what can be done differently?  
Certainly, barriers to reflective practice exist. As stated earlier, crises are unpleasant 
matters to deal with. Engaging in reflective practices will take both imagination and courage, as 
the approach presents a new frontier of crisis learning that might yield uncomfortable truths. 
Consequently, it may be that a body of empirical evidence is assembled by researchers before the 
practices are widely acceptable, but this study suggests initiating the effort could be worthwhile. 
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Some Final Words: Implications for Organizational Studies and HRD 
While scholars have observed that the study of crises—and therefore OCDM—have been 
excluded from organizational studies because they are viewed as anomalies, this study suggests 
something different. Crises can impact any organization at any time, and therefore, the ability to 
effectively respond to them is an inherent organizational responsibility. Organizational members 
should not assume they are immune from crises, regardless of how exposed they assume they are 
to various risks.  
The ubiquitous nature of crises is widely recognized by regulators. For example, in the 
United States, the Security and Exchange Commission requires publicly traded organizations to 
disclose significant crisis-related risk factors in their annual reports (Commission Statement, 
2018). Academic and industry research indicates organizational leaders feel high levels of 
pressure to be able manage crises, and have identified unexpected crises as a top strategic risk 
(North Carolina State University & Protiviti, 2019). Organizations are seldom immune from all 
risks and threats. In brief, the phenomenon is universally relevant.  
Furthermore, the absence of crises and OCDM in organizational studies seems to signal 
that only “common” organizational phenomena warrant scholarly attention. This is a curious 
rationale, as it appears to deviate from norms in other scholarly domains. In other scholarly 
areas, improbable but highly impactful phenomena are not ignored: rare diseases (medicine), rare 
mental conditions (psychology), and uncommon merger and acquisition techniques (business) 
are not treated as out-of-bounds. Rather than focus on the absence of crisis and OCDM inclusion 
in academic studies, this researcher is optimistic that there are abundant opportunities to make 
progress and advance knowledge in this area— advances in which human resource development 
(HRD) can play a part.  
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While a myriad of subject matter areas within the HRD domain are likely applicable to 
the advancement of OCDM, one core aspect of HRD is viewed as being highly relevant: 
leadership. Each of the participants involved in this study were, or became, leaders in some 
capacities, often at the highest levels of their organizations. Given that organizational crisis 
decision-making often falls into the responsibility of leaders, it follows that the development of 
crisis leadership capabilities would benefit organizations. Despite this need, Wooten and James 
(2008) suggested leaders have been inadequately prepared to manage crises, both in terms of 
decision-making and other leadership skills.  
 Consequently, the question is asked: what role can HRD play in advancing leaders’ 
OCDM capabilities? A primary role that HRD can play is simply to recognize that crises and 
OCDM are inherent to organizations and are therefore are inherent aspects of leadership. In 
doing so, HRD can support the refinement of relevant leadership competencies, a measure that 
would provide a framework for crisis decision-making (Bolman & Deal, 1997). Furthermore, 
HRD can leverage the community’s vast knowledge of organizational culture to explore the 
effectiveness of crisis leadership styles within various cultures. And to the degree leaders engage 
in strategic planning, Ruona, Chermack, and Lynham (2003) suggested HRD can support the 
development of crisis awareness, as well as policy and procedure development. While only a few 
opportunities have been discussed, recognizing that crises are germane to organizations opens up 
a wide range of opportunities to apply HRD knowledge and research. By engaging in OCDM, 
HRD can play a vital role in protecting people and their organizations.  
Chapter Summary 
 Chapter five has discussed this study’s conclusions and implications. An over-arching 
conclusion reached in this study was that in volatile, uncertain, chaotic, and ambiguous contexts, 
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organizational crisis decision-making can be described as a complex adaptive system (CAS). 
This conclusion is novel in that it departs from traditionally normative and process-based 
explanations of decision-making. A CAS-based model of organizational crisis decision-making 
is proposed. 
 This study further suggests that naturalistic decision-making (NDM) may be influenced 
by past experiences which are not highly similar to real-time conditions. NDM research has 
suggested that people make time-constrained and high-severity decisions by using similar past 
experiences as proxies when determining courses of action. This study suggested that people can 
invoke a variety of past experiences to guide urgent and consequential decision-making, even 
when experiences are not similar to current conditions.  
 This study has also drawn a number of conclusions related to factors that influence 
decision-making. First, personal well-being was described as a significant concern, and was 
often viewed as an organizational matter. Second, peoples’ perceived inability to control a 
situation narrowed the scope of decision-making, thereby decreasing associated stress levels. 
This was an unexpected finding, as research has suggested that the lack of control over a 
situation results in heightened stress levels. Third, group member trust was found to be a 
significant decision factor, suggesting the need for further research into various aspects of 
psychologically safe climates and decision-making. 
 A key implication resulting from this study concerned calls for theorizing within the 
domain of crisis studies. Several scholars have argued that a unifying theory should be developed 
to bring clarity to the domain. However, this study has found that even within a similar context, 
perceptions of crises vary dramatically. Therefore, while a grand theory may be useful, mid-
range and local theories may be appropriate to accommodate the highly unique and contextual 
184 
aspects of various crisis phenomena. Such theorizing could also serve as a platform upon which 
to advance further organizational crisis decision-making research.  
 The practical implications of this study suggest that leaders, managers, and other crisis 
decision-makers will be well-served by standards of practice that incorporate behavioral and 
social decision-making factors. While current standards of practice provide frameworks that 
guide the implementation of various activities, they do not address the myriad of decision-
making factors that are associated with those activities during a crisis. Therefore, this study 
argues for a more expansive view of decision-making within relevant standards of practices.  
 Finally, this chapter has suggested that matters related to organizational crises should be 
more substantially represented within the field of organizational studies. While crises have 
traditionally been viewed by scholars as organizational anomalies, recent trends have suggested 
that the ability to respond effectively to a crisis has become a more common expectation of 
leaders. Because it encompasses a wide-ranging scope of human and organizational dynamics, it 
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Interviews will follow Rowley’s (2012) guidance on initiating discussions: 
Researcher introduction: I will introduce myself and provide a brief description of my 
background. I will then discuss why I am conducting this research, and why it is of interest to 
others.  
Interview format: I will describe the estimated length of the interview, seek permission to use an 
audio-recorder, and remind them that they may decline to answer any questions.  
Informed consent: At the beginning of each interview, participants will be asked to review the 
consent form, and to acknowledge consent by signing the consent form before the interview 
commenced.  
Aims and objectives: I will review aims of the research as a way to create interest and to 
establish a wide frame for interview questions.  
Purpose & relation to research 
questions 
Question 
Frame the case, establish personal 
context, gain an initial sense of the 
person’s role identity 
1. What was your role during the time of the fires?  
• (probe for description of organization and key 
responsibilities) 
2. What is your role now?  
• (probe for description of current organization, if different) 
3. Prior to the fires, had you experienced similar situations?  
• (Probes: what was your role? How did that influence you?)  
Identify an initial decision for 
purposes of establishing a 
foundation for the person’s SM 
and DM processes and behaviors. 
(We’ll start by talking about a specific decision that you dealt 
with…) 
4. What did you see as your most important decision during the 
initial stages of the fire?  
• (probe for why, what was driving the importance: 
consequences, pressures, time, other?) 
Examine SM and DM aspects of 
the initial decision. 
Attend to decision factors focus 
and priorities. 
Attend to SM behaviors and 
(Talk me through that particular decision…) 
5. What sort of information was important to you, and why?  
• (Probes: consequences, or other?) 
6. How did you get information?   
7. What did you recognize as key indicators that helped you 
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processes. understand what was going on?  
• (Probes: What were they? How did they help you understand 
what was going on?) 
8. What aspects of that decision did you find the most difficult or 
challenging?  
• (Probes: time constraints, stress, social pressures, 
procedures, changing situation, lack of info, other) 
9. How did you arrive at your decision?  
• (Probes: evaluation? NDM? other?) 
10. How do you perceive the outcomes of that decision? (would 
you make the same decision again?) 
Examine ongoing SM and DM. 
Attend to decision factors focus 
and priorities. 





-Work rules and procedures 
 
Attend to changes in SM/DM 
behaviors and processes. 
 
(Let’s take a step back and look at the big picture now…) 
11. Over the course of the fire, what other types of decisions 
became the most important to you?  
• (Probe: What were then and why were they important? What 
had changed and how did you know that?) 
12. Did the way in which you collected information change as the 
event progressed?  
• (Probe for how information was obtained, and what was 
most importation)   
13. Did certain key indicators that help you understand what was 
going on?  
• (Probes: What were they? How did they help you understand 
what was going on?) 
14. What aspects of the ongoing need to make decisions did you 
find the most difficult or challenging?  
• (Probes: time constraints, stress, social pressures, 
procedures, changing situation, lack of info, other) 
15. How did you arrive at your decisions?  
• (Probes: evaluation? NDM? other? Multiple?) 
16. How do you perceive the outcomes of those decision?  
• (Probes: would you make the same decisions again?) 
General recollections and 
comment to identify other 
(Again, taking a broad look at your experience during the fires…) 
17. Thinking back on your first important decision, can you review 
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retrospective insights. why that was meaningful to you?  
18. Looking back at (…the key issues we’ve been talking about), 
do you think you would have done anything different? Why?  
19. Would you have any recommendations for other people that 









The following table presents all codes used during this study, in alphabetical order. This list was 
extracted from the Atlas.ti project file associated with this study. 
  
Code Description 
Action This code represents things that were done that might 
have been a result of a specific decision. 
Aftermath Outcomes related to the long-term effects of the event. 
Anger The presence or indication of participant anger. 
Antecedent conditions for DM General description of pre-existing conditions that could 
have established a particular "DM environment” (my 
term); potentially related to sensemaking. 
Assumption: get over it A participant assumption that people should be able to 
“get over” fire issues and move on. 
Assumption: lack of 
appreciation 
A participant assumption that the general population 
doesn’t have an appreciation for firefighting sacrifices. 
Assumption: this will never 
happen 
A participant assumption that this type of event could 
not occur or was not foreseen. 
Bias, Assumption. 
Preconception 
The indications that biases may have been influencing a 
decision or a belief. 
Calm The mention of calm, or the appearance of calm in a 
situation during which some level of chaos, uncertainty, 
or excitement could be expected. 
Changing conditions Reflects dynamic event conditions; describes the nature 
of the crisis. 
Changing decision Instances in which decisions were changed. This might 
provide insight into “why” decisions change…perhaps 
from a systems perspective. 
Chaos The mention or appearance of chaos. In the absence of 
chaos, I used the code “calm". 
Clarity The mention, perception, or appearance of situational 
clarity. 
Cohesion and trust Cohesion and trust can be internal or external, and can 
involve the team, org, community, or institution. 
Connectedness or “sense of community” might be a 
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good way to think about this. 
Commitment The presence or absence of doing something based on a 
feeling of commitment to the organization or its 
stakeholders. 
Communications context Relates to the role of communications or the perception 
of its importance in the event. 
Community relationships Relating to the relationship between the participants and 
the communities in which they live/work. 
Comparative retrospection An initial code that is designed to capture the 
participant’s view of their experience in relation to past 
experiences or to those of others during the same event. 
Complexity Captures a characteristic of the event as mentioned by 
the participant. 
Confirmation bias Participant’s preconceived ideas about “how things are". 
Confliction Relates to the idea that the participant was conflicted 
about a decision (or not). 
Control The mention of control (over being able to do 
something) as being present or absent. 
Coping The mention or appearance of coping mechanisms, 
whether in terms of long term effects, or decision 
making. 
Decision Possible decision points. These might be “actions”, or 
should be combine with “actions”.  
Decision avoidance Participant’s reluctance to make a decision. 
Decision ecology, influences Comments related to overall decision ecology. 
Decision paralysis Participant inability to make a decision due to 
“paralysis". 
Economic forces Economic influences on SM/DM. 
Emotional or psychological 
issues 
The mention of emotional support as a need or influence. 
Establishing new relationships Relationships that participants developed through the 
course of the fires. 
Evaluating alternatives Relates to vigilance and evaluation of options…classic 
normative DM model. 
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Event description Quotes helping to describe some situation or reality at a 
point in time. 
Event speed Relating to how fast the event was perceived as 
progressing. 
Existing relationships Participant’s previously established relationships, 
internal and external to the organization. 
Financial Outcomes Loss of dollars as an outcome. 
Fire description Descriptors of fire behavior. 
Fire response description A description of how firefighters responded to the fire. 
Human health and well-being A description of how the fire impacted people’s health 
and well-being. 
Human or animal safety Outcomes associated with health impacts, fatalities, etc. 
Identity Identity as a factor in terms of decision ecology or 
outcomes. 
Immediacy The degree of time urgency related to a problem or 
decision. 
Imposed timeline Time pressure resulting from a timeline established by 
the participant or someone else, and not necessarily 
driven by the occurrence of an outcome. 
Information inputs Relates to the types of information inputs received by the 
participant…or not received. 
Information seeking Explicit search for new information to inform decision 
making. 
Initial action Things that the participant or organization did early on in 
the event. 
Initial impacts Impacts to the organization or individual early on in the 
event. 
Initial notification When/how the participant became aware of the event. 
Is this a Crisis? Relates to how the person or organization viewed a 
particular point in time (early on, now, etc.). 
Key Memories Key “take-aways” recalled by the participant. 
Leadership, management Can relate to leadership and/or management importance; 
or support such as overt actions taken by leadership to 
support the decision-maker. Could have been before, 
during or after the event. 
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Lessons learned, retrospection Various observations made when thinking back on the 
event. 
Love of the job A participant trait demonstrating love for the job…may 
be related to commitment? 
Luck The mention or indication of "luck" (good or bad) being 
a factor in a situation related to a decision (or eliminating 
the need for a decision). 
Misinformation Describes information received that was not accurate or 
reliable. 
Mitigation Things done during the event to mitigate harm. 
Modes The idea that you are in a particular mental state that 
corresponds with your role/responsibilities at that time. 
Observations of other's 
experiences 
Various observations of others’ experiences. 
Ongoing impacts Crisis-related impacts that haven’t been resolved yet. 
Operational outcomes The disruption of routine or important business or 
organizational functions. 
Opportunity Situations in which participants saw opportunities to 
improve things as a result of the situation. 
Organizational Culture Aspects of the participant’s organizational culture. 
Organizational effectiveness Aspects of the participant’s organizational effectiveness 
or ineffectiveness. 
Organizational Description Comments that help describe the organization. 
Organizational Response Descriptions of how participant organizational 
responded to the event. 
Outcome Severity The notion that the event posed severe outcomes. This 
could also relate to the uniqueness of the nature of the 
possible outcomes. 
Participant Role or 
Responsibility 
The role of the participant at the time of the event. 
Past Events, Experiences Events that the participant might have drawn from 
during this event. This could also refer to the lack of 
experience in a certain area. 
Personal impacts Personal impacts, or potential impacts, to the participant. 
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Personality, demeanor, style Relates to the personality and demeanor of the 
participant; could be self-perceived, perceived by others, 
or perceived by me. 
Plausible alternatives Consideration of “what could happen” 
Politics Political influences on SM or DM. 
Population response/impacts A general description of how the population responded 
to the fire. 
Population/community 
outcomes 
General types of impacts to the local population. 
Preparedness measures This can involve planning, team structure, assigned 
roles, exercises, proactive mitigation measures, etc. 
Pride The mention or appearance of participant or team pride 
with respect to how the situation was managed. 
Prioritization Discussion of prioritizing actions or outcomes. 
Problem solving, Decisiveness, 
NDM 
The notion that a particular issue is a problem to be 
solved rather than a situation requiring a decision. These 
were also characterized by decisiveness. 
Professional experience Experience held by the participant. 
Property damage outcome Fire damage to structures or property. 
Property destruction description Descriptions of property damage (structures, vehicles, 
other). 
Real time concern Issues deemed important by the person or the 
organization at the time of the event. 
Resulting outcomes/new 
normals 
The state of something post-event. 
Retrospective information Information that is known now but wasn’t known then 
(and could have impacted a decision). 
Rules, Procedures Rules and procedures as an SM/DM factor. 
Self-perception How people view themselves, whether socially, role-
based or attribute based 
Sensemaking Represents times in which the participant “made sense” 
of a situation or drew conclusions about something.  
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Stakeholder Pressures DM pressures from internal (superiors) or external 
(stakeholders). 
Stress Response Comments related to the presence or degree of stress, 
anxiety, worry, fear, adrenaline, or similar feelings. 
Tactical actions/decisions This is a broad code intended to catch actions that could 
have implicitly involved key decisions, but those might 
not have been discussed by the participant.  
Time constraints Instances in which time pressures were mentioned or 
were implied. 
Time in the group The amount of time that the participant has been a 
member of their work group or organization. 
Unbounded time The sense that no timeline can be associated with a 
decision or action. 
Uncertainty Comments related to the state of uncertainty at the time; 
could relate to the absence of information. 
Unexpected The extent to which something was or wasn’t expected 
to happen. 
Uniqueness The degree to which something was unprecedented. 
Unknown time Instances in which a participant did not have a sense of a 











To: (participant name) 
Subject: Invitation to Participate in Research Study 
 
Dear (participant name),  
My name is Cliff Thomas; I am a doctoral candidate at Colorado State University in the School 
of Education and would like to invite you to participate in a dissertation research project. In 
general, my study will explore how people make decisions for their organizations during times of 
crisis. Crises have been¾ and continue to be¾ challenging situations for organizations, yet 
many researchers believe that there have been few new insights to help people improve decision-
making. This study is designed to produce new insights into crisis decision-making. As such, I 
am hoping to interview several people whose organizations were affected by the 2017 Northern 
California wildfires, and who made a critical decision associated with that event. The Principal 
Investigator for this research is my advisor, Thomas Chermack, Ph.D., Professor, in the School 
of Education at Colorado State University, and my advisor is Russell Korte, Ph.D., Professor, in 
the Graduate School of Education and Human Development at The George Washington 
University. 
It is my understanding that you were involved in critical decision-making for (organization) 
during the wildfires. I am hoping to conduct a 1 hour interview with you at a time and place that 
is convenient. The purpose of the interview will be to explore various aspects of critical 
decisions that you made. There is no intent to “judge” decisions; rather, I hope to understand 
how you engaged in the decision process, what influenced you, and how you went about arriving 
at your decisions. I have a short list of questions to ask, but I expect that our discussion will be 
flexible.  
The time required of you is limited to a single interview lasting about one hour. You will have 
the option of reviewing the transcript of your interview.  This may take you an addition 45 
minutes - 1 hour.  If you are interested in participating in this study, I will provide you with an 
informed consent and answer any questions you might have about the study.  
If you would like to participate, or if you have any questions, please contact me at 
cliff.thomas@colostate.edu, or call me at 720-837-4338. If you have questions about your rights 
as a volunteer in this research, please contact the CSU Institutional Review Board at 
RICRO_IRB@mail.colostate.edu; 970-491-1553. 
Sincerely, 
Cliff Thomas       Thomas Chermack, Ph.D. 
Doctoral Candidate      Professor 
Co-Principal Investigator      Principal Investigator 
Organizational Learning, Performance, and Change  CSU School of Education 













Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
Colorado State University 
 
TITLE OF STUDY: An Examination of Decision-Making During Organizational Crises: A Case Study of 
the Northern California Firestorm 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Thomas Chermack, Ph.D Advisor, Organizational Learning, Performance 
and Change; Colorado State University; Email: thomas.chermack@colostate.edu 
 
CO-PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Cliff Thomas, doctoral candidate, School of Education; Organizational 
Learning, Performance, and Change; Email: cliff.thomas@colostate.edu 
 
WHY AM I BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH? You are being asked to participate 
in this research study because of your experiences related to the October 2017 wildfires in Northern 
California. Specifically, the investigator is interested in interviewing people who believe that they made at 
least one high-stakes decision for their organizations during the wildfires. A high-stakes decision is one in 
which you believe that a decision could avert or lead to severe outcomes for your organization. 
 
WHO IS DOING THE STUDY? This study is being conducted by Cliff Thomas, doctoral candidate, School 
of Education (Organizational Learning, Performance, and Change Program) with the guidance of his 
Advisor, Russell Korte, Ph.D and Principal Investigator, Thomas Chermack, Ph.D. 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? The purpose of this study is to explore how people engage 
in crisis decision-making for their organizations, with a focus on the processes and behaviors associated 
with decision-making. The purpose of the study is not to examine whether decisions made were 
appropriate or not, or to evaluate the quality of decisions.   
 
WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST? This study will 
involve an interview with you at a convenient private or semi-private location; the interview should last 
approximately 1 hour. At your discretion, you may review the interview transcripts; this review is estimated 
to take 45 minutes to 1 hour. The only member of the research team expected to be present is Cliff 
Thomas. With your permission, the interview will be audiotaped. 
 
WHAT WILL I BE ASKED TO DO? You will be asked to answer questions about a high-stakes decision-
making experience during the October 2017 Northern California wildfires. You will be asked to describe 
various aspects of your decision-making, such as what you perceived decision outcomes to be, the 
factors that were influencing you, what pressures you experienced, what choices you felt were available 
to you, and how you felt about making the decision.  
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?  There are no anticipated risks associated 
with this study. It is possible that discussing a difficult decision might be uncomfortable. It is not possible to 
identify all potential risks in research procedures, but the researcher has taken reasonable safeguards to 
minimize any known and potential, but unknown, risks. However, if at any point you wish to stop the 
interview, you are free to do so. 
 
ARE THERE ANY BENEFITS FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? By participating in this study, you 
might gain new insights that will assist in personal and professional settings involving decision-making. 
Other benefits might be offered in for the form of opportunities to reflect on issues discussed. Also, you 
might gain knowledge if you read the results of this study.   
 
DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY? Your participation in this research is voluntary. If you 
decide to participate in the study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participating at any time 
without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.   
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